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THEIR IMPERIAL MAJESTIES THE EMPEROR AND EMPRESS OF JAPAN

JAPAN IN THE WORLD OF TO-DAY

BY
ARTHUR J. BROWN



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By ARTHUR J. BROWN

THE NEW ERA IN THE PHILIPPINES
THE MASTERY OF THE FAR EAST
JAPAN IN THE WORLD OF TODAY
RUSSIA IN TRANSFORMATION
NEW FORCES IN OLD CHINA
THE EXPECTATION OF SIAM
THE CHINESE REVOLUTION
A TOUR OF ASIA
UNITY AND MISSIONS
THE FOREIGN MISSIONARY
THE WHY AND HOW OF FOREIGN MISSIONS
RISING CHURCHES IN NON-CHRISTIAN LANDS
A SECOND VISIT TO CHINA, JAPAN AND KOREA
THE NEARER AND FARTHER EAST (Joint author)

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FOREWORD

MODERN Japan is universally recognized as one of the major powers of the world. It was classed as such at the "Peace" Conference in Paris, and it has this standing in the League of Nations. Whatever nation may ultimately become the dominant power in Asia, Japan is the dominant power today, and every present indication points to her retention of that dominance for a long time to come. A nation which, within the memory of men still living, has risen from obscurity to such a commanding position merits the thoughtful study of people in other lands.

The materials for this volume were gathered during an administrative relationship of over thirty years with missionary work in Japan, two visits to that country, an extensive correspondence, and many personal conferences with Japanese of all classes, and with Americans and Europeans who are or who have been in Japan as missionaries, business men, editors, teachers, consuls and ambassadors. Part of the first chapter was used as an article in *Asia*, and such sections of a former work on the Far East, published in 1921, as are still applicable, have been revised, brought down to date and incorporated. Some controverted questions have necessarily been discussed, but the author has sought to be fair. Any one who tries to keep in the middle of the road between those who regard the Japanese as "the most perfect of peoples" and those who regard them as "varnished savages" must expect to be assailed from both sides. The author is not conscious of any desire to magnify either the virtues or the defects of the Japanese, but he frankly confesses to a warm personal interest in them, and to a hearty admiration for the qualities which have enabled them to achieve the high position in the world they have now attained.

A. J. B.

New York City.

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I

WORLD CONDITIONS THAT HAVE AFFECTED JAPAN

THE great events of the ancient world occurred around the Mediterranean Sea. The great events of the modern world have occurred around the Atlantic Ocean. The great events of the twentieth century will undoubtedly occur around the Pacific Ocean. In the vast region of the Far East live over five hundred million people, a third of the population of the earth. Europe and America, absorbed in their own affairs, were long ignorant of or indifferent to those teeming myriads. Missionaries, traders and an occasional traveler were interested in them, but the average white man, when he thought of them at all, deemed them "uncivilized heathen."

There has been too much of a disposition to think of Asiatics as a mass, almost as one would regard herds of cattle or shoals of fish. Why not rather think of them as individuals, as men of like passions with ourselves? They have the same hopes and fears, the same joys and sorrows, the same susceptibility to pain and the same capacity for happiness. The white man complacently imagines that he is superior to the Asiatic. But Benjamin Kidd declares that "we shall have to set aside many of our old ideas on the subject. Neither in respect alone of colour, nor of descent, nor even of the possession of high intellectual capacity, can science give us any warrant for speaking of one race as superior to another." Superiority is the result, not so much of anything inherent in one people as distinguished from another, as of the operation upon a race and within it of certain uplifting forces. Any superiority that the white nations now possess is due to the

action upon them of these forces. But they can be brought to bear upon Asia as well as upon Europe and America.

Occidental and Oriental alike need to realize that men of other lands are brother men with all the possibilities of kindred human souls, to cultivate the catholicity of spirit which sees our common humanity beneath external distinctions. Ruskin reminds us that the mud from the street of a manufacturing town is composed of clay, sand, soot and water; that the clay may be purified into the radiance of the sapphire; that the sand may be developed into the beauty of the opal; that the soot may be crystallized into the brilliance of the diamond, and that the water may be changed into a star of snow. So the lowliest men in all lands may, by the power of the Divine Spirit, be ennobled into dignity of character. We shall get along best with the Asiatic if we remember that he is a human being like ourselves, responsive to kindness, appreciative of justice and capable of moral transformation. He differs from us not in the fundamental things of life but only in the superficial things that are the result of environment. From this viewpoint, we can say with Shakespeare:

*"There is some sort of goodness in things evil,
Would men observingly distil it out."*

Those who are wont to refer so contemptuously to the Asiatic might profitably recall that when, in Dickens' *Christmas Carol*, the misanthropic Scrooge says of the poor and suffering: "If he be like to die, he had better do it and decrease the surplus population,"—the Ghost sternly replies: "Man, if man you be at heart, not adamant, forbear that wicked cant until you have discovered what the surplus is and where it is. It may be that in the sight of heaven, you are more worthless and less fit to live than millions like this poor man's child."

It is a significant and revolutionary fact of our age that the common man has begun to think for himself and to demand

the recognition of his real or imaginary rights. For uncounted centuries he had seen that all power was vested in a ruling class, and that he was regarded as having no rights which his superiors were bound to respect.

That day has passed. Viscount Morley, in his *Recollections*, well says that alike with those who adore and those who detest it, the dominating force in the living mind of Europe for a long generation after the overthrow of the French monarchy in 1830 has been that marked way of looking at things, feeling them, handling them, judging main actors in them, for which, with a hundred kaleidoscopic turns, the accepted name is Liberalism. "Respect for the dignity and worth of the individual is its root. It stands for pursuit of social good against class interest or dynastic interest. It stands for the subjection to human judgment of all claims of external authority."

The human will cannot be kept in bondage in the era of the printing-press, the public school and the open Bible. It is hazardous for a dominant class to educate a subjugated one. And yet under modern conditions it would be dangerous not to. This erstwhile abject serf and peasant, this cringing servant, this sweaty toiler, has now become conscious of his power. The giant has awakened from the sleep of ages. He sees that he forms the huge majority of the human race. He asks himself why he should longer submit to the lot which his masters have hitherto imposed upon him. He refuses to tolerate the divine right of kings and aristocracy. He no longer permits capital to dictate his wages and hours of labour.

This force has banished kings from North and South America, France, Portugal, Russia, Germany, Austria and Greece; wrested power from throne and aristocracy in several other lands; and convinced remaining sovereigns that, if they desire to keep their crowns, they must walk carefully as constitutional monarchs. The race is emerging once for all from the stage of development in which, irrespective of personal qualifications, a few persons can be permitted to arrogate to

themselves the right to rule as they please millions of their fellow men because they imagine themselves to be divinely appointed rulers by virtue of descent from ancestors, some of whom were dissolute idlers and most of whom, if compelled to earn their own living, would never have become anything more than clerks behind the ribbon counters of department stores. There have been in the past and there are today some really great kings who would have risen to eminence if they had been born in obscurity, as indeed some of them were; but they have been few in number.

It is not surprising that some of the manifestations of this spirit of independence are violent. The first taste of power is apt to be intoxicating, and intoxicated men are seldom rational. The degree of violence is usually proportionate to the degree of injustice against which a revolution reacts. Have autocracy and capital never been unjust? Bolshevism began as a half crazed democracy running amuck, the revolt of the unreasoning mob against the oppression of an arrogant ruling class. The world is witness that it is as autocratic, as cruel and ruthless, as the autocracy which it has displaced.

We are familiar with the effects of this rising spirit in Europe and America, but we need to take into account the fact that it has spread to Asia. President Wilson's phrase, "the self-determination of peoples," ran around the world like a prairie fire. Everywhere subject classes raised their heads. The psychology of the race has changed. Everywhere one notes the impact of revolutionary forces. A new spirit is abroad. It is awakening the minds of men. It is widening their vision. It is begetting impatience of oppression and misgovernment. It is creating new wants, developing new ambitions. It is declaring in trumpet tones that the greatest thing in the world is not property but humanity, not money but life. The revolutionary forces of the modern world, which exerted their first reconstructive power in England and America, are manifesting their inevitable transforming power in other lands. Men have become impatient of conditions in which they for-

merly acquiesced either through callous indifference or a sense of helplessness. A stern protest against misgovernment and oppression has been engendered, and it is overturning and recasting ancient institutions and deeply rooted customs.

Recent events have given new significance to these dense populations in the Far East. The mighty transforming forces of the modern world have been operating upon those vast and, hitherto, comparatively stagnant masses of humanity, and a transformation correspondingly stupendous is taking place. The Orient has awakened from the torpor of ages. Continental Asia is literally in convulsion. There the breaking down of old systems and the readjustment to new conditions are still in process. India and Egypt are in fierce commotion, and the British Government finds itself confronted by administrative difficulties of a more formidable character than any which have arisen since the Sepoy Rebellion. Changes have taken place in Turkey and Persia which would have been deemed incredible a few years ago. Koreans and Filipinos are demanding independence. All over Asia the time has gone when the foreigner can with impunity kick a coolie. No longer does the white man face a cringing, helpless Asia, but an alert, resolute, resentful people. Substitute Asiatic for "Jew" in Shylock's defiance if you would know the spirit of Asia today:—

Hath not an Asiatic hands, organs, dimensions, senses, affections, passions; fed with the same food, hurt with the same weapons, subject to the same diseases, healed by the same means, warmed and cooled by the same summer and winter, as a Christian is? If you prick us do we not bleed? If you tickle us do we not laugh? If you poison us do we not die? And if you wrong us shall we not revenge?

The western world is now beginning, but only beginning, to realize the portentous possibilities that are inevitably involved. We should not lament but welcome the growth of an independent spirit. It is a sign of life. Better an ill-regulated

aspiration than utter despair. If some of its first manifestations are tragic, as they were in the French Revolution, after a time the agitated waters will subside, and better conditions will result, even as they did in France. The evils of a wrong use of power by those unaccustomed to its exercise should be corrected, but it would be folly to imagine that this can be done by force. Let us remember the lesson not only of the French but of the Russian Revolution.

The upheaval in China is a case in point. Into that chaotic, seething, struggling mass of humanity the new leaven is working. What is taking place there is not different in kind but only in degree from that which is taking place in many western nations. The new wine of democracy has been poured into the old skins of autocracy, and of course they have burst. The people who have hitherto been a heterogeneous mass of individuals with hardly more unity than particles of sand, a people who have been proverbially conservative and slow moving, have suddenly shown a national spirit that would have been deemed inconceivable a short time ago. The present chaos is not surprising. Such a huge mass could not reasonably be expected to find itself at once. But the old conditions can never be restored. For better or for worse China has entered upon a new era. Such a revolution is not to be adequately described by a mere cataloguing of its particular events, an account of a battle here, the burning of a city there, and a diplomatic negotiation yonder. These, however interesting in themselves, are but the concomitants of a movement which can be adequately viewed only as a whole.

Consider that the revolutionary forces which operated upon western nations one at a time are operating simultaneously upon Asia. In Europe, the intellectual revival which broke up the stagnation of the Middle Ages, widened men's knowledge, and stimulated their minds began in the thirteenth century. Very slowly did Europe bestir itself after the torpor of the mediæval "Dark Ages." It took the violent shaking up of the Crusades to rouse men from their lethargy and open the

way for a real revival of learning. Yet after the Crusades, progress was slow for several centuries. Indeed down to the eighteenth century there were members of the English Parliament who could neither read nor write. Even in alleged enlightened Europe and America, there is still a large substratum of humanity down to which the facts and truths of modern science have only begun to percolate.

The religious reformation which quickened and purified men's spiritual faculties came in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries. Martin Luther in the Protestant Reformation liberated a force of mighty transforming power. Ignatius Loyola inaugurated a counter Revolution which stirred the Roman Catholic Church to new energy. Four hundred years have passed since Luther nailed his ninety-five theses on the church door at Wittenberg and since Loyola proclaimed his message; but does the religious situation in Europe and America justify belief that the white peoples have adequately adapted themselves to the operation of a free spiritual force?

The political revolution which upheaved the masses, gave rise to democracy, and opened the eyes of the masses of common men to the power that they might wield, began in the eighteenth century. Is it finished? Americans are wont to speak of their country's institutions as the highest type of democratic self-government. But Elihu Root, in an address before the Constitutional Convention of New York characterized "the government of this State" as "an invisible government" of "party bosses." Gilbert Murray says that "hatred of the existing world order is more rife than it has been for over a thousand years." Bolshevist dictators rule half of Europe, and Bolshevist sympathizers are active in the other half. However confident one may be as to the ultimate outcome, one is blind indeed who imagines that western nations have yet successfully adapted themselves to the revolutionary force of democracy.

The industrial revolution caused by the invention of the steam engine, the telegraph, the telephone and other inventions

and discoveries, came in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. A portly volume would be required even to outline the operation of this force upon industrial organization and individual and social life. It is difficult for men of this generation to place themselves in imagination back in the days when houses were lighted by candles, cloth was woven by the women of the family, journeys were made by stage coaches, letters were borne by messengers, tools, utensils and appliances of almost every kind were made by hand, when newspapers criticised the first bathtub in 1840 as "a luxurious and undemocratic novelty," physicians denounced it as "a menace to health," Philadelphia in 1843 passed an ordinance prohibiting bathing between November 1 and March 15, and an English news letter vouchsafed the interesting information that "Queen Elizabeth hath built herself a bath where she doth bathe herself once a month whether she requires it or not."

But the period of transition has been and still is a stormy one. Mobs assailed the first railway trains. Ridicule was heaped upon the idea of propelling boats by steam. The introduction of the cotton gin was attended by vehement protests. In almost every case the substitution of the machine for the human hand was followed by riots. As large capital and mass production by machinery began to eliminate the small producer and concentrate industrial power in great corporations, the discontent of the masses grew. Reports for the United States list an average of 1,470 strikes a year for twenty-five years and an average of 3,342 for a recent half decade. In a single year the number of striking men in America and five European countries was 7,638,738 and the number of working days affected was 99,054,660. Almost everywhere today the strife between labour and capital is acute. In the face of these facts can we say that the industrial revolution among western nations is completed and life adjusted to the changed conditions?

I am not a pessimist. I am aware that great progress has been made. I believe that the mighty revolutionary forces to

which I have referred are essentially constructive and that they are, slowly I grant, but nevertheless surely working toward a better day for humanity. My point now is that the rise and operation of these revolutionary forces in western lands were scattered through nearly five centuries, so that their impact was gradual and people had time to make at least partial adjustment to one force before another began to operate.

Now the tremendously significant fact is that all these revolutionary forces have been operating at once upon the vast populations of Asia. Fifty years ago China and Japan were so distant, isolated and vaguely known that they had no appreciable effect upon American life. Even the stupendously frightful Tai-ping Rebellion was almost unheeded as a remote event of small concern to the rest of the world. Hunter Corbett and Calvin Mateer, young missionaries who sailed for China in 1863, were six months in reaching their destination in a sailing vessel of small tonnage, few conveniences and no comforts. In our day, such vessels have given way to swift steamers. New York is nearer Tokyo and Peking than California once was. Modern means of communication have brought Europe and America to Asia and resulted in an inrush of western influences which have exerted enormous revolutionary power.

Western manufacturers began to send to the Far East their locomotives, steam engines, electrical apparatus, labour-saving machinery and other products of American inventive genius. As Japanese Samurai and Chinese Mandarins saw foreign clocks, watches, telephones, electric lights and magazine rifles, they wanted them too. At a court dinner in the Summer Palace near Peking, the distinguished guests cut York ham with Sheffield knives and drank French wines out of German glasses. People of all ranks, who but a decade or two ago were satisfied with the crudest appliances of primitive life, are now learning to use steam and electrical appliances, to like Oregon flour, Chicago beef, Pittsburgh pickles and London

jam, and to see the utility of foreign wire, nails, cutlery, drugs, paints and chemicals.

Coastwise and river trade had been conducted for centuries by slow and clumsy junks. Steamships took their business and brought beggary to their owners. Millions of coolies earned a living by transporting merchandise on their backs or in wheelbarrows. Then came the foreigner's railway and a single train did the work of a thousand coolies. So ominous was the excitement of the populace when, in 1876, the first railroad was constructed in China, a British line fourteen miles long from Shanghai to Wu-sung, that the Government bought it, tore up the roadbed, and dumped the engines into the river. When railway building was resumed in 1895, every mile had to be constructed under the protection of foreign bayonets. In Japan, railways were built under the direct supervision of the Government and the disciplined obedience of the people prevented trouble. But the social and economic results were no less striking than in China. One can imagine the changes in an Asiatic community that are involved in the substitution of the locomotive for the coolie as a motive power, the freight car for the wheelbarrow in the shipment of produce, and the passenger coach for the cart and mule-litter in the transportation of people. Orientals, who for uncounted centuries had plodded along in perfect contentment, soon found that the whole order of living to which they and their fathers had become adapted was being shaken to its foundation.

Many other illustrations of a changed economic situation might be cited. The Asiatic of today demands a hundred things that his grandfather never heard of. When he goes to the shops to buy them, he finds that his daily earnings, although larger than they formerly were, are not sufficient to pay for what he wants, and he is sullen. The new condition, however, is on the whole beneficial. There are indeed vicious influences accompanying it. But surely it is for good that the farmers of Shantung and Kyushu can now ship their produce to other lands and with the proceeds vary the eternal

monotony of a rice diet; that the sewing-machine has lessened the drudgery of weary women; that kerosene lamps make evenings in humble homes more cheerful than a burning rag in a saucer of bean oil; that people have discovered the advantages of roads over rutty, corkscrew paths, of sanitation over heaps of putrid garbage, and of wooden floors over filth-encrusted ground; and that post-offices and telegraph lines are an improvement over private messengers or chance wayfarers.

The political ideas of the modern world have also surged into the Far East with all their revolutionary force. As the vastness of the field and its resources became better known, western nations eagerly sought to extend their influence into it. They deemed it necessary, also, to protect their growing commercial interests. So the nations of Europe sent envoys and warships. Their arrival precipitated a new controversy, for these Asiatic governments, not being accustomed to receive the agents of other nations except as inferiors, were not disposed to accord the white men any different treatment. The result was a series of collisions and, in China, territorial aggressions that were numerous enough to infuriate a more peaceably disposed people than the Chinese.

The intellectual ideas of Europe and America exerted an influence which, while more silent, were even more persuasive and powerful. The wall of isolation once broken, a veritable deluge of western thought poured in. The foreigner established schools in which the mental acquisitions of other lands were made available to the rising generation. The printing-press spread the new ideas far and wide. The governments, unwilling to leave the education of their young people to foreigners, began to develop educational systems of their own. Thousands of elementary schools, hundreds of middle schools, and scores of colleges and technical schools sprang up. Ambitious students made their way to educational institutions in Europe and America. Voltaire, John Stuart Mill, Charles Darwin, Herbert Spencer, Henri Bergson, William James, and other writers on science, economics, sociology and philosophy

were eagerly read. It is estimated that ninety-five per cent of the Chinese who received part of their education in other lands became, on their return, leaders of revolutionary thought. A dispatch from Shanghai to the *New York Times* of April 14, 1927, stated that "the young leaders are mostly from American universities, with two or three from British universities." We shall discuss Japanese education in another chapter. Suffice it here to state that everywhere throughout the mighty mass of population in the Far East the ideas of the West are working and that an intellectual awakening of stupendous proportions is taking place.

The world's attention is focussed on political and commercial forces; but another force is operating, with less noise but with more depth, the force of Christian missions. It is the most pervasive and reconstructive of all forces. Others effect changes in externals; but this effects an internal transformation not only of the individual but of society. The magnitude that this force has attained in the countries commonly grouped as the Far East, (China, Korea, Japan, Siam and the Philippines) is indicated by the fact that Protestant Missions are represented by 9,903 foreign missionaries, 37,171 native workers, 19,285 congregations with 1,363,297 communicants and definitely known adherents, 9,222 schools and colleges with 306,514 students, 923 hospitals and dispensaries which treated in a recent typical year 3,706,817 patients, and 37 printing-presses whose annual output of Bibles, books, tracts, and periodicals aggregates 107,700,000 pages. Roman Catholic Missions report 1,944,281 baptized members, including children, many schools, and an extensive work.

This is wonderful when one considers the comparatively brief period in which missionary work has been conducted, the difficulty of inducing people to change their hereditary beliefs, the limited resources of the mission boards, and the fact that they have had the support of only a part of the churches in Europe and America. There are more Christians in Japan alone than there were in the Roman Empire a cen-

tury after Pentecost. Now that Christianity has become rooted in these far eastern lands, and with increasingly competent native as well as foreign leadership, rapidly increasing influence may reasonably be expected.

It would be difficult to overestimate the silent and yet mighty energy represented by this teaching, steadily continued through a long series of years and representing the life labours of thousands of devoted men and women. True, the number of Christians is yet small in comparison with the immense populations of the countries concerned; but the Gospel of Christ may be compared to a seed which, lodged in a crevice of a rock, thrusts its thread-like roots into tiny fissures but in time rends the rock asunder and firmly holds a stately tree.

In addition to their direct results in the spiritual sphere of religion, missions have effected striking changes in the popular attitude toward woman, in the status of the wife, in the education of girls, in the care of the sick, and in creating a sentiment against harmful drugs. William Elliot Griffis, who lived in Japan in the old feudal days, says that conditions at that time were unspeakably bad—ignorance, squalor, disease, and immorality. He declares that old Japan had no principle of regeneration, and he quotes approvingly a statement of Dr. Verbeck's that new Japan came from across the sea with missionaries. The defective and dependent classes were almost wholly neglected until the missionaries came with their humanitarian teaching and Christlike ministries. It was the missionary who first showed interest in the blind, the deaf and dumb, the orphaned, the leprous, the sick, and the insane. Institutions for their care are scattered all over Asia, and all of them were founded either directly by missionaries or indirectly as the result of their teachings. That eminent Japanese, Dr. Nitobe, after recounting the indebtedness of Japan to Christianity for schools, hospitals, and churches, added: "The leaders of the campaign to promote sanitation and hygiene, of the anti-prostitution movement, and of the temperance societies are recruited from among the Christians."

Marquis Okuma publicly said: "Christian work in Japan has been the means of putting into these fifty years an advance equivalent to that of one hundred years. Japan has a history of two thousand five hundred years, but never took wide views nor entered upon wide work. Only by the coming of the West in its missionary representatives and by the spread of the Gospel did the nation enter upon world-wide thoughts and world-wide work. This is a great result of the Christian spirit."

The beneficent influence that Foreign Missions exert in promoting international friendship was expressed by the late Mr. Fukuzawa, of Japan, who said: "In the early days of Japanese intercourse with foreigners, there can be no doubt that many serious troubles would have occurred had not the Christian missionary not only showed the Japanese the altruistic side of the Occidental character, but also by his teaching and his preaching imparted a new and attractive aspect to the intercourse which otherwise would have been masterful and repellent. The Japanese cannot thank the missionary too much for the admirable leaven that he introduced into their relation with foreigners."

It was no less an authority than Lord Bryce who said that the jarring contact of many nations in the Far East imperatively calls for the strengthening of foreign missionary work, which, he declared, must be the chief influence in smoothing that contact, in allaying irritation, and in creating those conditions of international good-will which are essential to the preservation of world peace; and he added: "The one sure hope of a permanent foundation for world peace lies in the extension throughout the world of the principles of the Christian Gospel."

No consideration of particular forces, however, should lead one to ignore the fundamental fact that one of the vital factors in the Far Eastern problem is psychological. A radical change of mind is taking place. The fundamental transformation is not so much in objective realities as in the subjective realm of

ideas. The differences in activities and in habits of life are results of this altered mental state. It is a new Asia that the western world is dealing with. The old Asia has gone, perhaps forever. Because this is true the policy of armed intervention by foreign governments can no longer be prudently employed. Gunboats cannot now protect western nationals and their properties. They can only intensify any danger to which they might otherwise be exposed. States of mind are hardened, not softened, by the physical force of bayonets and machine guns. It is sheer folly to allege that a foreign army could restore peace in China. It would simply unite all the discordant factions into a solid and portentous force. For better or for worse the white man in the Far East must take his chances with the people and laws of the land, just as Asiatics in England and America must do. If they are not willing to do so they had better stay at home.

Give the peoples of the Far East time. They and they alone can work out their own political and social salvation. That they can and will do so we firmly believe. Meantime, wise statesmen of other lands, sensible business men, fair-minded journalists and friendly missionaries can help if they will trust them and be willing to accept any risk that may be involved. The arrogant, supercilious foreigner and the militaristic jingo should keep out.

No one can now foresee how soon all the nations of Asia will emerge from the welter and turmoil that have followed their awakening under the impact of the forces of the modern world. One nation, however, has already emerged with a swiftness and an intelligence that have challenged the attention of mankind. A world power of the first magnitude has risen in the Far East. While chaos still prevails on the continent of Asia, order reigns in the Island Empire of Japan. To the study of that Empire and its people we now turn.

II

DISTINCTIVE NATIONAL CHARACTERISTICS

THE superficial observer is apt to comment upon the essential similarity of the peoples of Japan, Korea, and China. It is true that there are points of resemblance. When dressed alike it is not always easy for a traveler to distinguish them. Certain manners and customs are similar, as well as some religious beliefs and a general type of mind which may be called Oriental as distinguished from Occidental. Nevertheless, there are fundamental distinctions that must be borne in mind if the characteristics and problems of these three peoples are to be rightly understood. I do not refer now to physical distinctions but to psychological ones, the real things wherein Japanese, Chinese, and Koreans really differ.

The keynote of Japan is solidarity. The individual is nothing; the nation is everything. The Japanese move as a unit in politics, in war, in commerce, and in daily life. How far back this characteristic runs is a disputed question. Baron Kikuchi has emphasized the unity of the nation through a traditional succession of twenty-five unbroken centuries of a single dynasty in relation to a people who regard it with profound veneration. The Japanese appear to be completely under the spell of this fascinating conception. They insist upon the indissoluble relation of modern Japan to ancestral Japan, of the ancestors of the people to the ancestors of the Imperial House. It is not simply the relation of present Japan to its ancestors, but of many centuries of Japanese to many centuries of imperial rulers, the solidarity of a nation persisting through the ages.

Professor Basil H. Chamberlain, however, scoffs at this claim

of the Japanese. "The sober fact is that no nation probably has ever treated its sovereigns more cavalierly than the Japanese have done, from the beginning of authentic history down to within the memory of living men. Emperors have been deposed, emperors have been assassinated; for centuries every succession to the throne was the signal for intrigues and sanguinary broils." He goes further and argues that the whole superstructure of alleged Japanese unity and emperor worship is a modern creation, a manufactured article devised by astute leaders who see that their ambition to make this comparatively small nation a first-class power in the world cannot be realized unless they can weld the people into a compact mass that will be absolutely amenable to their leadership, and can be handled as a solid body in all its relations with other nations.

Whatever may be the antiquity of this national solidarity, its present existence and power cannot be doubted. Ancient or modern, natural or manufactured, no one can understand the Japanese who fails to take it into account—a solemn, mystical, and yet tremendously real and vital fact. The submergence of the individual in the mass, the knitting of the entire body of the people into one communalistic system, has no parallel in history, unless it be among the ancient Peruvians. Lafcadio Hearn loved Japan, but he wrote: "Personality has been wholly suppressed by coercion, the life of every individual being so ordered by the will of the rest as to render free action, free speaking, free thinking out of the question. . . . With implacable minuteness, with ferocity of detail, everything was ordained for him, even to the quality of his footgear, the cost of his wife's hairpin, and the price of his child's doll. . . . The result was to suppress all mental and moral differentiation, to numb personality, to establish one uniform and unchanging type of character. To this day every Japanese mind reveals the lines of that antique mould by which the ancestral mind was compressed and limited."

The degree to which this characteristic influences modern Japan may be partly due to the fact that feudalism continued

in Japan until a later period than in any other nation, having been abolished only a few decades ago. But while feudalism has disappeared as a political system, its spirit has been merged into the larger and more absolute feudalism of the State, one vast system having taken the place of several smaller ones. Among themselves indeed the Japanese have differed, and they now differ. There are clans and political parties which sometimes fiercely dispute. In recent years these parties have become more outspoken in the press and in the Imperial Diet. But Europe and America will be grievously mistaken if they proceed on the assumption that in all international affairs the Japanese will not act as a compact and well-disciplined unit.

The western world marvelled when Admiral Togo, in his famous telegram after the defeat of the Russian fleet in the Russia-Japan War, modestly ascribed his victory "to the virtue of the Emperor" and "the protection of his ancestors," and "not to the action of any human being." Occidentals said: Is it possible that an intelligent Japanese, who had received a modern education and who is thoroughly trained in western science and the art of war, could make a statement of this kind? But Admiral Togo was as intelligible to the Japanese as Moses was to the victorious Hebrews when he exclaimed: "I will sing unto Jehovah for He hath triumphed gloriously." The Emperor is conceived, not as an individual temporarily at the head of the country, but as the supreme incarnation of the communal life, the spirit and tradition and power of the nation, the "Son of Heaven," whose government is an integral part of "a line of Emperors unbroken from ages eternal," as the first article of the Constitution declares. Speaking of the Mikado as the centre of the nation, Ichiro Tokutomi said: "Considered as a body politic it has him as its sovereign, considered as a distinct race it has him as its leader, considered as a social community it has him as its nucleus."

In a very real sense, therefore, says William Elliot Griffis, "the victories of Oyama and Togo were the result of all the

past life and training of the whole people. The 'brilliant virtue' of the Mikado is not a stock phrase, a figment of imagination; it is a soul-nerving reality; it is Japan's grandest asset. Neither the Mikado nor his people would be what they are except for 'the spirits of the ancestors.' Togo's statement is in harmony with all Japanese history, with literal fact as determined by critical analysis, as well as with sentiment, art, poetry, mythology, tradition, Bushido (the knightly code), and all that goes to make up the world of thought and subconscious motive in the minds of men. No true son of Nippon is likely for generations to come to express his thoughts otherwise. Be he Confucian, Shintoist, Buddhist, or Christian, he will ascribe no glory of Japanese victory to 'any human being' but to the virtue of the Mikado and to the spirits of his imperial ancestors." When the late Emperor lay dying, weeping and praying multitudes prostrated themselves before the palace gates for whole days and nights, unmoved by inclement weather. They had never seen him, but he was to them the embodiment of the nation and his passing from earth was both a national and a personal calamity.

The keynote of China is the direct opposite of this solidarity. It is individualism. The Chinese as a man is industrious and capable, often masterful, and able to compete with any other man in the world. But he does not take naturally to coöperative enterprises. He is not good in team-work. The Chinese are individually strong but collectively weak. They are deficient in organization. Everywhere in China one sees evidences of this characteristic. Commercially, although the Chinese are the best business men in Asia, it is difficult to form a large Chinese corporation which can hold together and do efficient work. There are successful corporations, but they are few in number. Politically, there is a conspicuous absence of centralization. The Emperor was traditionally venerated as the Son of Heaven; but the people regarded him as an alien Manchu. They chafed under his rule and were callously indifferent when he died or was deposed. The nation was honey-

combed with anti-dynastic societies which were continually plotting the overthrow of the reigning sovereign and his whole line. When the Revolution was accomplished and a Republic was declared, the presidents were rapidly changed, had no popular following and no real power. Individualism characterizes the nation. Village life is largely communal under local elders; but taking China as a whole, it is every man for himself.

Thus there is none of that sense of national unity which is so evident in Japan. The people of the south know little and care less about the people of the north. The inhabitants of Szechuan are almost as far removed in sympathy from those of Fuh-kien as if they belonged to different nations. If a war breaks out, large sections of the country are indifferent. It is a matter for the governors of the provinces attacked; let them attend to it. Probably many Chinese never knew that there was a war between China and Japan in 1894, and those who did know cared little more than if the war had been between Germany and Japan. If a foreign power were to obtain possession of a Japanese port, it would not be able to hire a coolie in all Japan to fortify it; but when the Germans seized Kiaochow Bay in 1897, although the Province of Shantung was thrown into great alarm, the German admiral had no difficulty in employing thousands of Chinese to make the German position impregnable against the Chinese. In like manner the Russians, when they took Port Arthur under an agreement which they had extorted from the Chinese Government, found it easy to employ 60,000 coolies to construct their defenses. After the Boxer Uprising the foreign legations in Peking fortified themselves by the aid of Chinese labourers within rifle-shot of the imperial palace.

China is a loose aggregation of units rather than a solidified nation. Governors, viceroys and war lords are virtually independent rulers who have their own mints, their own military force, and who do about as they please. The Japanese Government directs its individual subjects and supports them in their

enterprises; but the Government of China leaves its subjects to shift for themselves. Perhaps this is due in part to the density of population, which makes the struggle for existence fiercer than anywhere else and develops a callous selfishness as well as a spirit of self-reliance.

This individualism is one of the reasons why the present transformation in China is so significant. The new influences which are at work are affecting the essential genius of Chinese life. They are revolutionizing fundamental thoughts and relationships. Railways and telegraphs are making possible intercommunication and a knowledge of other parts of the country, and are tending to develop a consciousness of unity which have never existed before. And herein is large ground for hope. The reform movements in China are essentially movements of the people. The government did not lead them; it was indeed far behind. A popular movement on so vast a scale will probably prove as irresistible as the similar movement was in Europe, for it will mean that the new order, when once established, will be firmly based on the consent of the nation.

It is true that the country is now in commotion, that there is no recognized central government, and that rival military chieftains are struggling for the mastery. History shows that the mob and "the man on horseback" are in the background of every republic. The diffusion of those fundamental ideas of education and religion upon which popular government must rest has been a matter of only a few decades in China. Vast numbers of the people have as yet been but slightly touched by them. It would be unwise to underestimate the gravity of the present tumultuous situation, or to assume that the most numerous and conservative nation on the globe has been suddenly and completely transformed in character. The movement toward better conditions is being attended by mistakes and manifestations of human infirmity. Inflamed passions may be slow in subsiding. In spite of the national spirit of sobriety and conservatism, there is a good deal of the heady,

rhetorical sophomore in many of the younger Chinese, and all sorts of vagaries are finding eager advocates.

But let us not be deceived by the disturbances incident to a period of transition during which good and evil are struggling together for the mastery, and during which also mixed motives appear among those who are being used, perhaps unconsciously to themselves, for the inauguration of a better day. It took five hundred years to bring Europe only part of the way from paganism to Christianity; and China is larger and more conservative than Europe. The world moves faster now, and the change-producing forces of the present exceed those of former centuries as a modern steam hammer exceeds a wooden sledge. But China is ponderous, and a few decades are short for so gigantic a transformation. Whatever may be the blunders and crimes of the changing order, however uncertain progress may be here and there, whatever backward steps may be taken for a time, it is clear that conditions can never revert to their former state. The old order has been broken up once for all. That dam has burst. We should be large-minded enough and have enough of the Christian altruistic spirit to discern the good that will surely follow. The Crusades were frightful tragedies and attended by horrors over which the world still shudders; but they broke up the stagnation of the Middle Ages, liberated men's minds from iron-bound traditions, gave new knowledge of other peoples, awakened new aspirations, and so changed the conditions which had hitherto repressed truth and liberty that they made possible a better era. May we not believe that the present upheaval in China may serve a similar purpose, and that even as a new Europe followed the chaos of the Crusades, so a new Asia will follow the chaos of the present upheaval.

In Japan we have a totally different situation. Here a homogeneous and united people are obedient to a capable central government which leads reconstructive movements. The people are far in the rear. The whole modern development is directed by a comparatively small group of leaders

who are more or less blindly followed by the masses of the population. These leaders are men of splendid ability, and their ideas are gradually making their way down among the common people; but it will be a long time yet before the majority of the people of Japan will assert themselves as a real governing force. History shows that such a situation is not altogether reassuring. It is a great thing for advance movements to have the prestige of official leadership; but unless there is wide popular support based on intelligent public sentiment, changes in personnel may at any time result in an alteration of policy. The increasing number of men in the upper classes who have caught the spirit of the modern world encourage the hope that no reaction will set in; but if it ever should come, the solidarity of the nation will make it a serious matter. I refer in another chapter to the fact that a progressive party has already developed and that its growth promises much for the future.

The keynote of Korea is not so easily stated in one word. We might call it subjectivity. The people are less virile, less ambitious, less independent in spirit. They revered their Emperor in a hazy sort of way, but with none of that passionate devotion which characterizes the Japanese. Any Japanese will gladly give his life for his sovereign, and this is one reason why Japan is such a formidable military power. The entire nation fights, and fights to the death for the Emperor who incarnates the national ideals. Such a sentiment is utterly foreign to the Chinese mind. The Korean occupies a middle position in this respect. Some devoted officials committed suicide when their Emperor was humiliated; but this spirit did not characterize the people as a whole. Even in the most patriotic Korean the normal feeling was one of wounded national pride because a foreigner ruled, rather than of special attachment to the Emperor. The Korean was oppressed for so many generations, he felt so helpless, that he settled into almost apathetic despair. Individuals made heroic struggles, but the people as a whole had so long acquiesced in the in-

evitable that a certain state of mind resulted. The decisive methods of the Japanese are doing much to stir the Koreans out of this apathy, but it still prevails to a marked degree. They accept, often grudgingly, the modern improvements that the Japanese have introduced; but they show little disposition to make them their own or to bring in others. They merely acquiesce in what the Japanese do and let it go at that. Missionary schools are now developing educated men and women of a higher type. The hope of the country lies in them. But their number is yet small. The Korean temperament, too, is more emotional than that of the Japanese or Chinese. It is comparatively easy to reach his heart and to arouse his sympathies. This is one reason why Christianity has made converts more rapidly than in either China or Japan. There are, of course, other reasons for evangelistic success in Korea, but this temperamental condition is a differentiating factor.

National ambitions also differ. The ambition of the Japanese is that his country shall be recognized as a world power. The ambition of the Chinese is to advance his personal interests. The ambition of the Korean is to be let alone. It was pathetic to see the people flock to the Salvation Army officers. They felt in a half-childish way that the drums and fifes and military imagery meant something which would help them to get rid of the outsiders who were disturbing their life.

I am aware of the limitations of the distinctions which have been indicated. It would be easy to specify exceptions in each country; but I am now considering the peoples as a whole, and these fundamental distinctions run deep and affect many political, commercial, and missionary problems.

The Japanese sensibly make no secret of their ambition. The well-known Japanese author, Professor Kawakami, writes: "Japan must have a place in the sun." "It is Japan's mission to harmonize eastern and western civilizations in order to bring about the unification of the world," said Marquis Okuma; and in a public address he declared: "Forty years ago but an insignificant nation in the eye of the world, Japan

is now regarded as one of its strongest Powers, in a sense holding the destiny of Asia in her hand. Henceforth, in the solution of the eastern questions, even where she does not play a conspicuous part, her will cannot be altogether ignored. She has raised herself to this high position and has determined to maintain it none too soon, for the object of European anxiety is no longer the continent of Africa alone but that of Asia as well, with which Japan is so closely connected; for, unless she is strong enough to make her voice heard in the deliberation as to measures for relieving that anxiety, her own safety might be threatened."

There may be individuals here and there who can consistently criticise Japan for cherishing such an ambition, but they are not representative citizens of the United States, Great Britain, France or Germany. Charles Dickens found Americans so loudly asseverating that their country was destined to be the biggest, grandest, most glorious country on earth that he good-naturedly satirized them in the pages of *Martin Chuzzlewit*. For generations, Fourth of July orations, congressional speeches, and innumerable newspaper and magazine articles have proclaimed the same tidings to a sceptical world. Some Americans talk as if they had a right to the control of the Pacific. If they were familiar with the history of their own country, they would know that the United States did not possess a clear title to any territory bordering on the Pacific Ocean till 1846. Why should we regard our claim to the supremacy of the Pacific as superior to that of nations which have occupied territory on that ocean for more than two thousand years? It may be that the Japanese are overambitious and offensively self-assertive. I suspect that they are and that Americans belong in the same category. If we are disposed to persuade nations to adopt a more modest and Christian attitude toward one another, we should include our own people as well as the Japanese in our well-meant efforts.

III

THE COUNTRY AND PEOPLE OF JAPAN

THE rise of Japan is one of the startling phenomena of the age. Within the memory of men now living, Japan was an obscure and unimportant Asiatic nation, whose people knew little and cared less about the western world and were still under the sway of age-old feudalism and superstition. Only a few Europeans had been seen, beginning with some wandering Portuguese who are said to have arrived at Kyushu in the year 1530, and the Portuguese Pinto who came in 1542. The first white men were hospitably received. Shortly after Francis Xavier arrived, in 1549, he wrote: "The nation with which we have to deal here surpasses in goodness any of the nations ever discovered. They are of a kindly disposition, wonderfully desirous of honour which is placed above everything else. They listen with great avidity to discourses about God and divine things."

During the last quarter of the sixteenth century and the first half of the seventeenth, "the testimony of all writers is that the Japanese in their intercourse with foreigners were distinguished for high-bred courtesy combined with refined liberality and generous hospitality. On the other hand, the merchants and mariners with whom they came in contact were usually of bad manners and morals, overreaching, avaricious, and cruel; the missionaries were often arrogant, ambitious, and without proper respect for native customs; and the naval and other officials of foreign governments were haughty, actuated by a spirit of aggression, and unmindful of the comity of nations. The history of the time shows that the policy of ex-

clusion adopted by Japan in the seventeenth century was not inherent in the constitution of the state or the character of the people, but that it was adopted in consequence of the unfavourable character of the relations with Europeans.”¹

Incensed by the overbearing conduct of the white men and alarmed by reports that the Roman Catholic missionaries were political emissaries of western nations, the Japanese turned against the foreigners within their territory. Missionaries and traders were driven out, Japanese converts to Christianity were subjected to bloody persecution, severe laws were enacted forbidding foreigners to enter the country or Japanese to leave it under pain of death, and fierce efforts were made to root out and exterminate every foreign influence, missionary and commercial. This period extended down to 1853. During all those years Japan appeared to be hermetically sealed from the outside world.

Americans are fond of saying that this isolation and stagnation were broken up by Commodore Matthew C. Perry, who, March 31, 1854, concluded a treaty between Japan and the United States, the first of the links to bind Japan to western nations. Many Japanese have given cordial testimony to the same effect; but Marquis Okuma challenged this popular belief and ascribed the first impulse toward modern civilization to the Russian Admiral Nicholas “Lizanoff” (Nicolai Petrovitch de Rezanov, 1764-1807), who visited Japan nearly half a century before Perry. Certain it is, however, that Commodore Perry’s visit to Japan and the visit of a Japanese commission to America in 1860 marked the transition from the old to the new Japan and the start of the nation on that road of progress on which it has since made such amazing strides.

A period of internal commotion ensued. While some Japanese welcomed the new era, others reacted in fierce opposition. It is ever thus in every land. Some men eagerly reach forward to the new, others cling tenaciously to the old. In Japan the conflict between the progressive and conservative forces kept

¹ John W. Foster, *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, p. 12.

the country in a turmoil for a decade. The reactionary party rallied about the Shogun, the most powerful of the feudal lords and the commander-in-chief of the army, who had virtually usurped the government and reduced the Emperor not only to a position of nominal authority but of real subordination. The progressive party rallied about the Emperor. The struggle culminated in 1868 in the overthrow of the Shogun and the restoration of the Emperor to his rightful place as reigning sovereign.

The reconstruction of Japan upon modern lines promptly followed. The mere enumeration of the changes that were inaugurated profoundly impresses one: 1869 saw the telegraph and the Charter Oath, which was to Japan almost what Magna Charta was to England; 1870 saw charted waters and light-houses; and 1871, post-offices, postage stamps, railways, newspapers, the downfall of feudalism and the founding of the Imperial University. In 1872, an imperial commission visited Europe and America to study western institutions and methods and ascertain what they had that might be beneficial to Japan. In 1873 the Christian calendar was adopted and the anti-Christian edicts were repealed. In 1877 a postal treaty was concluded with foreign nations. In 1880 the penal code was reorganized and prefectural assemblies were established. The year 1881 marked the first steps toward constitutional government, and February 11, 1889, the constitution was formally promulgated, the first constitution to be adopted by any country in Asia. In 1897 the gold standard for currency was adopted. By 1899, Japan had made such progress and had so gained the confidence of the world that, with the consent of the European and American governments, the extra-territorial laws were abolished and Japan was recognized as one of the enlightened nations which could be trusted to deal fairly with citizens of other nationalities within her borders.

Foreigners do not complain of any loss of privilege as a result of the treaties, which July 17, 1899, abolished their long-cherished rights of extra-territoriality and brought them

under the jurisdiction of Japanese courts. The new treaties went into effect without a jar. Both missionaries and business men assured me that they were as safe in their rights as ever, and that Japanese judges were rather inclined to favour them in their solicitude that foreigners should have full justice in the courts. Indeed Americans in Japan have had less trouble than Japanese have had in the United States. Foreigners are free to travel or reside wherever they please, and they are perfectly safe in doing so if they behave themselves. If they violate the law, a Japanese policeman will courteously but resolutely hale them before a Japanese magistrate, who with like courtesy and resolution will inflict appropriate punishment. The offender almost invariably richly deserves what he gets.

Today, all the tides of modern life are sweeping through Japan. Evidences of the new spirit which is stirring the nation are apparent on every hand. The ports of Yokohama, Kobe, Nagasaki and Shimonoseki are crowded with the shipping of many lands. One would not expect to see much change in Kyoto, the artistic and Buddhistic heart of Japan, or in scenic and historic Nikko; but even in these places of venerable antiquity the traveler finds modern hotels and other indications of progress. The fine highway, three miles in length, connecting the two Shinto shrines in the sacred city of Yamada, is not surpassed by any road in Europe. The contrast with the Japan of 1850 is so great as to be well-nigh incredible. A nation that had never heard of steam as a motive power is now gridironed with thousands of miles of railways and is sending its merchant marine to the most distant lands. A nation that knew nothing of electricity uses telegraphs, telephones, radio, trolley-cars, and motors of every kind. From small coasting junks to huge ocean steamers, from hand looms to improved machinery, from sedan chairs to railway trains, from swords to machine guns and battleships, from a burning rag in a saucer of bean oil to the brilliancy of electric lights, from memorizing Confucian classics to the study of modern science, from national insignificance to world power—and all this within a half dozen

decades, leaping as it were at a bound over stages of development which other nations spent weary centuries in traversing—this is the amazing achievement of Japan. Such a people is surely worthy of careful study.

Inquiry regarding the early history of Japan speedily brings the investigator to a point where facts are shrouded in myth and legend. Ethnologists have long speculated regarding the origin of the curious white Ainus, of whom about 17,600 still remain in Yezo and the Kurile Isles. William Elliot Griffis believes the Ainus to be of Aryan stock. He gives an interesting account of their coming to prehistoric Japan, and shows how the Ainu and Yamato peoples struggled during two thousand years for supremacy until the fusion of races made the present Japanese nation. He places this prehistoric period prior to 552 A. D., and divides the subsequent history into four periods: military and civil conquest 552–1192; establishment of feudalism 1192–1604; Yedo period of the Shogunate 1604–1868; Mikado period of modern development 1868–1900; and the period of world relationships 1900 to the present time. He declares that the conclusion of nearly thirty years of scientific investigation by native Japanese men of science agrees with Professor Koganei's verdict that "the Mikado's realm was once an Ainu realm"; and that his "own opinion is that the Ainu once occupied the whole archipelago of Japan. The oldest names of the mountains and rivers are not Japanese but Ainu. Made up of four of the strong races of mankind, Aryan, Semitic, Malay, and Tartar, there was no such thing as a Japanese nation until 1192 A. D.; and the fusion was not complete until much later. Increasing harmony among scholars, archaeologists, ethnologists, critical reading of the *Kojiki*, or ancient records, 712 A. D., all point to the fact that the basic stock of the Japanese of today is Ainu. That is, the Japanese are as much Aryan—whatever that may be—as any other stock perhaps on earth. Leaving diplomacy to settle political questions, let us hold to science. After forty-six years' study of the Japanese, I cannot but conceive of them as a non-Mon-

golian people." Kazutami Ukita, professor of history in Waseda University, holds substantially the same view, characterizing the Ainus as "of an ancient Caucasian origin in race, the descendants of those who did not assimilate with the Japanese in the main island . . . gentle, honest and kind though backward in civilization."

Edward S. Morse, formerly professor in the Imperial University, Tokyo, vigorously challenges the theory of Aryan origin. He holds that the Ainus were the original inhabitants of Japan, or at any rate the only ones that are known, and that they are not Aryans at all; that the ancestors of the modern Japanese were Mongolians who came from the mainland of Asia by way of Korea; that Japanese civilization is essentially Mongolian; that there has been some admixture of Ainu blood, possibly of Malay and perhaps of North American Indian, which was near in Alaska; but that these strains had no appreciable effect upon the national type.¹

We may leave to experts this vexed question of ethnological and antiquarian research; and readers who wish to delve deeply into it may find ample material in their writings.² Our present concern is with the Japan of more recent days. Suffice it here that the definitely known history of Japan is far less ancient than that of India, China, and even Europe, and that when the nation emerged from the mists of the prehistoric era it was composed of several discordant elements which were a long time in solidifying into the compact body with which the world is now familiar. Basil H. Chamberlain declares that it is one of the certain results of investigation that the first glimmer of genuine Japanese history dates from the fifth century after Christ; that the accounts of what happened in the sixth century must be received with caution; and that back of that period we enter the realm of national mythology and legends,

¹ Address, November 24, 1911.

² *History of the Japanese People*, by Captain Frank Brinkley: *Japan and Japanese-American Relations* (Proceedings of Conference at Clark University, November, 1910); *History of Japan*, by Murdock; *The Mikado's Empire*, by W. E. Griffis; *The Ainu of Japan*, by John Batchelor.

characterized by miraculous impossibilities and chronology palpably fraudulent.¹

Modern Japan has passed considerably beyond the limits of ancient Japan in territory as well as population, as the following table shows:

	<i>Area in Square Miles</i>	<i>Population</i>
Japan proper	148,756	61,081,954
Korea	84,738	17,264,119
Taiwan (Formosa)	13,944	3,655,308
Karafuto (Japanese Saghalien) ...	13,253	105,899
	<hr/>	<hr/>
	260,691	82,107,280

Tokyo, the capital, with 2,173,201 inhabitants, is the largest city in Asia and one of the influential cities of the world. Streets in the extensive section that was destroyed by the earthquake of 1923 have been widened, and better and more permanent buildings erected. Osaka, the second city of Japan, is a great industrial centre with a population of 1,252,983. Kobe follows with 608,644, and Kyoto with 591,323. Twelve other cities have populations ranging from 100,235 to 439,997, and nine others from 72,300 to 95,381. A half dozen other cities are of good size and are rapidly growing. The census reports 12,669,635 people living in cities of more than 10,000 inhabitants.

The average number of foreigners residing in Japan in recent years is about 18,000, of whom approximately three-fifths are Chinese, and the remainder British, German, American, French and Russian, in the approximate order named. The territory of Japan proper is smaller than that of California, but its population is twenty-one times larger. If we imagine half the people of the United States packed into California, we shall have an idea of the density of population in Japan. The situation is analogous to that of Great Britain which,

¹ Article in the *Japan Weekly Mail*, December 23, 1911.

with an area of 121,633 square miles, has 43,783,032 inhabitants. The combined area of Japan and all its dependencies is less than that of Texas, but the population is sixteen times greater.

To the visitor Japan is one of the most attractive countries in the world. One can never forget the charm of its hospitality, the neatness of the homes and villages, and the courageous energy with which the people are grappling with their new and difficult problems. The first view lives long in one's memory—the serrated mountains sharply outlined against the sky; the thatched houses of the villages nestling at their feet; the neatly divided plots of rice fields on the lowlands; the gleaming water of the bay dotted by quaint sampans sculled by half naked boatmen; the island made famous by the landing of Commodore Perry in 1853; the grim fortifications guarding the harbour entrance; and, as we steam slowly onward, the busy city of Yokohama with its modern buildings and the countless funnels and masts of its world-wide commerce; while towering above all, the snow-covered monarch of this matchless scene, is majestic Fujiyama, the sacred mountain of Japan.

Closer acquaintance deepens the favourable first impression. Physically, Japan is very beautiful—a land of hills and valleys, of rushing streams and rich bottomlands. Kanazawa is one of the scenic cities of the world. The view from the mountain above the Bay of Tsugaru amply repays a journey across Japan. “Do not use the word magnificent until you have seen Nikko” is a Japanese proverb which many a visitor has echoed. The trip from Tokyo to the mountain resort of Karuizawa will never be forgotten by one who has taken it, and the railway journey from Kyoto to Tsu is through a region of fascinating beauty. Foreign residents have grown weary of the praises of Fujiyama; but Americans are forever telling of Niagara Falls and Europeans of Mt. Blanc, and why should not Japanese love and revere their royal mountain?

We were so fortunate as to be in Japan in the famous cherry blossom season. The trees are not cultivated for their

fruit, but from sheer love of the beautiful the people have set out so many that their cities and villages are literally abloom with the delicate pink and white blooms. When to these are added the deeper tints of the peach and camellia, the purple of violets, the white and purple of stately magnolias, and the rich yellow of the fields of rape seed, the traveler feels as if he were in some vast conservatory. All classes of the people delight in flowers. The chrysanthemum is a national pride. Arthur Christopher Benson says that "one hears how workmen in Japan will keep a flower by them to look at in the pauses of their work, for refreshment, where an Englishman would need a pint of beer to make him a cheerful countenance."¹

The high cultivation of the soil adds to the effect. Not a weed is permitted to grow. Not a foot of available land is wasted. Even the hillsides are terraced to the very summits with almost incredible labour. Rice is the staple product wherever the land can be flooded. But we saw many fields of wheat sowed, not broadcast as in America, but in rows carefully hoed. Considerable space is devoted to rape seed, from which oil is extracted for both cooking and illuminating, while vegetable gardens, tea-bushes, mulberry-trees, and a species of palm are often seen. The fields are pleasantest from a respectful distance, as disagreeable refuse is a favourite fertilizer. All household waste is scrupulously preserved in earthen jars and collected every morning for use on the farms and gardens.

Sanitary laws are strict and are enforced with energy. Epidemics are carefully guarded against. In Osaka, we saw municipal house-cleaning on a large scale. A suspicion that bubonic plague was present having injured the business of the city, the suspected quarter was visited by a swarm of inspectors who entered every house, removed furniture, took up matting, pulled down ceilings and swept out dirt, while the unhappy inhabitants looked on in helpless dismay. The streets were filled with the smoke of the burning débris. Fac-

¹ *Along the Road*, p. 12.

tory conditions are not so well watched, as we shall have later occasion to note.

Japanese conceptions of comfort differ from ours. Their houses are scantily furnished. There are no beds, the Japanese simply spreading their quilts on the matting which covers the floor. Chairs are used only in a few Europeanized homes. People sit on the floor with their legs under them in a way which a foreigner soon finds intolerably painful. The railway cars in which we traveled had seats, but we were usually the only persons in them whose feet were on the floor. Our fellow passengers had slipped off their sandals and tucked their feet under them on the seats.

The village Japanese are a cleanly people after their manner. The hotels conducted for foreigners in the ports and the larger cities of the interior have all modern conveniences; but in the smaller towns the inns are "native style." The bathtubs—wooden boxes with little stoves on one side—are filled with water in the morning, and when guests arrive the fire is started, soon making the water hot enough to stew one. When the first arrival has bathed, the thrifty proprietor has no idea of wasting all that hot water, nor does the next guest expect him to do so. So the newcomer willingly bathes in the same water. Later guests do likewise, and the last traveler, if he is a foreigner, discreetly decides to postpone his bath until the next morning. The Japanese do not regard it as good form to use soap in such a bathtub as it would discolour the water for subsequent users. Unhappily, I did not know this when I reached my first inn, and as I was covered with the dust of a hot journey, I fear that I gave the next bather reason to use strong language.

Few houses, schools, or public buildings are adequately heated. Furnaces are almost unknown, and the scanty warmth of a few pieces of charcoal is poor protection against the chill winds that easily find their way through the lightly built walls and loosely fitting doors and windows. The ordinary dress of both sexes is cut so low in the neck as to expose

the upper part of the chest. However abundant the body clothing may be, the legs are often bare below the knees, and sockless feet are thrust into the straps of straw or wooden sandals, not only in summer but in winter. As I wrote on the train with my overcoat closely buttoned, the bare feet and ankles of a three-year-old child peeped from under the folds of an apparently expensive dress. Of the 193 people whom I had the curiosity to count in a few minutes on the streets of Tokyo, 130 were either barefooted or wore only a sandal which protected the sole from pebbles; fifty-nine had a thin white cotton cloth wrapped around the foot, the calf of the leg often being bare; and only four wore European shoes. Whether due to this exposure or not, half the children I saw had colds. Throat and lung diseases are alarmingly prevalent and tuberculosis is the scourge of Japan.

In the Japanese code of good manners it is considered bad form to show emotion. One must not storm in anger or sob in grief. Stoical self-control when others are excited, an impassive countenance when under critical observation—these are among Japanese virtues. The mercurial Korean and the impatient white man manifest their feelings in their faces. Not so the Japanese. They are, as a rule, outwardly calm, although they may be inwardly boiling. It is not always prudent, therefore, to infer their real sentiments from their public manner. This is not hypocrisy; it results from their conviction that a self-respecting man does not parade his private sentiments before slight acquaintances.

The people are the most charming of Orientals to meet, if we may judge from our experience. We traveled many hundreds of miles in Japan, mingled with the crowds in cities and villages, visited shops, offices, factories, homes, Buddhist, Shinto, and Christian places of worship, schools of all kinds and even military posts; and we were uniformly treated with the utmost courtesy. I did not see a fight in Japan, and a drunken man only once. Nobody was rude, but every one was smilingly polite and ready to show every kindness.

The traveler is sometimes misled by this universal politeness, for it occasionally leads the Japanese to smile affably and bow assent to his questions whether they understand him or not. You ask whether the post-office "is on this street," and when you receive what you regard as a pleasant nod in reply, you tramp contentedly onward, only to find later that the post-office is not on that street. The Japanese did not mean to deceive, but he did not understand.

It is said that two American women awoke one night to find a burglar standing at the foot of their bed. He suavely asked for money. The frightened ladies said that all their money was locked up; that they were American ladies and could not get out of bed when a man was in the room; but that if he would step out while they dressed, they would get the money for him. The burglar actually complied with the request, going out of the room and nearly closing the door, simply keeping one foot in the opening, "not necessarily for publication but merely as a guarantee of good faith," while the modest maidens arrayed themselves for such nocturnal company. Then he again entered. By this time, however, the nerves of one of the younger women gave way in a scream, whereupon the burglar snatched the pocketbook and ran, doubtless distressed that he was under the disagreeable necessity of acting so rudely.

The national politeness, while very delightful to the traveler, does not necessarily argue superior moral qualities. The characteristic vices of Japan are substantially the same as those of Europe and America, although some of them are not so noticeable to the visitor. If the Anglo-Saxon goes wrong, he is apt to make himself a nuisance in public where he attracts instant attention. The Japanese is more even-tempered and prides himself on concealing his emotions; but in his code of morals certain vices are not reckoned so heinous as we reckon them. But this subject belongs in another chapter.

The Japan of today is a curious mixture of the antique and the modern. I saw a man riding a new bicycle, wearing a

derby hat, cutaway coat, shirt, collar, cuffs and necktie; but his single loose lower garment streamed behind him exposing a pair of bare legs, and his feet were naked save for clumsy wooden sandals. He was a type that we saw in many other cities. European dress, however, has become common in the capital and port cities. I found a number of high officials in frock coats, and these garments and silk hats are numerous among the guests at the best social functions. The prevalence of English signs is a great convenience to the western traveler. One rarely sees Russian, German or French signs, but English are numerous. Railway tickets are printed in English on one side and Japanese on the other. At the stations the names of the towns are printed in Japanese and English. On the trains the designations of class and destination are given in both English and Japanese. English notices tell you not to put your head out of the window and not to stand on the platform. Sometimes the wording is rather odd, as when one is warned: "No admission to enter," but the meaning is usually clear.

The efforts of Japanese shopkeepers to attract English visitors result in some amusing struggles with our language. Every returning traveler brings a sheaf of stories to chuckle over with his friends. You observe that in one place "Printiny is Done," and that in another "Drugs Apothecary Sell." A sign on a tailor's shop hospitably announces that "Respectable Ladies and Gentlemen are Invited to come in and have Fits." An express office truly says that "Baggage is Sent in Every Direction." A fur dealer's sign vouchsafes the disquieting information that "Furs are Made from our Skin or Yours"; and an antique shop naively admits that "Antique Curios are Bought, Sold and Made." A Japanese in applying to a London newspaper for a position as correspondent from Japan, after describing his other qualifications, added: "As for my knowledge of English and capacity of journalistic work, I cannot myself say much for them, but you may perhaps be able to roughly estimate them by these lines. With regard to my per-

sonal reliability and honest character I can, however, unscrupulously vouchsafe them." If we are disposed to smile at such mistakes, we may discreetly remember that even the courtesy and impassivity of the Japanese are often severely taxed to keep from uproarious laughter over the blunders of Americans in trying to use the Japanese language.

Thousands of educated Japanese speak English with accuracy, and many thousands more are acquiring it. At all the leading hotels and railway stations and on most of the trains, we found one or more Japanese who spoke English, and an American or Englishman who knows no language but his own seldom has any serious difficulty in traveling about the country. Indeed English is now being taught in the public schools and in the universities, and lecturers from the West can find audiences to which they can deliver their message without an interpreter.

The railway service is excellent. The first rail was laid in 1871. There are now 9,974 miles of railway in Japan proper, in addition to the 2,900 miles that the Japanese have built in Chosen, Formosa, Manchuria and Saghalien. First, second, and third class cars are run on most trains. There is none of the fussy calling for tickets every hour or two that is such a nuisance on American railways. The passenger shows his ticket to the gateman before entering the train, and to the guard that he may know the class, and that is the end of it till the ticket is surrendered at the gate after leaving the train at the destination.

The popular mode of local conveyance is the jinrikisha, a tiny, light, two-wheeled affair seating one person, and whose invention Dr. Griffis attributes to a Japanese and Professor Nitobe to an American named Goble. I mentally doff my hat as I think of the man who draws it. Of the scores that I used at various times, the typical one wore even in cold weather a thin cotton upper garment, short drawers, and straw sandals. He could not have weighed more than a hundred and fifteen pounds, while the jinrikisha and I together tipped the beam

at over two hundred. But that little fellow pulled me five miles at a fast trot. The fare was sixteen sen (eight cents). I felt ashamed to pay such a sum; but my host advised me not to give more, saying that the prices are now much higher than formerly and that soft-hearted visitors make things harder for residents. In Kanazawa we rode up a long hill in a cold, heavy rain. The men, with smiles and bows and profuse apologies, said that they would have to ask for more than the usual rate because of the storm. What was that extra charge? Nine rin, less than half a cent. Everywhere we found the men patient, good-natured and with amazing powers of endurance. Colonel Davis of Kyoto laughed when I spoke of their runs with me, and said that they often made fifty miles a day. I have bumped my head often enough in entering the doors of their houses to give me painful proof that the Japanese are a small race, but their bodies are all bone and sinew.

It is about as difficult to get an unprejudiced and dispassionate opinion of the Japanese people as it is to get one of Theodore Roosevelt, William Jennings Bryan, or Lloyd George. Each observer glorifies or defames in accordance with his preconceived ideas. Some writers laud the Japanese with fulsome eulogy, magnifying their virtues and minimizing their vices—a nation before whose perfection Europeans and Americans should veil their faces in shame. I have listened to adulatory speeches of this kind which, if I were a Japanese, I would deprecate as flattery too gross to be pleasant. Other writers exhaust their vocabulary in denunciation, alleging that the real Japan is not what Americans innocently imagine it to be, but “the Japan of farms and factories and fishermen, ruled by a little group of ambitious statesmen, and dominated by the imperialistic aims which dominated Germany”; that “in Japan we see a power still partially under the influence of barbaric traditions of warfare and conquest, and yet possessed of all the weapons and powers of the most enlightened countries”; that “her boasted progress has consisted in imitating the inventions and discoveries of western nations”; and that “we



CRYING THE NEWS IN JAPAN OF TO-DAY

should beware of the reports of American visitors who have been dined and flattered, and in some cases decorated by the Emperor, until they have been hypnotized and have returned to America to spread rosy impressions of a Japan whose virtues and good intentions exist only in their own imaginations.”¹

It is undeniable that the world's sympathy with Japan has materially lessened since the war with Russia. This may be due in part to the fact that it is human nature to sympathize with the smaller man in a fight, and that the mingled admiration and pity which were evoked by the spectacle of a little nation attacking mighty Russia were no longer needed when the little nation emerged as proud victor. Western nations began to realize, too, that the war had made Japan a factor in world problems and a rival in the Far East which must hereafter be reckoned with, and there was some disquietude as to whether the new rival would introduce additional complications. Triumphant, imperial Japan, proposing to be mistress of the Pacific Ocean, and with an army and navy which enable her to make the claim good, is not so appealing an object to grow sentimental over as a small country fighting for its life against one three times its size.

The wrath of numerous war correspondents was another factor in the change of public sentiment. They eagerly flocked to the Far East at the outbreak of hostilities with Russia, only to find their high hopes for good copy destroyed by polite but inexorable officials, who kept them cooling their heels several hundred miles from the front. The sternly practical Japanese were not playing to the galleries of Europe and America. They were making grim war and they gave scant heed to ambitious journalists. The resultant emotions of the correspondents could not be expressed in terms that were “fit to print.” As these war correspondents included influential writers who had free access to the columns of the greatest daily newspapers and magazines, the effect was soon apparent.

We need not ascribe this criticism wholly to pique. Prior to

¹Quotations are from *Japan and America*, by Carl Crow.

the Russia-Japan War, Americans and Englishmen saw everything Japanese through a glamour of cherry-blossoms, cloisonné, Satsuma ware, quaint temples, ancient palaces, polite men, daintily smiling girls, romantic glens and snowy Fujiyama. It was the land of poetry, beauty and art. Thomas F. Millard declares that the accounts of it which were so widely published in Europe and America were the output of the most skilful and systematic press bureau in the world, and that nearly all of the news that reached English speaking readers came through that press bureau. The reports given by Mr. Millard and Mr. F. A. McKenzie of their personal observations in Korea, after the Japanese were in full control, are not pleasant reading,¹ and Price Collier felt moved to exclaim that "it is an open question whether England's hypocritical and short-sightedly selfish alliance with these varnished savages has not done more to menace Saxon civilization, both in Europe and America, than any diplomatic step that has been taken for centuries."²

For myself, while not blind to the faults of the Japanese, I deplore such indiscriminate condemnation of them. If they are not the lovely fairies that Lafcadio Hearn pictured them, neither are they the "varnished savages" that Price Collier called them. From the huge mass of available data it is not difficult to make a selection that will apparently support almost any preconceived idea. But conclusions obtained in that way are one-sided. They leave some facts out of account, and state others in ways which make them appear more unfavourable than they really are. If one is to err at all, it is better to do so on the side of charity, to magnify good qualities rather than to minimize them. It is unreasonable to expect an Asiatic people to exemplify within sixty years standards of Christian character and conduct which Europe and America but imperfectly exemplify after fifteen hundred years. The Japanese have many fine qualities. They also have some grave

¹ McKenzie, *The Unveiled East*; Millard, *The New Far East*.

² *England and the English*, p. 243.

defects. So have we. It is easy to pick out flaws in any people under heaven, including our own. After all, the Japanese are human beings like ourselves, and in thinking of them we may well remember the words of the poet Bailey:

“ Men might be better if we better deemed of them.”

IV

AUTOCRACY AND DEMOCRACY

THE mighty democratic movement of the modern world has not failed to affect Japan. No nation in this era can wholly escape its influence. A generation ago one might have supposed that Asia would be the last place on earth to reconstruct governments on the basis of the rights of the people. But, as we noted in Chapter I, the opening decades of the twentieth century saw the rising tide of humanity manifesting itself even in that age-old citadel of despotism.

It was inevitable that Japan should feel the impulse of this rising tide of popular will. When one considers the history and social and political organization of the Japanese people, one is not surprised to find that the modern democratic movement has made rather slow headway. Feudalism was not abolished till 1871, and it was not till 1889 that the constitution was formally promulgated. It was a notable day for Japan when the first Imperial Diet convened, November 29, 1890. The electoral franchise was so restricted that less than half a million voters took part in the election. The law of 1908 increased the number of voters to a million and a half. Agitation for wider suffrage continued, and the Manhood Suffrage Law of 1925 extended the right to vote to all males over thirty years of age, carrying the qualified electorate to approximately twelve million. Is there any other nation which in the space of thirty-eight years has expanded the franchise twenty-four times? This was not done without strenuous opposition, particularly on the part of the privileged classes, but step by step privilege has been obliged to yield to the popular demand. The first election under the enlarged franchise, while on the whole favourable to the administration, narrowed its majority and strengthened the opposition. Some disappoint-

ment was expressed by the Tokyo press that only about one-half of the qualified electorate appeared at the polls. However, there was no special interest throughout the country in the issues of that particular election, and Americans who, after many generations of education in popular government, often neglect to vote, should not be surprised that newly enfranchised men do not show an immediate appreciation of their privilege.

One of the leaders in the popular movement was Sennosuke Yokota. As we have already noted, most of the leaders of modern Japan have come from the knightly classes, but Yokota was born outside of that charmed circle. He was a dyer's apprentice, sold newspapers on the streets, became house servant in the home of Toru Hoshi, won the favour of his powerful employer, studied law at an evening school, entered politics, was elected a member of the Diet, was made chairman of the Bureau of Legislation, became an influential party leader and, at his death February 4, 1925, was a member of the Cabinet as Minister of Justice. His career shows that a man of ability and force of character can rise in Japan even though he does come from the ranks of the common people.

The Diet consists of a House of Peers and a House of Representatives. The Presidents and Vice-Presidents of both Houses are nominated by the Emperor, although the choice for the House of Representatives is made from three members who are presented by the House. The membership of the House of Peers includes 16 princes of blood royal, 15 other princes and 30 marquises, all of whom have seats by virtue of their rank; 20 counts, 73 viscounts, and 73 barons, chosen by the noblemen of these orders; 120 men of distinguished public service appointed by the Emperor, 47 financial magnates chosen by the largest taxpayers of their respective prefectures, and a few members of the Royal Academy chosen by that body. The House of Representatives is a popular body consisting of 464 members elected by the people.

The House did not immediately find itself. Gradually, however, its members began to give voice to their opinions and

even to criticise the acts or policies of the Cabinet. But the mental attitude developed by centuries of implicit obedience to feudal chieftains is not readily changed. The surprising thing is that the popular will has found any expression at all within so short a period. Today, debates in the Diet are often animated and sometimes sharply critical of the government, and the daily and weekly press is more and more outspoken.

But ruling classes everywhere do not lightly yield their prerogatives. They believe with the philosopher Hegel that "the people is that portion of the state which does not know what it wills," and with the Prussian Minister von Rochow, who spoke of "the limited intelligence of subjects." In Japan, the ruling class has kept power in its own hands. The aristocratic House of Peers is at a far remove from the people and wholly beyond their reach. The administration of the government is vested in a Cabinet of ten Ministers of State, including the Premier, appointed by the Emperor. A Privy Council with a President, Vice-President and twenty-four Councillors advises with the Emperor in matters of importance. This organization of the State is a great advance upon the feudalism which it supplanted, and it gives Japan a remarkably capable and efficient government. But modern Japan can hardly be called democratic. A nation which regards its Sovereign as a ruler by divine right and a demigod to be worshipped, and whose real government has not been in the hands of any constitutional body or person but of a small group of "Elder Statesmen"—such a nation is not yet under the sway of those conceptions of popular government which are current in the most advanced western nations.

These Elder Statesmen, or Genro, constituted a body which should not be overlooked by any one who wishes to understand Japanese political affairs. They had no legal status. "They are not recognized in the Japanese Constitution nor in the laws of Japan."¹ They have been merely a little group

¹ *Tokyo Asahi*.

of old men of high rank who became trusted advisers of the Emperor. The prerogatives of the crown are great, and they were exercised as the Elder Statesmen "advised." Theoretically, the Cabinet represented the throne; practically the Elder Statesmen represented it. The Japanese Cabinet has never wielded the power of the British Cabinet. Changes in ministerial personnel seldom effected changes in national policy, for the Emperor remained and he did what the Genro advised him to do. The latter, therefore, have really been the supreme governing body. Ministers rose and fell, but the Elder Statesmen were independent of Cabinet and Diet alike and beyond the reach of either. If the official bodies did not agree with the Genro, so much the worse for the official bodies.

Seldom mindful of the opinion of the people, often indeed defiant of it, there was a time in the early months of 1914 when the Genro deemed it prudent to do what astute political managers in America occasionally do—give outward recognition to a wave of public feeling by acquiescing in the choice of a popular idol for high office, in the hope that if they could not manage him directly they might be able to do so by their control of the agencies through which he would be obliged to work. Scandals in governmental departments under Prime Minister Yamamoto stung the nation to the quick, and in the turmoil the Cabinet went to pieces. The Elder Statesmen chose one "trusted" man after another to form a new Cabinet, but no one of them could succeed. The situation was becoming serious when the great popularity of Marquis Shigenobu Okuma and the belief that his advanced age would prevent him from being troublesome led the Genro to offer him the post. They did this with many misgivings, for Okuma was not a member of "The Old Guard" but was the acknowledged head of the Constitutional Party. The people regarded him as the "Grand Old Man" of Japan, and popular demand became too loud to be prudently resisted at a time when "The Old Guard" had been thrown on the defensive by disclosures of corruption.

Okuma soon intensified both the misgivings of the Elder Statesmen and the hopes of the constitutionalists by the vigour with which he undertook reforms. Unfortunately, the outbreak of the World War worked a change in his policy. Questions of home administration fell into the background before Great Britain's request to Japan to drive the Germans out of the Province of Shantung on the mainland, the opportunity to seize the German islands in the Pacific and thus eliminate a powerful rival to Japan's policy of supremacy in the Far East, and, most attractive of all, the chance to strengthen Japan's influence in China while the European Powers were so preoccupied at home that they could interpose no effective objection.

These developments necessarily brought the imperialistic military party to the front again and compelled Okuma to work with it. This was not altogether agreeable to him and, together with the burden of age, criticisms of his handling of relations with China, and an election scandal which involved his Minister of Home Affairs and weakened the influence of the Cabinet, led him to resign. It was significant of the power which the Elder Statesmen held that, before the public announcement of his retirement, October 4, 1916, he respectfully asked permission of the Elder Statesmen, and that when he recommended Viscount Takaaki Kato as his successor, in accordance with the known wishes of the Diet, the Elder Statesmen calmly disregarded the recommendation and the popular will and chose Viscount Seiki Terauchi, then Governor-General of Korea.

This selection of Terauchi as Okuma's successor as Prime Minister illustrated not only the ascendancy of the Elder Statesmen but a trend in the government of Japan which was the reverse of democratic. The Elder Statesmen at this time were Prince Yamagata, Prince Oyama, and Marquis Matsukata, Prince Yamagata being the dominant figure. These men, of great ability and force of character, were strongly of the opinion that the Cabinet should be responsible to the Throne

rather than to the Diet, which really meant that it be responsible to them. Marquis Okuma's party, however, held that the Cabinet should be accountable to the Diet, and through that body to the people. The issue, therefore, was really between autocracy and democracy. And autocracy won.

Great was the satisfaction in army circles when Terauchi's appointment was announced, and equally great was the dissatisfaction in other quarters. The popular press, not only in America and Great Britain but in Japan, was outspoken in opposition. The *Tokyo Asahi* sharply said: "The Genro should have respected the opinion of the Premier and should have paid attention to his recommendation of the leader of the majority as his successor." The *Tokyo Nichi-nichi* boldly declared: "The question is whether or not the government of Japan is to be conducted to forward the wishes of the people." The English *Japan Advertiser* added: "The Elder Statesmen have once more conferred on Japan a Cabinet devoid of any pretense of connection with representative institutions. Once more it is demonstrated that all the appurtenances of popular government with which we are familiar—the voters, registers, the elections, the legislators, and the parties—are a western façade run up to modernize an old style personal-government edifice of which the interior arrangements are uniquely Japanese."

Terauchi was an able, efficient, and masterful man, one of the outstanding personalities of Asia. He was, moreover, honest, patriotic and well-meaning. But he was an autocrat in every fibre of his being. A field-marshal in the army, he was a soldier by training, profession, and temperament—a great soldier and a good autocrat, but preëminently a soldier and an autocrat as distinguished from a civilian and a man of the people. He sincerely wanted to do what he deemed to be for the best interests of his country. He believed that Japan could best fulfil its high destiny as a power of the first-class, and as the leader and guardian of eastern Asia against further aggressions of western nations, by having a strong

centralized government that was free to act without being obliged to obey a popular assembly whose members might not act with adequate knowledge or under a due sense of responsibility. Like some other great soldiers he preferred peace to war. But his point of view was that of the army and the court rather than that of democracy in the British and American sense. He was a strong Premier, but he was guided by the opinion of the Genro and not by that of the Diet as the representative of the nation. He believed that power should come from above and not from below, that the court and nobility should rule, and that the people should obey. He was not a Gladstone but a Bismarck; with this difference, that back of him were the all-powerful Elder Statesmen to whom even he had to bow.

A well-known Japanese in America, in defending his native land before an audience which was cheering the world's growing demand for popular government, rightly argued that "democracy is no synonym for republic." But the situation in Japan hardly bears out his further statement that, if the former is rightly defined, "present-day Japan is as much a democracy as the United States, England, and France." It is true that Marquis Okuma said to a newspaper reporter after his retirement from office: "Japan is not ruled by a small group of politicians or by a ministry, but by public opinion." Perhaps he felt that patriotism made it desirable to speak in this way to the representative of a foreign newspaper. But he had said to his own people on a former occasion: "Certainly it does not appear to be the policy of Japanese diplomacy to voice the views of the people and their representatives in the Imperial Diet. Our Foreign Office has as a rule overlooked or disregarded public opinion. In most countries the cooperation of public opinion and diplomatic policy is thought to be most conducive to the best interests of the state: But in Japan diplomats are a class apart."¹ The attitude of the dominant party was significantly illustrated within a few

¹ Reported in the *Japan Magazine*, Tokyo, June, 1923.

weeks after the Terauchi Cabinet took office. Daikichiro Tagawa, a Christian gentleman of high standing, formerly a member of the Imperial Diet and for five years a vice-mayor of Tokyo, published three articles in which he criticised the government in language that would be considered commonplace in America, where the opponents of the party in power are accustomed to denounce the Administration. He compared the method of choosing a premier in Great Britain with the method in Japan; King George selecting the man whom the people desired, and the Emperor the man designated by the Elder Statesmen without regard to the popular will. "The whole Empire," added Mr. Tagawa, "recognizes that the Terauchi Cabinet was formed by the Elder Statesmen rather than by the imperial commands. By such means it is futile to think that the people can be made to respect the Imperial House. In fact it must be said with regret that the dignity of the Imperial House has been not a little impaired by such procedure."

This was held to be lese-majesty, as reflecting upon the Emperor and implying that he, who is of divine origin, is in the same class as King George and the men on thrones in other lands. Mr. Tagawa was arrested and sentenced to be imprisoned for five months and to pay a fine of one hundred dollars. Not only this, but Mr. Kashiwai, editor of the *Bummei Hyoron*, in which this article appeared, was also arrested and sentenced to two months' imprisonment and a fine of sixty dollars. Article XXIX of the Constitution guarantees that "Japanese subjects shall, within the limits of law, enjoy the liberty of speech, writing, publication, public meeting, and association;" but these writings were held to be not "within the limits of law."¹

This stern decisiveness was displayed not only toward the press but toward the Imperial Diet itself. In January, 1917, members of the House of Representatives ventured to raise the issue of parliamentary responsibility and a sharp debate

¹ Bulletin of April 30, 1917.

ensued, vigorously led by Yukio Ozaki, leader of the Constitutional Party and Mr. Takashi Inukai, leader of the Kokuminto or National Party. Believers in democratic institutions in other lands are glad to know that the party of the people is already strong enough in Japan to find bold advocates in the Diet. In this debate, the tide of opposition to the course of the government rose high, and Terauchi found himself confronted with the probability of an adverse vote on a question of confidence in the ministry. He did not flinch. Rising, he declared that the situation involved the prosperity of the Empire, and that while he maintained the confidence of the Emperor he could not accept the verdict of the House. Angry members rose to protest, but he stood his ground and demonstrated his power and his willingness to use it by having the Emperor dissolve the Diet January 25. The discomfited members had no alternative but to go home.

This occurrence has been construed as supporting the opinion that Carl Crow expressed in his book entitled *Japan and America*, that Japan is absolutely ruled by a small group of resolute men who dominate the Emperor and the people alike so that the former is a mere puppet in their hands and the latter an ignorant and acquiescent proletariat which is not consulted in any important matter. But this is going too far. The Emperor of Japan was not "a mere puppet." It is true that the organization of the government and the course of affairs made it clear that, however great his constitutional powers might be, these powers were exercised through the Genro and the Premier whom the Genro selected. But high rank among sovereigns must be accorded to the late Emperor, his Imperial Majesty Mutsuhito, in whose long reign of forty-five years Japan passed from a backward to a progressive nation.

Nor am I willing to concede that the people of Japan are adequately described as an ignorant and acquiescent proletariat. It would be unreasonable to expect that the democratic spirit could pervade the people of Japan in a couple of

generations to the extent that it has pervaded western nations after hundreds of years. It is highly creditable to the Japanese that already they have developed a small group of exceptionally strong and capable leaders to guide the nation through the period of transition. Some of these men, as for example Prince Ito, Marquis Okuma, Viscount Kato and others, have high place among the progressive statesmen of the modern era. It is not surprising that long and deeply-rooted absolutism is still incarnated in other powerful men.

The Japanese will work out the problem of relative pre-eminence in their own way. The issue of democracy versus autocracy is joined there as it has been everywhere else in the modern world. Men in the Island Empire are asking: Do the people exist for the state or the state for the people? Should the cabinet be responsible to a monarch or to a parliament? Should final supremacy be lodged in an emperor or in a body chosen by the people? The parliamentary leader, Mr. Ozaki, said, shortly after an attempt had been made to assassinate him: "To make the situation as clear as possible to the American people, let me say simply that our aim is that the ministers of state who direct the affairs of this Empire shall be chosen with some regard for the make-up of the House of Representatives which is elected by the people. That is, after all, the essential meaning of our Constitution."

This element in the nation is certain to prevail sooner or later, for "the stars in their courses" fight for it. It had become strong enough by the summer of 1918 to make the tenure of Count Terauchi rather precarious, and on September 21 he found it expedient to resign. He was succeeded by the Honorable Kei Hara, leader of the Constitutional Party known as Rikken Seiyukai, originally formed by Prince Ito, and which had opposed the administration of Terauchi. Kei Hara was sixty-four years of age, a trained lawyer, an eminent journalist, and a man of considerable experience in public life, having occupied various diplomatic and cabinet posts including three terms as Minister of Home Affairs. He had visited

Europe and America and was one of Prince Ito's principal supporters in founding the Seiyukai Party in 1900, and in 1914 he succeeded Marquis Saionji in its leadership.

We may add that the English terms applied to political parties in Japan: Seiyukai (Liberal), Kenseikai (Conservative, the result of a fusion in 1913 which supported the Cabinet of Marquis Okuma), and Kokuminto (National-Progressive) should not be interpreted too literally, as these parties are often little more than groups around particular leaders. It often happens that no one party has a majority. The important point now is that the party of which Mr. Hara was the head represented the strongest democratic tendencies. It was a long step from the platform of Count Terauchi to that of Mr. Hara. Both men had fine qualities; but the friends of Japan in other lands, while gladly recognizing the great abilities of the former Premier, naturally anticipated with satisfaction the development of democratic tendencies under the leadership of the latter. He surrounded himself with men of kindred spirit. The Foreign Minister was Viscount Y. Uchida, a progressive man well and favourably known in America. He had a conspicuous diplomatic career for a man who was not yet fifty years of age, as he had been Minister of Foreign Affairs in Tokyo, Secretary of Legation in Peking and London, and Ambassador to Vienna and Washington. His wife, by the way, is a graduate of Vassar College, New York. The Minister of Home Affairs was Mr. Tokonami, who had visited Europe and America, and who, when Vice-Minister of Home Affairs, was so impressed by the necessity of religion in a nation's life that he arranged the conference of representatives of religions which we have described in another chapter. The assassination of Prime Minister Hara by a misguided fanatic, November 4, 1921, was a national calamity which elicited universal sympathy in other lands. His successors, Viscount Korekiyo Takahashi, Admiral Baron Tomosaburo Kato, Viscount Kiyoura, Viscount Takaaki Kato, the Honorable Reijiro Wakatsuki, and the distinguished men

who have followed them in office, were men of high character and ability and they have wisely guided the affairs of state.

The outside world should not expect any sudden or decisive change in the national policy of Japan. Whatever party is in power will be absolutely loyal to the traditions of historic Japan and patriotic to the core. Imperial Japan will remain imperial in every respect. But the public opinion of the people will probably become increasingly influential. Indeed democratic sentiment among the Japanese has made striking growth within recent years. A significant instance of this occurred May 7, 1927, when the Lower House of the Imperial Diet by a vote of 210 to 194 passed a resolution condemning the Privy Council for its action April 17 declining to approve a Cabinet proposal to relieve the financial panic which then prevailed. Never before had the Diet ventured to challenge a decision of the august Privy Council which is responsible only to the Emperor, and sometimes only nominally to him. In the election of September, 1927, twenty-seven labour candidates were successful. This was a small proportion of the nearly twelve hundred candidates for the various offices, but it showed that a Labour Party is beginning to emerge.

That influential Japanese, Danjo Ebina, has said that "the German system suited the spirit of militarism and imperialism that still obtained in certain quarters, and gave to Japan a philosophy of absolutism which has a fascination for some minds," but that "the defeat of German militarism and imperialism on the battlefields of Europe means the defeat of these doctrines all the world over." He declares that "the greatest crisis in Japanese history is impending," and that "when this shell of Japanese nationalism breaks, the people of this country will become an international people, the universalism of Christ will take the place of Buddhism, and Christianity will become the religion of international Japan."

The notable reign of Emperor Mutsuhito ended with his death, July 30, 1912, when he was succeeded by the Crown Prince Yoshihito, who was then thirty-three years of age. He

was an intelligent ruler of progressive spirit but frail health. It soon became evident that he was failing in both body and mind, and in 1918 it became necessary for him to go into retirement and devolve the imperial prerogatives upon the Crown Prince, Hirohito, who was made Regent. The complete withdrawal of the Emperor, however, did not lessen the veneration with which he was regarded by his devoted subjects. Although physically and mentally incapacitated, he was still their Emperor. When, toward the end of 1926, the news spread that his death was approaching, the whole nation manifested the keenest anxiety. Kneeling multitudes watched and prayed before the palace gates, and the announcement of his death, December 25, plunged the whole nation into a grief that was not merely formal but deep and genuine. His funeral, February 8, 1927, was conducted with wonderful pomp and splendour and yet with an equally wonderful solemnity and reverence. All the ancient rites and ceremonies were scrupulously observed. Precedent required that the final obsequies should be held at night. The weather was cold and raw, but more than a million mourning people silently lined the four-mile road along which the ox-drawn funeral car slowly passed to the tomb at Asakawa. Several Japanese committed suicide in token of their grief, and more would have done so if they had not been restrained by the police.

The Crown Prince Regent, who had now become the one hundred and twenty-fourth Emperor of Japan, was twenty-five years of age. Two experiences had given him rare qualifications for his imperial duties. He is the first sovereign of Japan to visit Europe so that his tour in 1921 gave him an opportunity which none of his predecessors had to see lands beyond "the four seas." The other experience was his regency which had familiarized him with the duties of his august position. He has begun his reign with the affectionate loyalty of his subjects and with the respect and good-will of people of other nationalities.

Meantime, death has been busy among the Elder States-

men. Iwakura, Ito, Oyama, Matsukata and Yamagata, all are gone. Of their successors, only one, Prince Saionji, remains at this writing. Realizing that at his advanced age the end of life was near, he sought in June, 1926, to arrange for the perpetuation of the Genro; but his effort aroused a popular opposition that indicated that, while modern Japan gladly revered the venerable members of that remarkable body, it was reluctant to give like power to their successors. Old men who are eminent for rank and wisdom will still have large influence in shaping the policy of the nation, but the Genro as an institution is apparently passing into history.

THE ARMY AND NAVY

IS Japan physically able to maintain the place in world affairs which she has now attained? It is not to the credit of modern civilization that such a question must be considered either by others or by the Japanese themselves. Unhappily, the world has been slow in emerging from the period in which there was no international court to which a wronged nation could appeal for justice, and in which national selfishness, greed, and arrogance are often glorified as "patriotism." Each government has felt that it must be able to protect itself or go to the wall, and that in the struggle for trade and territory and "a place in the sun" it is every nation for itself and the devil take the hindmost. "A nation must maintain its sea and land forces at such a point as shall correspond with its national strength," said a former German Chancellor; otherwise "it would run the risk of forfeiting its present place among the powers to some stronger nation that is willing to take it."

Japan is as apt a pupil in war as in peace, and western nations have done much to convince her that it was necessary to be. They long acted on the assumption that might makes right. Asia has always acted on that assumption, and recent experiences have not weakened the savage necessity. While Europeans and Americans have been talking about "The Yellow Peril," Asiatics have been talking about "The White Peril." The impressions of the Japanese have been voiced by Toyokichi Iyenaga, who grimly writes:

"Since modern nations have erected their political structures upon the ruins of Rome, the dominant note of their existence has been and still is militarism. To join their ranks the best passport is martial

prowess. This assertion is strikingly proved by the manner in which Japan was at last admitted into the list of modern Powers. For half a century Japan assiduously applied herself to the reconstruction of the arts of peace. She remodelled her educational system, codified her laws, brought the administration of justice to the modern standard, consecrated her energy to the cultivation of western science and literature, created the commercial and industrial middle class, opened a Parliament, and proclaimed the freedom of speech, press, and faith. Did this progress of Japan in the way of peace succeed in placing her on an equal footing with the western nations? No! Unpleasant as it may sound to you, the position which Japan coveted in the family of nations was gained only after she had unwittingly demonstrated her skill in the game of war. When in defense of her national honour and interests she fought her great neighbour and won the battles of Pyengyang and the Yalu, Japan discovered to her surprise that her prestige in the eyes of the West had become suddenly enhanced. And it was only after another terrible war, waged with fear and trembling for her national security, that the frank recognition of the insular kingdom as a great Power was given by the world. This is forsooth a sad commentary on the militarism of the West. . . . Is there any wonder that the conviction of dire necessity for guarding herself by efficient armament has sunk deep into the heart of Japan? ”¹

The aggressions of European Powers in Asia and Africa afforded painful evidence that Japan's apprehensions were not without cause. The Japanese were not slow in taking the lesson to heart. They realized that the necessity for military and naval strength in their case was intensified by their small home territory, its inadequate agricultural productiveness, their island position, their dependence upon foreign commerce, and the disposition of powerful western nations to seize the countries on the adjacent mainland whose enormous markets and resources, if in unfriendly hands, would isolate Japan and reduce her to a position of weakness and insignificance. They understand perfectly that the Russians will not permanently acquiesce in exclusion from an ice-free port in the

¹ Article in *The Oriental Review*, June 10, 1911.

North Pacific. They know that the Koreans and Chinese fear and dislike them. They also know that many foreigners throughout the Far East are not friendly to them. They believe, too, that the position which they have won in the world in general and in the Far East in particular is one that can be held only by military force. Lamentable it surely is that Japan's entrance into the family of nations should entail a demonstration of her ability to fight on equal terms with the alleged Christian Powers of the West! Convinced that this must be done, the Japanese are maintaining their army and navy at a high stage of efficiency.

One hears many stories about a large army and enormous stores of munitions of war. It is difficult to tell how far they are true, for government secrets are more closely guarded than in America. The reports are probably exaggerated. But no one doubts that the Japanese are keeping themselves in a state of effective military preparedness. Military expenditures have been reduced in recent years. The appropriations for the army and navy are less than half of the military and naval budgets of Great Britain and the United States. But allowance should be made for lower cost of maintenance. Moreover, in a country where every physically fit man must serve a prescribed period in the army or navy and then a further period in the reserve corps, the number actually under arms at a given time is relatively immaterial since it can be multiplied overnight in case of need.

As for the navy, in 1894 it had a tonnage of 61,000; in 1904 of 283,743; and in 1916 of 699,916. A program of further expansion formed in 1917 was being effectively developed down to 1922, when the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments brought it to a halt. Japan entered wholeheartedly into that Conference and accepted third place after Great Britain and the United States on a ratio of 5-5-3 in capital ships. This reduced Japan's replacement tonnage in ships of this class to 315,000 tons, a reduction which was loyally carried out.

This leaves Japan the third strongest naval power in the world in capital ships. It is, however, by no means certain that in total naval strength she is in the third place because the Washington Conference agreement was limited to battleships and battle cruisers exceeding 10,000 tons, and it placed no limitation on cruisers of 10,000 tons or less, or on destroyers, submarines or airships. All the governments which participated in the Conference, including the French, British, and American, have felt free to proceed with the development of naval plans in these unlimited classes, and have actually done so. It is not to be supposed that Japan has failed to do what she knows perfectly well that other powers are doing. She has several large shipyards equipped with modern machinery in which she can construct her own craft for sea and air. Her gun factory at Kure is one of the largest and best equipped plants of the kind in the world. Her naval program for the five years beginning 1926 includes forty vessels under the Washington Conference limitation, at a cost of yen 321 millions, and her air force is being rapidly developed. As long as other nations are developing their naval and air strength, Japan cannot reasonably be expected to diminish hers. However, when, in 1927, President Coolidge invited four other nations to join the United States in a five-power Conference on Limitation of Armaments with a view to still further reductions than those which were agreed upon in 1922, Japan was one of the first to accept the invitation, although France and Italy declined it. When President Coolidge then proposed a three-power Conference of Great Britain, Japan and America, Japan, March 11, joined Great Britain in accepting that. The prompt and cordial response which Japan gave to these invitations of President Coolidge and her loyalty in scrapping some of her battleships under the agreement of 1922, leave no doubt as to the sincerity of her coöperation in the interest of peace. It was not Japan's fault that the Geneva Conference on naval limitation, in 1927, failed. Her representatives did everything they could to make it a success. It

was the deadlock of Great Britain and the United States that blocked progress. But no other nation should delude itself with the idea that, as long as military and naval preparedness is the order of the day, Japan will be unprepared for any emergency that may develop.

Japan possesses some advantages which make it more formidable as a fighting nation than its numerical strength and financial resources might suggest, and as they are important factors in the consideration of Japan as a world power, it may be well to mention them.

First: A political organization able to act quickly and decisively. Highly centralized monarchical governments can prepare for and wage war more readily and effectively than democratic governments. This is one of the grave indictments against war—it gives the advantage to those forms of government which allow the least liberty to the individual and concentrate the most power in a few officials. Such governments can adopt war measures secretly without the necessity of consulting congresses and parliaments, whose members demand unlimited freedom of debate and who are sensitive to a public opinion represented by myriads of inquisitive and outspoken newspapers. A democracy acts slowly and clumsily in comparison.

Second: A martial spirit pervading the entire population. The typical Japanese is a born soldier and he takes naturally and with avidity to the profession of arms. The annual calling of young men to the colours is made an occasion of festivities. Houses are decorated with flags and processions of friends and neighbours accompany the recruits to the station with every demonstration of honour. Until the aggressions of western nations compelled them to adopt a different policy, the Chinese despised the profession of arms and filled their regiments with the offscourings of their population. The Japanese have always given of their best to their army and navy. They have a genius for war. Feudalism dominated Japan longer than any other nation, and while the system has been

overthrown, the feudal spirit survives and becomes a formidable asset for war. For many centuries and until within the memory of men now living, the ideal type of the Japanese was the Knight. "Among flowers the cherry, among men the warrior" was a popular sentiment. "Bushido, the Soul of Japan," is "the Way of the Warrior." It is not surprising that such a people quickly assimilated modern weapons of precision and in an incredibly brief time learned to use them efficiently.

Third: An extraordinary national unity, inspired by the most intense and self-sacrificing loyalty. I have referred in another chapter to the solidarity of the Japanese people. The whole nation becomes a fighting machine in time of danger. The war with Russia illustrated this on a startling scale. The civil, military, and naval departments of the government acted in absolute accord. The spirit of patriotic determination actuated not only every soldier and sailor but like devotion characterized the people at home. Several aged and infirm parents committed suicide to enable their sons, upon whom they were dependent, to go to the war. Wives proudly saw their husbands march away, and mothers killed themselves in grief and shame when their sons were rejected as physically unfit. When neighbours called to express sympathy with a man whose boy had been killed, he replied: "I am not an object of sympathy. All must die, and my son might have died like the son of my neighbour, in a cabin, of fever. But he died on the field of battle in the service of his Emperor and in the performance of his duty. I should be congratulated."

Fourth: Thorough preparation. This preparation begins with the boys in the public schools. There is a parade-ground in connection with each one that I saw, and a spacious hall for drill in bad weather. Light rifles are provided and a dark-blue uniform with brass buttons. The training is far from superficial. Drills are a regular feature of the curriculum. In several cities that we visited our hosts happened to live near public school buildings, and every day I heard the bugle-

calls and saw the platoons of boys marching and going through the manual of arms in businesslike fashion. The Japanese believe in universal military service, and every physically qualified man between the ages of seventeen and forty receives military training and after his return to civil life is amenable to his country's summons. As we have noted elsewhere, the number of men actually under arms at any given time is therefore not important. The entire able-bodied population of the country is available on instant call.

Some of the military posts are the old feudal castles which were appropriated by the government when feudalism was abolished in 1871. I do not wonder that the Emperor deemed it inexpedient to leave the great nobles in possession of those massive fortifications. That at Nagoya, for example, stands in grounds of vast extent, is protected by deep outer and inner moats, and its solid stone walls are of a height and thickness which would make them impregnable against anything but modern artillery. The labour of construction must have been prodigious. The castle was founded in 1607 by Yoshinao, son of the celebrated Tokugawa Ieyasu. It towers impressively above the northern part of the city, its famous golden dolphins, although forty-eight feet long, appearing to be of modest size in comparison with the huge building which, as masters of water, they were supposed to defend from the god of fire. Ten thousand soldiers were stationed at the castle at the time of my visit, and the hard, level parade-ground is so vast that I was told that 37,000 men had drilled on it at once. The castle at Osaka is another notable example. I saw single stones which, as nearly as I could estimate, were forty feet long, twenty high, and eight feet thick, and there were others almost as large. Only "an unlimited command of naked human strength" could have made possible those stupendous fortifications in an age when modern hoisting-machinery was unknown. Of course they were built by forced labour and maintained by tribute exacted from the wretched farmers and common people over a wide area. When feudalism received

its death-blow, the people were emancipated from such contributions of work and rice. The haughty lords were compelled to reside in Tokyo where the Emperor could keep his eye on them, and their formidable castles were filled with imperial troops. Seven thousand were quartered in the barracks that had been erected on the Osaka Castle grounds, and the number appeared small in comparison with the extent of the preserve.

Regiments are drilled until they are perfect fighting units. I visited a number of military posts, and although I have seen soldiers of many nations, I have never seen such drilling as I saw in Japan. The officers devoted little time to those showy parades and fancy exercises which so delight spectators at an American military post, and which are about as helpful as dancing-lessons when fighting days come. They made their men trudge up-hill and down in heavy marching order, dig trenches, charge batteries, fight sham battles, and do everything just as it must be done in real warfare. The house in which I was entertained at Kanazawa was not far from a garrison, and the troops were drilling night after night when I went to sleep. I formed the impression then that when Japan did fight, somebody would get hurt.

The navy was working equally hard. "When matters were growing serious," an observer wrote, "the Japanese navy underwent a special battle training—constant firing at long range with heavy guns under war conditions, torpedo work at night in bad weather, using live torpedoes, manœuvring at night without lights, night-firing, and the rehearsal of operations that were actually to form part of the war when it began."

The individual Japanese soldier, while short of stature as all his countrymen are, is solid, patient, temperate, inured to hardship, accustomed to an outdoor life, disciplined to the highest point of military efficiency, armed with the most highly improved weapons, and unquestioning in obedience to his officers who are often hereditary chiefs of his clan. He was a familiar figure on the streets of all the cities I visited.

He invariably wore belt, sidearms and often gloves, was neat in appearance, erect in bearing and well behaved in manner.

After the outbreak of the World War in 1914, a missionary in the Marshall Islands wrote:

“On the morning of September 29, several Japanese men-of-war appeared, and an armed force was landed and the Japanese flag hoisted. Although martial law necessarily prevails, it is in its mildest form, and all nationalities are treated with the utmost courtesy and consideration. Last month 800 men from the fleet had leave on shore for a day, but there were no cases whatever of drunkenness, disorder, or immorality. The men, instead of drinking freely of beer and other intoxicants, which they could have obtained at the saloon that was open to all, preferred to spend their leave money on sugar, and appeared to enjoy themselves immensely. From the time of the first landing until the present, the conduct of the men has been exemplary, and I do not think could be surpassed by the troops of any other civilized nation.”

The Japanese soldier needs no such elaborate commissariat as the British and American soldier. He can live contentedly on a daily ration of a few cents' worth of rice mixed with whole wheat or barley, occasionally supplemented by a little meat or fish. And yet his endurance is as remarkable as his loyalty and bravery. In north China, during the Boxer Uprising, he came into competition with the soldiers of the great nations of the West, and it was the well-nigh universal testimony not only of missionaries and newspaper correspondents but of European and American army officers, that “the little Japanese were the best soldiers of them all,” excelling in discipline, in celerity of movement, in orderly behaviour, in the perfection of their commissary and quartermaster departments, and in general efficiency for hard campaigning. When the Pope sent a handsome diamond to Bishop Favier with instructions to give it to the man who had performed the best service during the siege of Peking, the bishop gave it to Colonel Shiba, military attaché of the Japanese Legation.

Japan's navy, too, is one of the best in the world. Her ships are thoroughly modern in construction and equipment, and her officers and men know how to use their formidable fighting machines. The world has not forgotten that in the war with China the Japanese captured and sunk Chinese battleships with unarmoured cruisers. When the thermometer is twenty-six degrees below the freezing-point, and the decks are sheeted with ice and the wind is blowing a gale and the air is thick with whirling snow, most sailors would discreetly suspend operations. But though these were the conditions before Weihaiwei, the Japanese tumbled down the Chinese fortifications as smilingly as if on a summer's holiday. Admiral Belknap said: "I do not hesitate to express the opinion that, were English and Japanese fleets of about equal strength to meet in battle, the chances would be as favourable to the Japanese as to the English. The Japanese will fight; let there be no mistake about that. The sun does not shine on a more determined or more intrepid race than that of Japan."

The Japanese soldier never counts the cost to himself of any order that he may receive, and rather hopes that he may have the honour of being killed for the Emperor, whom he loves and worships. Japanese soldiers and sailors are characterized by a self-sacrificing dash and determination which make them well-nigh invincible. At the outbreak of the war with Russia, some Japanese in their eagerness to go to the front divorced their wives or sent them back to their parents. Doctor Henry Loomis, of Yokohama, said that one man, finding himself unable to make arrangements for the care of his two little children, killed them in order to free himself for military service. Another sold his two daughters to a brothel-keeper. Admiral Togo told his officers to sail with the expectation that they would not see their wives and children again, and not even to think about them or write to them. It is said that he himself once struck his wife and ordered her to be silent when she entreated him not to rise from a sick-bed to go to his ship. "I shall count it an honour to die for

Japan," was the unanimous reply of a regiment to the question: "What do you plan to do in the war with Russia?" When Admiral Togo called for Kesshi-tai (a body of men resolved to fight till death) to sink blocking steamships in the entrance to Port Arthur, 2,000 men eagerly responded, and among the applications was the following from a second-class warrant officer:

February 18, 1904.

COMMANDER HIKOJIRO IJICHI,
H. I. M. S. *Mikasa*.

SIR:—I, being desirous of participating in the volunteer corps now being raised, entreat you to select me, hereby sending in application written with my own blood.

MONPEI HAYASHI.

When Captain Yashiro, of the Japanese battleship *Asama*, bade good-by to the volunteers, he gave them to drink from a large silver loving-cup filled with cold water, as if he were giving them the wine of the sacrament (when near relatives in Japan part without any expectation of ever meeting again, they drink by turns from a cup of cold water as they bid each other a last good-by) and said to them: "I send you to the place of death, and I have no doubt that you are ready to die; but I do not mean to advise you to despise your life nor to run needless risks in trying to make a great name. What I ask of you all is to do your duty regardless of your life. The cup of water that I now offer you is not meant to give you courage—it would be shameful if our men needed Dutch courage to go to the place of death—it is only to make you representatives of the honour of the *Asama*. Submit your life to the will of Heaven and calmly perform your duty."¹

In April, 1910, Lieutenant Tsutomu Sakuma, of the ill-fated submarine No. 6, found that, as the result of an unavoidable accident, his submarine was sinking and that death

¹ Quoted by George Kennan, article in *The Outlook*, June 18, 1904.

by suffocation was inevitable. He calmly wrote in his log-book:

"I have no words to beg pardon for losing His Majesty's boat and for killing my men, owing to my carelessness. But all the crew have well discharged their duties till their death, and have worked with fortitude. . . . Our only regret is that this accident may, we fear, cause a hindrance to the development of the submarine. . . . I am greatly satisfied. I have always been prepared for death on leaving home. I humbly ask Your Majesty, the Emperor, to be so gracious as not to let the bereaved families of my men be subjected to destitution. This is the only anxiety which occupies my mind at present."

Human Bullets, a Soldier's Story of Port Arthur, is the title of a little book by Lieutenant Tadayoshi Sakutai, in which a typical Japanese vividly describes the fierce joy of battle against the foes of his country. He calls it a "delightful business to pursue a flying enemy when they are shot from behind and fall like leaves in the autumnal wind." It is not a light thing for the world when modern weapons of precision are put into the hands of men of such warlike passion.

The war with Russia brought into high relief some phases of Japan's methods of preparation. The intelligence department had collected complete and detailed information regarding the topography of the country to be fought over. Every path and creek, every hill and valley in all Korea and Manchuria were indicated upon maps conveniently arranged for officers in the field. Plans of campaign had been worked out so that every important battle was fought on the prescribed lines, and the commanding general could report afterward that he had engaged the enemy "as prearranged," a phrase which occurs with significant frequency in official reports. Enormous accumulations of supplies and munitions of war had been bought or manufactured. Arms, ammunition, food, clothing, equipment, transportation—everything indeed that

the army and navy required—were provided and stored where they could be readily used.

This perfect preparedness enabled the Japanese to be prompt in taking the offensive. They forced the fighting from start to finish. Knowing precisely what they wanted to do, they went at their task with relentless energy. General Grant's motto, "When in doubt, go forward," was bettered by the Japanese for they were never in doubt. The result was that the campaign was fought on their lines, and that the Russians were kept so busy defending themselves that they had no chance to develop strategy of their own. The moral power of such bold initiative was tremendous. The Japanese troops were always eager and confident, while the Russians were kept in constant apprehension of attack, an apprehension which was saved from frequent panic only by the dogged obstinacy of the Slavic temperament.

Fifth: Maximum strength in battle was another element in Japanese success. The Russian general Kuropatkin lamented that "at the end of March, 1905, when we had carried out a very energetic preparation of the theatre of war-like action as far as the River Sungari, the fighting element in the Manchurian army consisted only of 58 per cent in some sections of the troops. . . . In April, the percentage of bayonets in the First Manchurian Army constituted 51.9 per cent." But the Japanese succeeded in keeping their sick and special detail lists so small and the health of their troops so good that they usually had more than 90 per cent of their men in action.

Sixth: Sanitation and prophylaxis must not be overlooked in studying the causes of Japanese success. Disease is often a greater danger to an army than the living enemy. The history of former wars shows that an average of four men have died from disease for every one killed in action. In six months of the Crimean campaign, the losses of the allied forces from this cause were 50,000 as against 20,000 from battle casualties. In the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-8, the deaths

from disease (80,000) were four times as many as those which occurred in battle or from wounds. In the war of the United States with Mexico, the proportion of deaths from disease to those from battle casualties was three to one. In the American Civil War the Northern armies lost 110,000 men by shells and bullets and 199,720 by disease, or 8.6 per cent of the number of men in the army. During the French campaign of 1894 in Madagascar, about 14,000 soldiers were sent to the front. Only 29 were killed in action, but over 7,000 perished from preventable disease. In the Boer War in South Africa, the British losses from disease, compared with those from wounds, were ten to one. In our own war with Spain, 14 lives were sacrificed to ignorance and carelessness for every soldier who died on the firing-line or from wounds. The actual figures were 293 deaths from battle casualties and 3,681 from disease.¹ President Taft declared that there were 20,000 cases of typhoid fever among 120,000 troops, and that 90 per cent of the volunteer regiments were infected within eight weeks from the date of mobilization. Among 10,759 men encamped at Jacksonville, Florida, for four months in 1898, there were 2,693 cases of fever and 529 deaths; an annual death-rate of 147.5 per 1,000 for soldiers at whom not a shot was fired.² Colonel Theodore Roosevelt declared that the whole American force at Santiago was an army of invalids. Shakespeare caused Henry V to voice the experience of many military commanders when, after a short campaign in France, the King lamented:

“ My people are with sickness much enfeebled;

My army but a weak and sickly guard.”

Until recent years, many officers of European and American armies were almost contemptuously indifferent to the health of their men. Army surgeons were free to advise, but had little or no authority to enforce sanitary measures. Their duty was

¹ Cf. Dr. L. L. Seaman, *The Real Triumph of Japan*.

² Major Robert E. Noble, quoted in the *New York Times*, May 27, 1917.

believed to be to take care of men after they had become ill, not to prevent them from becoming ill. There were regulations regarding camp locations, latrines, sick-calls and field-hospitals; but the average commander apparently deemed the prevention of disease unworthy of the soldier spirit. When I was in Manila in 1901, I saw a regiment encamped in a veritable lake of mud, and many of the men sick in consequence. I was credibly informed that a request to the general in command for permission to remove the camp to an available drier site was sharply refused on the ground that soldiers must get used to such things! An artillery officer who was prominent in the Santiago campaign boasted that he did not drink boiled water in Cuba, or carry out any other "ridiculous sanitary recommendations." He died of typhoid in the Philippines six months later. A lieutenant of infantry refused to be vaccinated, and smallpox caused his funeral a month after reaching the Philippines. Both of these officers were regarded by their countrymen as heroes who had died for the flag.¹

Japan was the first nation to remedy these abuses and to deal intelligently with questions of military health and sanitation. It is only fair to bear in mind that the real causes of many maladies and of the methods of propagation were not known until a short time ago. The germ theory of disease, the relation of mosquitoes to malaria, flies and water to typhoid, body-lice to typhus, dirt to suppuration, and the use of anti-septics, anti-toxins, and other preventives are comparatively recent discoveries. The average civilian slept in an unventilated room under the blissful impression that "night air is injurious," and ate and drank what he pleased in calm neglect of every health precaution. Even the medical profession prescribed drugs for diphtheria while drain-pipes were out of order, and ordered a milk diet for a fever patient without reference to the purity of the milk supply. There has been a remarkable increase in knowledge regarding these subjects.

¹ Article by Major Charles E. Woodruff of the Medical Corps, U. S. A., in the *New York Times*, October 18, 1908.

Japan and Russia were the first nations to wage a great war after the civilized world had begun to realize the significance of these things. But Russia certainly did not show, and it is doubtful whether any other white nation would have shown, the intelligent and resolute determination with which the Japanese handled this problem.

This care is not to be attributed to a greater regard for the welfare of the individual soldier as a man than has been manifested by other governments. No other generals in the world more freely sacrificed their men in battle. They were wise enough, however, to realize that sick men cannot fight effectively, that an invalid soldier is a double loss, for he needs a well man to take care of him, and that men in prime condition make a more formidable army than men weakened by disease.

The Japanese were as thorough and methodical in this as in all their preparation and conduct of the war. Surgeons are not regarded as mere civilians in uniforms who are accorded rank by courtesy; they are authoritative officers who not only care for the sick and wounded but who have power and discretion in sanitary matters. A commanding officer who ignored a recommendation of an army surgeon which dealt with the preservation of the health of his troops would have found himself in trouble in short order. The aphorism of Napoleon, that "an army fights on its stomach," is fully understood by the Japanese. Careful attention is given to camp hygiene, and troops are told how to prepare and serve their food, what kinds must be avoided, how food should be chewed, and how the bowels can be kept in proper order.

Drinking water receives special attention. The medical department of the army sends experts in advance of marching troops to test the water in wells and streams. If one is found impure, a notice is posted forbidding the use of the water without boiling. Every company has an apparatus for boiling water, and a soldier is not permitted to take a drink of any water which has not been pronounced fit for use either by testing or boiling.

Before going into battle, every soldier is given a first-aid-to-the-injured packet, and taught how to use it. He is required to take a bath, put on clean underclothing, and pare and clean his finger-nails, so that if a bullet enters his body it will not carry in shreds of dirty clothing or impurities from the skin or hands. One can imagine the laughter with which American troops would have greeted such orders, and the difficulty of enforcing them. But the feudal spirit, the unquestioning obedience, and the iron discipline of the Japanese are equal to every demand.

The results of this policy in the Russia-Japan War amazed the world. The Japanese generals commanded men in "the pink of condition." As the steel-jacketed bullets usually bored clean holes which were not infected by dirty bodies or soiled clothing, and as the soldier promptly clapped an antiseptic bandage over the wound, a very large percentage of the injuries received in battle quickly healed by first intention, many of them requiring no other treatment. Sickness was so effectually held in check that, while 58,887 men were killed in battle or died from wounds, there were only 27,158 deaths from disease among the 1,200,000 men who went to the front.

Equal care was exercised in the navy. Food and sanitation are more easily watched on warships than on land, so that illness is less common among sailors than among soldiers. Wounded men, too, can be more quickly cared for on ship-board than when they are scattered over miles of ground where they may have to lie for hours, and perhaps days, before they can be reached. Naval commanders order men to plug their ears with cotton before a battle so that the concussion of heavy cannon will not rupture eardrums. The Japanese surgeons took this precaution, carefully examined the eyes of gunners to make sure that there was no impairment of vision which might affect their aim, and during engagements supplied the battery crews with a weak solution of boracic acid to wash out the eyes when they became affected by smoke and dust. Food and clothing for both soldiers and sailors were

adapted to the climate and season, so that Japanese troops were not compelled in midsummer to swelter in the heavy flannel shirts and to eat the heating foods of Wisconsin lumber-jacks in winter, as American soldiers were in the war with Spain.

Some critics assert that the Japanese have been overpraised for their health record. It is alleged that they were as secretive about their sick returns as they were about everything else, and that there were more sick soldiers than they cared to have the world know. The Asiatic scourge of beri-beri was often prevalent.¹ We must remember, too, in connection with the fact that the number of deaths from disease was less than that from bullets, that the Japanese sacrificed their lives in battle as white soldiers seldom do. An American general who ordered repeated charges which resulted in the annihilation of the columns making them would be universally execrated. General Grant was denounced as "a butcher" because he directed single assaults which caused the death of less than half of the attacking force. But when Japanese regiments were completely annihilated at Port Arthur, fresh regiments were ordered up, to be wiped out in turn, and then still other regiments, until the hill slopes were turned into shambles. This kind of warfare of course swelled the proportion of killed and wounded as compared with the sick. But making all due allowance for these considerations, the general fact remains that, in comparison with all previous wars, the Japanese were successful to an unprecedented degree in lessening disease and in treating wounds.

Western governments have been learning the lesson. Their war departments now pay far closer attention to the health of soldiers, and the medical arm of the service has a higher relative standing than it had before the Russia-Japan War. The World War, a decade later, bore striking witness to this improvement. It is true that typhus raged among the Serbian

¹ Cf. F. A. McKenzie, *The Unveiled East*, p. 106, and B. L. Weale, *The Coming Struggle in Eastern Asia*, p. 204.

troops, that the Russians were characteristically heedless in matters of sanitation, and that the British and French expedition to Gallipoli lost nearly a hundred thousand men by disease. But the health record on the western front was remarkably good. Soldiers on both sides were comparatively well fed and well clothed. Epidemics were stopped. Wounds were so skilfully treated that more than 80 per cent of the wounded men recovered sufficiently to enable them to return to the battle-line within three or four weeks. Of the first half-million men that Canada sent to Europe, "the deaths from sickness were less than 5.3 per cent of all the deaths, and less than $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent of all the casualties. . . . Only one out of every 411 soldiers succumbed to sickness in the course of nearly three years of camp and trench life combined."

The English and Australian showing would probably be about equally satisfactory. The French record was sadly lowered by tuberculosis. Doctor Herman M. Biggs, of New York, said that 150,000 French soldiers had to be withdrawn from the army on this account alone. This lamentable fact should not be attributed to French disregard of reasonable precautions but to the fact that the frightful and long-continued fighting compelled France in her desperation to send to the front many men who were not physically able to withstand the strain of life in the trenches. Taking the World War as a whole, careful sanitation, preventive medicine and antiseptic treatment of wounds so lowered the mortality rate that the proportion of men killed or permanently disabled by wounds or disease was probably not as high as in most former wars. One-third of all the men who went into the battle of Gettysburg were left on the field. General Grant began a campaign in Virginia with 150,000 men, and from these and the reinforcements which joined them he lost 200,000 in three months from sickness and fighting. Major-General William C. Gorgas, Surgeon-General of the United States Army, who cites these facts, says that there was no such proportionate

loss as that in any of the big battles of the World War. The actual loss was, of course, far greater than in previous wars; but this was due to the unprecedented number of combatants engaged and not to a higher proportion. The death-rate from disease in the American army in France was declared by General Peyton C. March to have been less than three-fourths of one per cent, which is believed to be the lowest that any army has ever reported.

I am digressing from the Japanese; but perhaps I have said enough in this chapter to show that Japan is now a military power of the first class, and that she is quite able to maintain her position against all comers. Marquis Okuma voiced the united opinion of the Japanese people when he concluded an address in March, 1915, by saying: "Japan is becoming a great country. We must have an army adequate to defend our country. The European War proved that a regularly trained army is necessary in defending a country. The one-year service system advocated may do for small countries, like Switzerland for instance, but it will not do for Japan. We should consider our position in the world." The *Japan Advertiser* said that the *banzais* of the five thousand people who heard him "nearly lifted the Kabukiza Theatre."

VI

TRADE AND MANUFACTURES

MY two visits to Japan, eight years apart, gave me an opportunity to note the altering conditions. Visibly indeed there was little change. The charm of Japanese scenery was unmarred, save in a few places, by the crass materialism which in America lines our railways with huge signs vouchsafing the opinion that we ought to use bile beans, that soothing syrup is good for babies, and that pink pills will redden pale faces. Japanese architecture was the same, save that here and there a new public building was of foreign style. Native garments still predominated on the streets. The jinrickisha awaited the traveler at every station, and there were the same long rows of narrow shops with their picturesque signs. The visitor could easily find external signs of change if he looked for them, and in some instances they obtruded themselves. Nevertheless, Japan to the eye was the familiar historic Japan.

But as I moved among the people I became conscious of subtler changes. In 1901 I found the militant spirit dominant. The people had not recovered from their rage and chagrin over Russia's seizure of Port Arthur and Manchuria which had deprived them of the fruits of the China-Japan War. The nation was thinking of revenge. It realized, too, that Russian aggressions must result in war. It was therefore drilling soldiers, building warships, and accumulating military stores.

After the decisive victory over Russia, Japan, while not less military, became more commercial. It realized that war is expensive business. The China-Japan War ran up the national budget from \$41,500,000 annually to \$84,000,000, and the Russia-Japan War swelled it to \$252,500,000. The latter

cost Japan \$585,000,000, and at its close the nation was staggering under a debt of \$1,125,153,411. This may not look large in comparison with the enormous debts incurred by western nations in the World War a decade later, but it was \$23 per capita, which was ten times the per capita debt of 1893. Almost everything was taxed. Official reports listed among other sources of revenue taxes on land, incomes, business, succession, traveling, mining, bank-notes, liquors, soy, sugar, textile fabrics, kerosene, bourses, imports, tonnage, stamps, and "other taxes," while postal, telegraph, telephone, and railway services, forests, salt, camphor, and tobacco were classed as "public undertakings and state property" whose profits accrue to the state treasury. In addition to an import duty of 15 per cent on manufactured articles, native manufacturers were heavily assessed, and every citizen with an annual income of more than \$150 paid income tax. The Japanese had to pay from 20 to 30 per cent of their incomes for taxes. The Tokyo *Kokumin Shimfun* declared that "the heavy debts of Japan are more than the nation can endure"; and Baron Shibusawa, one of the ablest financiers in Japan, admitted that the rate of taxation in Japan was "extremely high and more than the people at large can bear."

Japan knows that its material resources are greatly inferior to those of other first-class powers, and that the position and ambitions of the nation require wealth as well as an army and navy. The Japanese cannot get this wealth by agriculture; for not only is Japan a comparatively small country territorially but only 13 per cent of its area is easily susceptible of cultivation, and 15 per cent is about the practicable limit. The valleys are rich, but they are not extensive, and there are no vast stretches of rich prairie soil like those in Manchuria and the United States. The increasing pressure of population in Japan has already been noted. Japan proper had 37,017,362 inhabitants in 1883; 39,607,254 in 1888; 41,388,313 in 1893; 43,763,855 in 1898; 46,732,807 in 1903; 48,649,583 in 1906; and it now has 61,081,954, an average of 378 to the

square mile. The birth rate is high, 34.9 per thousand. The population is densest on the main island of Honshu and the smaller southern islands of Kyushu and Shikoku. The far northern island of Hokkaido, although with a generous area of 23,000 square miles and much fertile soil, has only 2,500,000 inhabitants. The Government is attempting to relieve the pressure of population in the larger islands by inducing a million and a half peasant farmers to move to Hokkaido. But the response is slow and reluctant. The climate is that of Siberia. The Japanese of the more southern islands are not accustomed to such cold winters and when they leave their ancestral lands prefer a warmer climate.

The cost of living is rising. The limit of soil productiveness has been practically reached and Japan must import food for her people. Every year she purchases abroad millions of piculs of rice and beans, the former chiefly from China, Siam, and Burma and the latter largely from Manchuria. According to statistics issued by the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, the total production of rice in Japan during last year was 55,590,000 koku. (One koku is a little less than five bushels—4.963.) This was 4,110,000 koku less than the production the preceding year. The amount of rice annually consumed in Japan exceeds 70,000,000 koku, so that about 4,000,000 koku must be imported besides the estimated production of 9,000,000 koku in Korea and Formosa and 6,000,000 koku in reserve. Large quantities of flour are also imported from other lands.

The Japanese have therefore entered upon a period of commercial and industrial development. They have studied to good effect the example of England and they are fostering trade and manufactures on a large scale. They were already proficient in making artistic goods. Their lacquer work, cloisonné, and porcelain are justly famous, while their silks and embroideries call forth ejaculations of delight from every visitor. The finest pieces of decorated ware and embroidery are not made in factories, but in the homes of the people or in

obscure little shops. Nothing could be more unostentatious than the process of porcelain manufacture that we saw in Nagoya. A half dozen common looking Japanese, some of them mere boys and girls, sat in a rude shed, shaping dishes and vases out of the moist clay and pressing and cutting them into form with the simplest tools and yet with rare skill. The decorating was done in hundreds of lowly homes, and the firing in rough kilns tended by men who looked like day-labourers. But the results were so delicately beautiful that one felt like spending days in admiring them. People in other lands prize so highly what Nagoya produces that they annually spend over a million yen for her pottery, cloisonné, lacquer, and other art objects.

The curio shops and silk stores in all the principal cities are well worth visiting, though the prudent man will limit the sum of money that he takes with him. In Kyoto, for example, where the silk industry centres, one is taken to a low, modest building, quite unlike the gorgeous department stores of America. A polite salesman meets the customer at the door with low bows, and escorts him through a littered outer room and passageway into a back room, where he unfolds silks and embroideries that fairly take one's breath away.

It is not surprising that the art products of Japan have made their way all over the civilized world. The export trade is large and increasing, and stores for Japanese articles are now found in most of the leading cities of Europe and America. Unfortunately, the crude taste of many people in other lands calls for a gaudier kind of ware than the Japanese would make for themselves, and they are yielding, to some extent, to the demand, while the growth of the trade is begetting a haste to meet it which often shortens the time spent on the decorated ware. In some articles, therefore, particularly in lacquer, "the old is better." Japan exports annually about a million dollars' worth of lacquered ware, and two million dollars' worth of porcelain and earthenware, with every prospect of an unlimited increase.

The imitative temperament of the Japanese was a valuable asset in getting a start in manufacturing staple goods and articles. As soon as they realized the necessity for developing manufactures, they sensibly decided to avail themselves of the inventions and processes which western peoples had gradually acquired through many years of research and experiment. Accordingly European and American experts were invited to Japan to take charge of the new establishments. A Board of Public Works was constituted to secure the needed assistance in men and apparatus. An amusing but characteristic story is told of the following order that was sent to the Board's agent in London:

“Urgent. Send to Tokyo at once as follows:

1 Professor of Electrical Science.

1 Do. Mining.

2 Blast Furnaces.”

Attracted by the high salaries offered, many experts gladly accepted the invitation. The Japanese carefully watched their work so as to understand how it was done, let them educate the people to use the new appliances, and then, when the market had been created and the foreigners fondly imagined that they were about to reap the harvest of their toil and expenditure, the Japanese politely dismissed them, did the work themselves with cheap labour, and so undersold the alien companies that they were driven out of business. Hence there was woe among the foreign merchants of Yokohama, Kobe, and Nagasaki. Moreover, the foreign investor wanted control of his investment, but foreign control was precisely what the Japanese would not grant. Their pride of independence is a national passion. They want the foreigner's ideas and inventions, but they will not brook his leadership. Foreigners can own land only in a very few places and under such restrictions as to make purchase almost prohibitive, although some leases are given for such lengthy periods as to be virtually permanent.

Nearly all foreign properties are held under lease or in the name of Japanese. Missionary workers feel under a constraint of conscience to give Christian teaching to Japan at any sacrifice; but business men do not deem it a duty to invest their money apart from the expectation of returns in hard cash. Japan therefore found great difficulty in securing the capital that she needed to develop her resources and finance her enterprises.

One cannot but admire the courage with which the Japanese spent money on plants and equipment. They perceived that if they were to succeed against foreign competition they must not begin on a small scale and wait for business to grow. Their competitors had the benefit of long experimenting and accumulated capital, but the Japanese had to risk everything on a bold plunge. This required nerve, for they had little money and their resources were largely undeveloped. But they dared to go ahead. By using what they had, by heavily taxing themselves and by borrowing what they could, they proceeded to invest huge sums in mills, factories, railways, steamships, telegraph lines, post-offices, docking and terminal facilities. Determined to make equal advance in other lines, enormous amounts were also expended on streets, roads, sanitation, the army, navy, and public buildings.

For years, this meant hard times in Japan. Everything was outgo and income was not immediate. The gold in some of her banks went to a perilously low level. The demand for foreign goods increased, for Japan wanted many things in machinery, apparatus, and supplies that Europe and America had to sell. As there was at first little to sell in exchange, imports were heavily in excess of exports and gold was drained out of the country to meet the unfavourable balance of trade.

But the plucky people persistently continued their policy, and gradually the tide began to turn. Today, Japan has great machine shops, mills, foundries, shipyards, and manufacturing establishments of all kinds, equipped with the best modern machinery. The number of factories rose from 125 in 1883

to 17,062 in 1912, 47,786 in 1921, and it has since crossed the fifty thousand line. Seventy-three shipbuilding yards turn out hundreds of vessels yearly, three of them—the Mitsu-Bishi Dockyard and Engine Works at Nagasaki; the Kawasaki Docking Company, Ltd., of Kobe; and the Uraga Dock Company of Tokyo Bay—being among the largest and best-equipped in the world. Since 1914 private yards for the construction of steamships of more than 1,000 tons have increased their capacity two and one-half times. In a recent year 200,-453 tons of merchant shipping were launched. The Japanese merchant marine is the third largest in the world, being exceeded only by that of Great Britain and the United States. Japan's aggregate tonnage is 3,967,000 tons and it includes 6,312 steamships and 8,510 sailing vessels. The Japanese flag is seen in all the principal ports of the world.

The Japanese not only supply their own needs but they have entered into vigorous competition with England, Germany, and the United States for the commerce of the world. They are making bicycles for twelve dollars. They are turning out matches at a price that has closed the Asiatic market to western factories. They can deliver sashes, doors, blinds, and woodenware in America at so low a rate that American manufacturers would be driven out of business if they were not protected by a tariff.

Special attention has been given to the manufacture of cotton yarn and cloth. In the old days, the yarn was spun by hand and the cloth made on hand-loom in the homes of the people. But in 1865, the progressive Prince Shimadzu imported machinery from England and started at Kagoshima the first factory to spin and weave cotton by steam power. His 6,000 spindles attracted wide attention and within a few years other factories were erected. The business of cotton manufacture rapidly assumed considerable proportions. By 1895 over half a million operatives were employed, and by 1925 the number had risen to 1,987,295 in factories of all kinds but principally cotton. In 1897, American manufacturers besought

a committee of Congress to protect them against the competition of the Japanese, and a little later Edward Atkinson predicted that in the course of a few years the Japanese would be able to supply the increasing wants of the modern world. The growth has been so rapid that, in addition to supplying the home market, Japan in a single year exported nearly a hundred million dollars' worth of manufactured cotton goods.

The Asiatic market for cotton cloth is almost unlimited. The millions of people in Korea and Manchuria wear cotton garments the year around. Only the rich wear silk, and their number is relatively small. The staple garment is made of heavy, cheap, cotton sheeting, which is bought unbleached and uncoloured. It is then bleached for Korea, and is dyed for Manchuria. The piece goods trade is therefore very great. Of course the Japanese want it and they have it. While they do not grow very much cotton, they are encouraging its cultivation. Meantime, their subsidized steamships and government railways bring cotton to their factories and take the manufactured product to the foreign market. The goods are sold locally through Japanese tradesmen, who swarm in Korea and Manchuria and who can live more cheaply and are content with smaller profits than white men. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that the Japanese control these great markets.

Nor are Korea and Manchuria their only objectives. The garment of blue cotton sheeting is the well-nigh universal dress throughout the whole of China. Northern China does not grow enough cotton to be a serious factor in the situation. Southern China produces considerable quantities, but little is manufactured by modern methods. The Chinese market is therefore one of enormous possibilities. Japanese are after it, and the German, Englishman, and American find them a competitor not to be despised. Substantially the same statements may be made regarding Siam, the Philippines, India, Burma, and the Dutch islands. The hundreds of millions of people in these countries are also wearers of cotton which they buy in the

piece. Their soil and climate are better adapted to the raising of cotton than the colder regions of Japan, Korea, and Manchuria. A good deal of it is raised, but comparatively little is manufactured. Japan does this for them, and she is today shipping her cotton cloth and yarn not only to Manchuria and China but to Siberia, India, the Philippines, the Dutch East Indies, the Straits Settlements, Australia, and the Hawaiian Islands. The United States formerly had a generous share of the China trade and desire to retain it was one of the reasons which led Secretary of State John Hay to urge the policy of the "Open Door." But the National City Bank of New York announced, a few years ago, that in the short space of three years Japan had practically eliminated the United States as an exporter of cotton cloths to China, exports having fallen to less than \$200,000 during a year in which Japan poured in cotton products to the value of \$60,000,000.

Within thirty years following 1880, the foreign trade of Japan increased 1,419 per cent, and it has been mounting steadily since then, imports and exports in the last reported year having attained a total of nearly \$2,439,123,835. Japan buys most heavily abroad cotton, wool, iron, wood, machinery, and food-supplies of various kinds. She sells in largest quantities raw and manufactured silk, wool and cotton goods, porcelain, earthenware, and bean oil.

Meantime her thrifty people are saving money. Even the poor are encouraged to save in postal savings banks conducted by the government, postal savings at the end of 1926 amounting to 1,168,599,000 yen, a gain of 49 per cent in fifteen years.

The great earthquake and fire of 1923 made temporary havoc with Japan's currency and trade balance. The reserves of gold and foreign credits that had been accumulated during the World War had to be heavily drawn upon on account of the interruption of business, the relief of impoverished people, and the enormous quantities of supplies that had to be purchased in foreign markets. The currency depreciated. By the end of the year the adverse trade balance was 534,480,000

yen, and in 1924 it rose to 646,157,000 yen. In 1925, however, it fell to 267,066,000 yen, a sum which was probably counterbalanced by Japan's "invisible" foreign account in investments and shipping profits. The Bulletin of the National City Bank of New York declared that the Japanese handled with great courage and ability the difficult conditions arising from the earthquake disaster, which followed closely upon losses which Japan suffered in common with all countries from the post-war deflation. The Government was rigidly economical and required the people to adopt the same policy. The tariff was revised to discourage the importation of luxuries, foreign borrowing was limited, and the Government abstained from borrowing in the home market. The national accounts for the fiscal year ending March 31, 1926, showed a surplus of 546,383,000 yen, or over \$273,000,000. This was due in part to delay in carrying out reconstruction plans, but during all the trying period since the World War, the Government has not failed to close every fiscal year with a surplus. The financial position of Japan remains strong notwithstanding the heavy payments which the Government has been required to make abroad since 1923. The public policy throughout has been a resolute and consistent one, with the fixed purpose of eliminating unnecessary outlays and building up the resources of the country by a careful economy.

In order to stimulate her home industries by giving them a virtual monopoly and discouraging people from buying abroad what they should buy at home, the Government August 1, 1924, imposed a "luxury tax" of one hundred per cent upon a long list of imported articles. Resident foreigners found this tax a heavy burden since the list included many supplies which they were accustomed to purchase in their native land. But the wise American, remembering the high protective tariff policy of his own government, discreetly held his peace.

In April, 1927, the process of readjustment to normal financial conditions in a period of industrial unrest was interrupted by a panic which was precipitated by the failure of a large

corporation, Suzuki and Company. Frightened depositors did what such depositors have often done in America—made a run on the banks. The disturbance was widespread and for a time the situation was ominous. But the Government handled the situation wisely and efficiently and the crisis was soon safely passed.

No one now doubts the financial trustworthiness of Japan. The difficulty of securing foreign loans, formerly serious, has passed and her bonds sell above par. Japan's national credit is good in the banking circles of the world. Her currency, which a generation ago was as chaotic as China's, is on a solid basis. There are 1,701 ordinary banks, 139 savings-banks, and 27 agricultural and industrial banks. The leading institutions, like the Bank of Japan, the Yokohama Specie Bank, and the Japanese Industrial Bank, have a recognized standing not only in Asia but in Europe and America, where their branches do a thriving business and carry large balances.

Modern industrial Japan can be best studied in Osaka. The growth of Osaka has been prodigious. Its population in 1898 was 506,000, but it has now passed the million and a quarter mark. Long before our train reached it, we saw the pall-like smoke of its factories, and as we drew nearer tall chimneys were in evidence on every side. Articles of wide variety are manufactured. One finds wool and cotton factories, seed-oil mills, brick-yards, cement works, match factories, and scores of plants of other kinds. The streets are crowded with pedestrians, trolley-cars, taxicabs, bicycles, motor trucks, and automobiles, and the innumerable shops display the products not only of Japan but of many other countries.

Special permits were necessary to visit the establishments I wanted to see, but they were obtained without difficulty, and taking jinrickishas we rode through the busy streets to a great woolen factory. One vast room contained 1,600 weaving machines, managed by 800 women and girls, each tending two machines. The racket of countless shuttles was in the air

and innumerable whirling belts confused the eye. Other hundreds of men and women were employed in the winding, dyeing, and printing departments. The machinery was of English and French make, and the wool came from Australia. The whole plant was thoroughly modern in its appointments—spacious brick buildings, improved machinery, everything apparently that science could suggest and money procure. The Japanese owner had traveled in Europe and America, and was intelligent and progressive.

But in a corner of the factory yard I found a shrine containing a stone fox on a pedestal. My courteous Japanese guide from the firm's office informed me, in answer to a question, that the fox was the guardian of the factory, that the owner worshipped it, and that once a year a festival of the employees and their families was held in honour of the fox! Nor was this factory an exception. Many of the great factories in Osaka had similar shrines to reynard.

Several other cities illustrate the new commercial era in Japan. Nagoya, for example, not only produces exquisite artistic articles of old Japan but such modern staples as railway cars, textile fabrics, and other useful articles. The population of the city has leaped from 160,000 in 1889 to over half a million, and its ambitious inhabitants hustle for it as energetically as if they were Yankees.

When one considers the neglect of trade and the contempt for traders in feudal Japan until a few decades ago, one is amazed by the skill and persistence with which the new Japan is striving for mastery in the markets of the world. They are supreme in the commerce of the Pacific basin. They successfully compete with foreign and Chinese steamship lines far up the Yang-tze River, have their colonies in every port city of the Far East, and run their ships to Europe, the United States, India, South Africa, Australia, and South America. In 1926, there were 4,000 Japanese firms in China and there is hardly an important city in the world that does not have Japanese shops, New York and the principal European cap-

itals having large wholesale and retail establishments. Japanese business men are even seeking the markets of Turkey. In 1926, they organized a commercial exposition in Stamboul, where they displayed merchandise of the Far East adapted to Turkish tastes and the tastes of other Near Eastern nations. Following this, members of Japanese Chambers of Commerce visited Turkey and other parts of the Far East, cultivating friendly relations with commercial interests and learning what was wanted.

The Japanese are skilful in getting trade, and American business men might well learn a lesson from them. They send their agents to a country to ascertain the kind of goods that the people want, in quality, colour, price, and size of package. For example, the Korean, in order to make his peculiar garment to advantage, demands white cotton cloth eighteen inches wide. The western exporter often ignores this, and the consequence is that the Korean does not buy his cloth as there would be waste in cutting it. Japanese firms do not attempt to change Korean sentiment and make the cloth of the desired width. Then they pack the goods in packages convenient in size and weight for handling by porters and transportation on ponies and bullocks; while the more ignorant or careless foreign merchant ships in cases or bales so large and heavy that they must be repacked before the goods can be carried into the interior. The Korean, too, wants his cotton very strong in order to stand the pounding of Korean laundry methods. The flimsy stuff that the foreigner sells quickly goes to pieces in washing. The shrewd Japanese, by careful attention to these details, gets the trade, as he deserves to, while the white merchant curses the alleged stupidity of the Korean and "the trickery" of the Japanese.

The advantages of Japan in commercial rivalry with other nations are numerous. Control of transportation lines by land and sea, government subsidies, and, in the trade with Asia, short haul are important factors. The Japanese are so near to the great markets of the mainland that they can fill

an order from Korea, Manchuria and China within a week or ten days. Labour is so cheap that the cost of production is much less than in Europe and America, and prices can be kept low consistently with good profits. The strain of longer hours and the lower scale of living sag efficiency below the standard of American workmen, but the supply is abundant and the toilers are driven hard.

The Japanese, moreover, move as a unit in furthering their commercial ambitions. Several of their great enterprises are controlled either directly or indirectly by the Government. In some instances, the Government owns them outright; in other instances, high officials and members of the Imperial family are heavy stockholders. By the railway nationalization law and railway purchase law of March, 1906, the Government acquired all the important lines in the country. Payment was made by public loan bonds aggregating nearly \$250,000,000. The street car lines in Tokyo are owned by the city, and government ownership of public utilities is far more common than in America. The nation as a whole rules in commercial as well as in government affairs. The business man does not have to fight alone for foreign trade, as the American business man usually must. He has the backing of his country. Allied industries support him. Shipping companies give him every possible advantage. He is a part of an immense "trust," only the trust is a government instead of a corporation.

Take, for example, the periodical excitement in the United States regarding the alleged purpose of Japan to secure a foothold on Magdalena Bay, Mexico. A Japanese writer declares that any effort of this kind, if made, would have no political significance but would be merely an instance of a business corporation obtaining an ordinary lease for purely commercial purposes such as an American corporation might seek in some Asiatic country. This is an excellent technical reply, but it is only technical. Americans have no such national solidarity as the Japanese, and their government has no such relation to their business ventures. When an American firm

secures a lease in Asia, it has no political significance. The government of the United States does not work through the commercial ventures of its citizens, and beyond giving what protection is practicable in case of attack upon life or property, the government will not concern itself with the interests of its citizens abroad. When, however, a Japanese company leases harbour and shore rights in a foreign country, the lease is virtually tantamount to a government one, and it may be controlled as such at any time the government chooses. While, therefore, it may be literally correct to state that the Japanese Government was not trying to secure a base at Magdalena Bay and that only a commercial company's lease was contemplated, Americans were right in giving the reported effort a political meaning which would not attach to the effort of an American corporation to lease a harbour in Japan, which, by the way, the Japanese Government would not permit.

The principal steamship lines are so liberally subsidized by the government and hire their seamen at such low wages that they can carry freight at rates that are impossible for American-owned steamships, which have no subsidies and are obliged by law to employ a definite proportion of white men who demand good wages. The result is that the carrying trade of the Pacific is in Japanese hands. The Merchant Marine League of San Francisco, in March, 1917, sponsored a statement that Japanese steamship companies are permitted to charge foreigners whatever they please for moving freight but are rigidly held down to a small margin of profit in dealing with Japanese shippers; that the freight on a cargo of beans from San Francisco to Manila was twenty dollars a ton in a subsidized Japanese ship; but that if the same cargo were consigned to Kobe or Yokohama the freight charges were ten dollars a ton. A comparison of the rates charged for fifteen kinds of staple goods revealed that the citizens of Japan paid no higher freight rates for their necessities than before the World War, while the people of China and the Philippine Islands paid rates a hundred per cent higher.

I heard much criticism of Japanese commercial methods. European and American business men spoke with great bitterness of their unfairness. They alleged that Japanese firms obtain railway rebates; that transportation lines are so managed that Japanese firms have their freight promptly forwarded while foreign firms are subject to ruinous delays; that foreign labels and trademarks are placed upon inferior goods so that it is difficult to sell a genuine brand to an Asiatic as the latter believes that he can get the same brand from a Japanese at a lower price. They also alleged that foreign traders in Manchuria were compelled to pay full duties upon all goods, but that the Japanese, through their absolute control of the only railway, were able to evade the customs. It was said that of \$12,000,000 worth of Japanese goods which went into Dairen in the year preceding my visit, only \$3,000,000 worth paid duty. For a long time Japanese goods were poured into Manchuria at Antung on the Yalu River. Then foreign powers advised the Chinese to place an inspector of the Imperial Chinese customs at Antung. The Japanese could not oppose this, but they tried to have a Japanese inspector chosen. An American in the customs service, however, was appointed. He told me of his experience in endeavouring to enforce the laws against the Japanese. If it is ever published, it will make what Horace Greeley would have called "mighty interesting reading."

The rage and chagrin of European and American business men in the Far East can be imagined. A disgusted foreigner declared to me that there is not a white man in the Far East, except those who are in the employ of the Japanese, who is friendly to them, and that their dominant characteristics are "conceit and deceit." He denied not only the honesty but even the courage of the Japanese, insisting that the capture of Port Arthur was not due to the bravery of the assailants but to the incompetence of the defenders. He said that the Russian soldiers were as heroic as any in the world, but that their officers were drunkards and debauchees; that the War De-

partment, which should have sustained them, was rotten with corruption; that at the battle of Liaoyang both Russian and Japanese generals gave the order for retreat at about the same time, each feeling that the battle was lost; but that the Russian regiments received their order first, and that as the Japanese saw them retreat they moved forward. He held that the anti-Japanese agitation in the public schools of San Francisco was secretly fomented and made an international incident by the Japanese themselves, in order to divert attention from what they were doing in Manchuria; and more to the same effect.

These opinions are illustrative of many that I heard in the Far East. I need hardly say that I regard them as unjust. Their very bitterness indicates the prejudice that gave birth to some of them and added exaggeration to others. Even if they were true, the Japanese would simply be doing what it is notorious that some American corporations have often done. Rebates, adulteration, evasion of customs, short weight and unfair crushing of competitors are not so unfamiliar to white men that they can consistently lift hands of pious horror when they hear of them in Asia.

The fact is that western traders until recently had pretty much their own way in the Far East. While some of them were men of high character and fair dealing, others cajoled and bullied and bribed the Asiatic to their heart's content and their pocket's enrichment. They dominated the markets, charged what prices they pleased and reaped enormous profits. When they got into trouble with local authorities they called upon their home governments to help them out of their scrapes. Now they find themselves face to face with Asiatics who can play the same game and with the odds in their favour. It is rather late in the day for white men to go into paroxysms of indignation over commercial methods which they themselves have long practised.

I do not mean that unscrupulous methods should be condoned in the Japanese or any one else, and I gladly add that

the American and British firms now engaged in the Asiatic trade include many men of the best business type and of high personal character. I am simply calling attention to the fact that the Japanese are a strong, alert, aggressive people who have the same ambitions for supremacy that characterize white men. It is true that, at the beginning of the modern era, the general tone of commercial morality in Japan was distinctly lower than in western nations. This was probably due to the fact that, until comparatively recent years, business was largely in the hands of a low class of Japanese. Trading was long regarded as beneath the dignity of a gentleman. In the old feudal days, the knightly classes devoted themselves to arms and despised traders as heartily as the ancient Jews despised publicans. The priests of the old religions of Japan ignored the relation of religion to conduct and did not educate the popular mind to regard for truth and justice. As a consequence, the mercantile classes were chiefly recruited from men whose unscrupulous greed was proof against the contempt of their fellows, who had no standing to be sacrificed, and whose trickery and dishonesty justified the ill repute in which they were popularly held.

The notorious Doshisha scandal illustrated the resultant trouble to the foreigner. The title to the fine plant of this college of the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions was vested in Japanese directors who held the property in trust for the American Board. But to the consternation of the friends of missions, the directors refused to acknowledge the rights of the real owners, and in February, 1898, actually repealed an "irrevocable" constitutional provision that Christianity should always be the basis of instruction, banished religious teaching, and not only made the institution completely secular but allowed anti-Christian addresses in the chapel. Protests were unavailing. Appeals to honour were received with incredulity. For a long time the Japanese could not be made to understand that they had committed an unrighteous breach of faith, and it was only after the most per-

sistent efforts that the college was restored to a Christian basis. The Japanese long paid the penalty of the distrust which the Doshisha affair engendered, especially as many Japanese merchants guilelessly acted on the same principle. During my first visit a merchant refused to accept a large consignment of goods because the price had fallen since he had placed the order, and I was told that a foreigner could not always depend upon the delivery of goods which he had bought of the Japanese, if the price had risen.

When feudalism was abolished and the daimios and samurai were obliged to adapt themselves to the changed conditions of a society in which men had to earn their own living or starve, they naturally found military, naval, and civil offices more congenial than business, and their training fitted them for an efficiency in war and government which quickly brought Japan to the front in international affairs, as the Russians learned to their cost. But ere long capable men realized that captains of industry rank as high in the modern world as generals and admirals and render as valuable service to their country, and that if Japan expected to take a place among strong and progressive nations, a due proportion of her best men must become bankers, manufacturers, and railway and steamship managers. Today many of Japan's firms are managed by men of unquestioned probity and reliability, and the old gibe about Chinese tellers in Japanese banks has lost whatever point it ever had. Modern Japan is sensitive to considerations of business honour and is outspoken in condemning fraud. It was the Japanese Consul-General at Bombay, India, who frankly declared in a report:

“Although I am confident that the credit of Japanese merchants in general is not so low as is represented by a small section of the foreign merchants, yet it is to be deplored as an indisputable fact that there is one sort of short-sighted dishonest Japanese merchants who are always eager to obtain a temporary profit just before their eyes, who resort to extremely detestable and crafty expedients. They

will send samples of goods far superior in quality in comparison with the price quoted, and when they receive orders according to these samples, they never manufacture goods equal to the samples in quality but manufacture and ship inferior goods suitable to the price.”¹

Evidently intelligent Japanese are learning well the lesson that wise western business men have learned from hard experience, that a reputation for trustworthiness is the most valuable asset that a commercial house can have, and that the merchant who deals fairly with his customers prospers best in the long run. Japan now has great commercial houses that are as honestly and capably managed as houses of corresponding rank in Europe and America, and their representatives in the metropolitan cities of other lands are men of unchallenged character and ability. When, in the spring of 1927, a financial panic caused runs which compelled several banks in Tokyo to close their doors, their officers and directors voluntarily sacrificed their personal fortunes to protect their depositors and the credit of the institutions. It was a splendid example of a business integrity which refused to take advantage of technical right and accepted heavy loss in the interest of the public welfare.

¹ Quoted in the *Japan Weekly Chronicle*, July 3, 1916.

VII

SCHOOLS AND UNIVERSITIES

JAPAN has had schools and books from a remote antiquity. The first impetus to intellectual culture came from China, whose literature and civilization antedated those of Japan by many centuries. The earliest Chinese books to reach Japan are supposed to have arrived 284 A. D. The earliest extant Japanese book appeared in Chinese characters in the second decade of the eighth century. It is probable that many books preceded it that long since have disappeared. This particular book, the *Kojiki*, is a "Record of Ancient Happenings," and gives an alleged history of Japan from "the beginning," but one which mingles fact, tradition, myth, and legend in hopeless confusion. The art of printing by wooden block types, which also was introduced from China in the eighth century, enabled the Japanese to multiply their own books, and the ninth, tenth, and eleventh centuries were prolific in literature.

The period of internecine strife between rival clans made the following centuries intellectually barren; but with the "Great Peace" which began in the seventeenth century, the minds of thoughtful men again turned to learning and books and pamphlets became numerous. Most of them bore the unmistakable stamp of Chinese influence, being either Chinese classics or Japanese books that derived their thought and style in large measure from them. Dramas have figured largely in the literature of Japan. Short musical plays have been popular for centuries. In the seventeenth century Chikamatsu, the greatest of Japanese dramatists, "the Japanese Shakespeare," wrote over a hundred plays, some of which have

recently been translated into English.¹ With the exception of a few sporadic books, the literature of Europe and America did not appear in Japan until the opening of the modern era in 1853. Since then, there has been a remarkable quickening and broadening of intellectual life. Today, Japan has scholars and authors of international fame, printing-presses of the latest type, and libraries well stocked with the world's best volumes on history and art, science and political economy, philosophy and religion. Books in Japanese and English are published and imported in great quantities, the number published in Japan in a recent year having been 18,082. There are 1,137 daily newspapers and 2,850 weekly and monthly periodicals, with an aggregate circulation which probably exceeds ten millions. The four largest, the Osaka *Mainichi* and the Tokyo *Nichi-Nichi*, both published by the Osaka Mainichi Company, and the Osaka *Asahi* and the Tokyo *Asahi*, published by the Osaka Asahi Company, have a combined daily circulation of over 4,000,000 copies. These are called the "Super Big Four." They are followed by a group called the "Big Six," which have circulations ranging from 2,000,000 to half a million each. The plants of the larger papers are equipped with modern machinery and compare favourably with the plants of the great metropolitan journals of Europe and America.²

The first school in Japan of which there is any record was founded 664 A. D. The educational system which followed, if it could be called educational, was a mere memorizing of ancient classics and the composition of rhetorical essays about them. Education in the modern sense was begun by the missionaries who arrived in 1859. They founded the first schools which introduced western learning into Japan. Imperfect though they were from the viewpoint of present-day pedagogical standards, they were a vast improvement upon anything that Japan had hitherto known.

The awakening of the Japanese mind in the new era resulted

¹ *Masterpieces of Chikamatsu*, New York, 1927.

² K. K. Kawakami, article in *Asia*, October, 1927.

not only in political and industrial changes but in a new intellectual life which soon demanded a national system of education. The fifth of the five articles of the oath sanctioned by the Emperor, April 6, 1868, declared: "Knowledge shall be sought for throughout the world so that the welfare of the Empire may be promulgated."

The deputation which sailed from Japan in 1871 to study the institutions and methods of western nations included two men, Mr. Kido and Mr. Okubo, who gave special attention to education. They were deeply impressed by the general diffusion of intelligence among the people of America, and they speedily came to the conclusion expressed by Mr. Okubo: "We must first educate leaders and the rest will follow." Mr. Kido added: "We must educate the masses, for unless the people are trained they cannot follow their leaders, or, if they follow, it will never do for them to follow blindly."

A Department of Education was established and the first educational regulations were issued in September, 1872. The preamble of this historic document declared that "the cultivation of morals, the improvement of intellect, and proficiency in arts cannot be attained except through learning. This is the reason why schools are established."

The Japanese cordially acknowledge their indebtedness to the United States for guidance in educational matters. Doctor K. Ibuka, formerly President of the Meiji Gakuin, Tokyo, says that "when Japan reached out after western ideas, she copied her navy from Great Britain, her army from France, her medical science from Germany, and her educational system from America." The constructive genius whose name will always have an honoured place in the history of Japan's educational development was the American, David Murray, who was the adviser of the government Department of Education from 1873 to 1879. He was the real master builder of Japan's modern system of education. An extensive program was mapped out, beginning with primary schools and culminating in the Imperial University in the capital. Several trained

educators from western lands were invited to fill important professorships until the new institutions were able to turn out qualified men of their own. The Emperor declared: "It is intended that henceforth education shall be so devised that there may not be a village with an ignorant family or a family with an ignorant member."

Education in Japan is not left so largely to local control as in America. It is administered by the national government through a Department of Education, which is subdivided into three bureaus: General Education, Special Education, and Religions. A few institutions, like the Peers' School, the Nautical School, the Post and Telegraph School, and the military and naval colleges, are related to other departments of the government, but they are none the less under the supervision of the authorities. All children are required to begin attendance at school at the age of six and to continue for at least six years. Military training is compulsory in all government schools and in some private schools.

The basis of instruction in morals is the following Imperial Rescript of October 30, 1890, which is posted in every school and is certainly admirable as far as it goes:

"Know Ye, Our Subjects: Our Imperial Ancestors have founded our Empire on a basis broad and everlasting, and have deeply and firmly implanted virtue. Our subjects, ever united in loyalty and filial piety, have from generation to generation illustrated the beauty thereof. This is the glory and fundamental character of our Empire, and herein also lies the source of our education. Ye, our subjects, be filial to your parents, affectionate to your brothers and sisters; as husbands and wives, be harmonious; as friends, true; bear yourselves in modesty and moderation; extend your benevolence to all; pursue learning and cultivate the arts and thereby develop intellectual faculties and perfect moral powers; furthermore, advance public good and promote common interests; always respect the Constitution and observe the laws; should emergency arise, offer yourselves courageously to the State and thus guard and maintain the prosperity of our Imperial Throne coeval with heaven and earth. So shall ye not only

be our good and faithful subjects but render illustrious the best traditions of your forefathers. The way here set forth is indeed the teaching bequeathed by our Imperial Ancestors to be observed alike by their descendants and the subjects, infallible for all ages and true in all places. It is our wish to take it to heart in all reverence, in common with you our subjects, that we may all thus attain to the same virtue."

All public schools are forbidden to teach religion, the governmental educational policy being one of neutrality between the various religious faiths of the Empire. The government is sincere in this, but it does not consider Shinto ceremonies religious, as nearly everybody else does, while the large preponderance of Buddhist teachers naturally creates an atmosphere unfavourable to Christianity and colours, more or less unconsciously, the instruction in many departments, particularly in ethics, science, and philosophy. Moreover, some of the required ceremonies, which the government considers patriotic rather than religious, are deemed religious in fact not only by foreigners but by many Christian Japanese; as, for example, the worship of the picture of the Emperor and the acts of veneration to the spirits of the Imperial Ancestors. Experience has taught the Christians of Japan that they must maintain their own schools and colleges if they are to secure educated leaders for their churches. Private schools are permitted to exist and may teach religion; but their curricula must be approved by the Department of Education, which demands satisfactory courses, text-books, methods, and qualified teachers, under penalty of exclusion of their graduates from the government universities and technical schools. As the diplomas of these universities and technical schools are virtually essential to civil, military, or naval preferment, the consequences of failure to meet the government requirements are not light.

Official reports of the public schools list 733 kindergartens with 2,088 teachers and 63,063 pupils; 25,562 elementary schools with 189,476 teachers and 8,872,006 pupils; 385

middle schools with 8,242 teachers and 194,416 pupils; 597 high schools with 8,132 teachers and 187,020 pupils; 18 universities with 18,009 teachers and 26,208 students, five being imperial universities with 1,140 professors and instructors and 9,337 students; and 723 technical schools with 8,573 teachers and 161,236 students. Including some miscellaneous schools not classified under these headings, the total number of schools is 43,025 with 241,961 teachers and 10,532,561 pupils. 1,442,222 were graduated in a recent year. 99.30 per cent of the boys of school age are enrolled, and 99.03 per cent of the girls, the highest record of any country in the world. The government budget for 1925 included yen 123,593,000 for education. The imperial universities in Tokyo and Kyoto are among the best equipped universities in the world, with every facility in buildings, laboratories, and libraries, and with faculties which include men of international reputation. The largest of the private institutions is the famous Waseda University in Tokyo, founded by Marquis Okuma but conducted in full conformity with the standards of the government, of which he was long an influential member. The graduates of these universities have as high an intellectual training as the graduates in Europe and America. No other nation is so scrupulously careful about the education of its youth; no other spends more money upon its schools in proportion to its population and wealth. After the earthquake of 1923, the Educational Department of the Government began a program for sixty model primary schools with spacious playgrounds.

Physical training is emphasized in an ample program of health and recreation. The Hon. D. S. Ujihara, of the Ministry of Home Affairs, claims that as the result of this universal outdoor exercise Japanese young men of twenty years of age are an inch taller than the young men of that age twenty years ago, and that young women are two inches taller than those of twenty years ago.¹

¹ Address at Pan-Pacific Conference, Honolulu, May, 1927.

I visited a number of public schools and was very favourably impressed. Discipline is about perfect, for teachers are regarded as virtual officials of the government, and the Japanese by temperament and hereditary training are obedient to authority. This may account, in some degree at least, for the high records in attendance, punctuality, and deportment. But Japanese pupils are also notable for the quickness with which they learn their lessons. Wherever I went I found handsome, commodious, well-equipped school-buildings. In one school I visited in Kyoto, 1,600 pupils were enrolled, the ages being from eleven to fifteen. The grounds and buildings were so extensive that there was no undue crowding. The order was excellent, and the apparatus as complete as in any public school I have seen in America.

My visit to the public schools in Kanazawa occurred on a raw day in early spring, when I was glad to wear heavy clothing; but most of the children were barefooted, and the teachers told me that the boys and girls often came to school through the winter snow without footwear. This is not to be wholly attributed to a desire for learning as the teacher also said that the children were eager to play in the snow. Japanese children are not accustomed to protecting themselves against the cold as we do; but the striking thing was that with insufficient clothing and in poorly heated rooms they sat so quietly at their lessons during the long hours of study.

Japanese school children have a harder time in acquiring an education than children in other lands. Japanese youths are so ambitious to obtain the education that opens the way for preferment in life that the government has not yet been able to provide sufficient buildings, equipment, and teachers to accommodate the throngs of applicants for the higher institutions. Partly because this fact compels selection and partly because the government insists upon a high standard, the examinations are made very severe. Doctor Nitobe says that the number of candidates for admission to the freshman class of the college in Tokyo is usually seven or eight times the

number that can be received. He adds: "It is a very touching sight to watch some 2,000 boys, the pick of our youth from all parts of the Empire, flocking to the college for examination—to watch them at their heavy task, all the time knowing that seven out of every eight will be disappointed. Those who fail one year can try again; a great many do try three or four times, and in exceptional cases seven or eight times, one instance of perseverance being on record where success crowned the fourteenth attempt."

The task of the Japanese school children is seriously intensified by the nature of the written language. When Japan received her civilization, religion, and learning from China, she received with them the Chinese character. The Japanese gave their own pronunciation to the Chinese ideographs, so that the spoken language became quite distinct from the Chinese, but the written language is a curious mixture of Chinese and Japanese elements. Professor Tanakadate, of the Imperial University of Tokyo, says: "The Japanese student must learn the language and the method of its representation in a system which is foreign to the nature of the language. The number of these Chinese characters amounts to over 50,000, of which about 3,000 are used in daily life. Each of these characters has two or three, sometimes five or six, different meanings, so that the learning of 3,000 amounts really to that of more than 10,000."

The result, as frankly stated in Marquis Okuma's *Fifty Years of New Japan*, is that "Japanese students today are attempting what is only possible to the strongest and cleverest of them, that is to say, two or three in every hundred. They are trying to learn their own language, which is in reality two languages, blended or confused the one with the other according to the point of view, while attempting to learn English and German, and in addition studying technical subjects like law, medicine, engineering or science." University professors declare that many students break down during their course and that those who do get through "require six or eight years

longer to acquire a university education than in other countries."

As far back as the year 809, a priest, Kobo Daishi, devised a syllabary of five letters, and various attempts at simplification have been made since. Modern authorities tried some years ago to lessen the confusion by limiting to twelve hundred the number of Chinese characters to be taught in the lower schools. As this was considered almost revolutionary, a virtual discarding of Chinese classics in favour of more modern literature, a foreigner can but dimly imagine the labour of the Japanese boy under the old system. It is more difficult to limit the use of Chinese in the higher institutions, for many of the modern scientific and philosophical terms, while not easy to translate at all, can now be better expressed in Chinese characters than in vernacular Japanese. The demand for the adoption of the Roman alphabet is steadily gaining ground in Japan as it is in China, and has the powerful backing of many of Japan's leading educators, including, besides those already mentioned, Baron Kikuchi, formerly president of the Peers' School and the Imperial University and Minister of Education in the Imperial Cabinet.

An Imperial Rescript, issued September 20, 1917, announced that "We, in view of the situation at home and abroad, and in consideration of the future of the Empire, have thought it advisable to organize an educational committee in the Cabinet, empowering it to deliberate on educational affairs in Japan, so that progress of education may be attained. We hereby approve the organic regulations of the Extraordinary Educational Conference and order them to be published." This committee went vigorously to work under the chairmanship of Viscount T. Hirata, formerly Minister of Home Affairs, and Baron Y. Kubota, formerly Minister of Education, as vice-chairman. The whole educational system of the country was carefully studied with a view to ascertaining what improvements could be made. It will be noted, therefore, that the Japanese are thoroughly modern and progressive in

their educational ambitions. They want the best methods and they are sparing no effort to develop them.

An increasing number of Japanese are studying in Europe and America. In addition to those who go abroad on their own account, the Ministry of Education sends to other lands about 150 instructors and students of government universities and colleges each year. For this purpose the Ministry appropriated 1,656,000 yen during the year ending March 31, 1926. In that year 73 students were specializing in engineering, 59 in medical science, 41 in physical science, 79 in literature, 32 in economics, 42 in agriculture, 40 in jurisprudence, and nine in other subjects. Nineteen were women. Germany has the largest number of these officially appointed students with 89, England has 49, France 48, America 35, Switzerland 9, Austria 5, China 4, Italy and Belgium 2 each, and Holland, Sweden, and Denmark 8 each.¹

Speaking broadly, the Asiatic mind is more imitative and less constructive than the mind of the Anglo-Saxon. It commits a lesson to memory in school more easily, but it is less resourceful and original in the practical duties of life. Observers have long noted that the East Indian youth, who easily outstrips his duller English schoolmate in the classroom, is likely to be the latter's clerk twenty years after graduation, not merely because of his race but because of his comparative lack of constructive ability and aggressiveness. He is better fitted to copy than to create, to do something that has been marked out for him than to mark out something for himself. There are, of course, many exceptions to this. Some Asiatics are born leaders, as both ancient and modern history clearly show, while many Anglo-Saxons are content to be followers. Making all due allowance, however, for exceptions, the generalization holds, although the proportion of exceptions is higher in Japan than in most other Oriental lands. Imitation is natural when the first task of an awakened people is to catch up with the peoples who have gone further. It is

¹ Japanese Student Bulletin, October, 1926.

not surprising, therefore, that Japan as a whole is utilizing the inventions and discoveries of western nations, and thus far has made comparatively few of its own.

The Japanese, however, are catching up with extraordinary rapidity. Indeed in many lines they are now fully abreast of western nations. The intellectual activity of modern Japan is evidenced by the fact that more than 3,000 newspapers and periodicals are in circulation, and that in a recent year there were published in Japan 18,082 new books on various subjects as follows: education 3,128, literature 3,075, travel and geography 3,075, handicrafts 889, music 887, religion 873, industry 798, languages 716, medicine 568, art 560, social problems 527, politics 503, law 503, architecture 438, economics 428, philosophy 381, science 332, history 287, biography 278, mathematics 238, statistics 154, dictionaries 141, transportation 100, military 91, miscellaneous 1,397. Meantime, Japan bought foreign books to the value of 4,459,000 yen, which were distributed as follows according to the countries from which these importations came: America 1,370,000 yen, Germany 1,368,000, England 1,258,000, France 234,000, China 148,000, other countries 81,000.¹

The Japanese have already made important additions to the stock of the world's knowledge and appliances, and they will undoubtedly make more as a larger number of their capable men take their positions in the front rank of the progressive movements of modern civilization. Some of the ablest statesmen, generals, admirals and professional and business men of the modern world are Japanese, and almost every year sees new figures of commanding proportions. Modern Japan has educators, authors and lecturers who are widely and favourably known outside of their own land, and she can now point with just pride to specialists of recognized standing in the field of scientific research and discovery.

¹ Japanese Student Bulletin, March, 1927.

VIII

SOCIAL PROBLEMS

DESPITE the growing wealth of the nation, poverty still prevails among the masses of the common people. 1,500,000 are said to have no property of any kind. Eighty-six per cent of the population depend upon farming for subsistence. High fertilization and intensive cultivation make the land very productive and the farmers usually have enough to eat; but as the average farm is only about two and a half acres and the average family is large, the daily fare is not abundant. Meat is seldom eaten, the staple fare consisting of rice, vegetables, and an occasional fish. Few animals can be kept on these tiny plots. Only one farmer in three is said to own a horse or an ox, and men, women, and children toil early and late in doing by hand what an American farmer does by machinery. "The day-labourers on the farm receive wages ranging between nine and fifteen cents, though the latter have risen more than 100 per cent during the last fifteen years. With this meagre income some of the labourers have to support their aged parents, wives, and children. The tenants, whose number bears the ratio of about two to one to that of the proprietors, live literally from hand to mouth and cannot always afford even the necessary manure, and the proprietor's profit hardly rises above five per cent, while the capital he employs pays an interest of 15 to 30 per cent and his local and central taxes further reduce his income."¹ Toyohiko Kagawa says that seventy per cent of the land workers are tenant farmers who must pay the owners fifty-five per cent of their produce. Miners number 332,387, some of whom are women.

¹ K. Asakawa, *The Russo-Japanese Conflict*, pp. 5-7.

The labouring classes in the larger towns present many acute social problems. The rapid development of manufacturing has brought great numbers of people into the cities for employment in the factories. These are herded in overcrowded sections and their wages are so small that many of them cannot secure suitable food and healthful surroundings. The wages of textile operatives range from 44 to 88 cents a day. Employees in most of the factories toil twelve hours a day and sometimes sixteen. Many of the factories are poorly ventilated and without safety or sanitary conveniences. Of the 1,835,991 operatives, more than half are females. Multitudes are children, 80 per cent being under twenty years of age. 44,478 boys and 224,481 girls are under sixteen. Many factories compel their girls and young women to live within stockades on such light food and in such unsanitary conditions that tuberculosis rages among them. Official reports show that "while the general death-rate from tubercular diseases is about 10 per cent, the death-rate from the same cause in printing-works and type-foundries is 49 per cent, and in cotton-spinning and weaving factories 35 per cent. Of the 200,000 girls who enter the factories each year 120,000, according to A. M. Pooley, in *Japan at the Cross Roads*, never return to their homes, but drift from one factory to another till they are broken down or become open or clandestine prostitutes; while of the 80,000 who do go back to their families 13,000 are ill.

Strenuous efforts have been made by enlightened Japanese in recent years to bring about better industrial conditions. An increasing number of manufacturers are providing for the welfare of their employees. Some good laws are now upon the statute-books. The factory law of July 1, 1926, fixed working hours in industrial occupations at fifty-seven per week and raised the age limit, except for workers in silk factories, from twelve to fourteen for children who have not completed the primary school course. Children under sixteen are forbidden to work in mines. But children may still be made to work

eleven hours a day, and girls over sixteen as well as boys may toil underground. The struggle for existence in overcrowded cities, the pressure of competition, the eager desire for profits, the abnormal demands for increased production following the War, have thus far prevented adequate enforcement of legal requirements. Western lands are still far from perfect in this respect; but the condition of working people in Japan is undoubtedly low as compared with that of the corresponding classes in America. Men and women, and especially boys and girls, cannot work eleven hours a day, seven days a week, on poor food, in overcrowded quarters and sometimes unsanitary surroundings, without serious physical, intellectual and moral deterioration.¹

Human life has long been held cheap among the Japanese. Some people who lightly value the lives of others are scrupulously careful of their own. But the Japanese do not hesitate to sacrifice their lives on various pretexts. We have discussed in another chapter the military significance of this fact, but we may note it here among the social phenomena. "Suicides are common even among the young. According to official statistics, in a recent year 241 youths under the age of sixteen committed suicide, 801 between sixteen and twenty years of age, and 3,086 between twenty and thirty. An American student who fails to pass his examinations never thinks of killing himself, but every year Japanese students end their lives for this reason. One young man of nineteen years left the following lines:

"Alas! having missed the road to success, I go asleep into the night.
The days of a man's life are but fifty sad years—the end, dust."

A favourite place for suicides is the beautiful Kegon Waterfall near Nikko. Sidney L. Gulick writes:

¹ Cf. Report on Industrial Conditions of Modern Japan, prepared by the Social Welfare Committee of the Conference of Federated Missions, 1916, and Sidney L. Gulick's *Working Women of Japan*.

"A brilliant and widely known university graduate flung himself into the river just above the waterfall. His battered body was found a few days later among the rocks six hundred feet below. He left behind a letter which was published throughout the land and was in substance as follows: 'I have studied all that science and philosophy have to teach about the problem of existence. I have examined all the religions for their answers to the problem of human life. Nowhere have I found anything satisfactory. I now go into the other world to search for the solution myself.' Presently another youth did the same thing, and then another, and still another. Police were stationed at the head of the waterfall to stop the tragedy, but without complete success. A barricade of stout posts fastened together by iron failed to stop the human cataract over those falls that for a thousand years had been connected with the pessimistic religious tradition of the land. In 1912 no fewer than 248 men and women ended their lives in that tragic way at that single spot. How many had ended their lives in the crater of Asama no records can show."

Even maternal love sometimes fails to make a mother cling to her child when she believes that his honour is involved, although the point may concern only a school prize. In his *Life of Japan*, Mr. Masuji Miyakawa tells us that a Japanese mother would want her son to commit suicide because he had failed to get a prize at school and another boy had received it. He says that when he was a schoolboy in Tokyo, only six years old, "his most faithful schoolmate received a medal and he got none; his dear mother then told him he had better commit hari-kari, which even at that young age he thought strongly of doing."

The social unrest which is creating such a ferment in western countries has reached Japan, and although its manifestations have not yet appeared on a large scale, they have been prominent enough to indicate that a significant movement has begun. The government does not permit the kind of labour unions with which America is familiar, but the principle of collective bargaining is rapidly gaining advocates. The Japanese labourers of today are not as meek and docile as their fathers

were. The *Japan Advertiser* reports that in a recent year there were 180 strikes in which 30,000 men participated. "In olden times," said Mr. Nakashoji, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, "we very seldom had a labour question. Because of the relations between lords and subjects, subjects had to obey their lords. Lately, with the coming in of new ideas, disorder has arisen here and there."

During the World War the cost of living rose 80 per cent and, as in other lands, the profits of the enormous increase in manufactures and commerce were unequally distributed. While some men accumulated huge fortunes, the wage-earning classes found that the prices of necessities of life went up out of all proportion to the gain in their incomes. Widespread discontent resulted. In the summer of 1918, the large stores of food which the War Department felt obliged to accumulate for the Siberian expedition, and the hoarding of the remaining rice by greedy speculators who charged exorbitant prices, caused a shortage of this staple which the Japanese deem so essential. The victimized people were not so submissive as they would have been in like circumstances a generation ago. Riots broke out in various parts of the country, and the situation became so serious that the government was forced to buy up all the rice in storage and sell it to the people at reasonable prices.

According to the statistics published by the Social Work Bureau of the Home Office, there were 1,005 cases of labour disputes in Japan in 1926, involving 100,000 labourers. This is an increase of 200 cases and 10,000 men over the previous year. On May Day, 1926, 15,000 factory employees paraded through the streets of Tokyo, carrying banners and singing the Song of Labour. Professor Ryoza Okumura of Tokyo has published an interesting article on the plight of students in Japan. He declares that the acuteness of economic pressure upon Japanese life today is driving students to become more and more utilitarian, and that every graduate faces the distressing problem of unemployment. According to the report

of the Ministry of the Interior, from twenty to forty per cent of the graduates of colleges and professional schools in 1926 were unable to find employment of any kind. Moreover, there are many who, being unable to find employment of their own preference, are forced to take employment of a temporary nature. The economic phase of Japanese life today is hard and sometimes pathetic. That these educated young men are restless and discontented is not surprising.

The Yuai Kai, a friendly association of workers as near a labour union as the laws permit, was founded in 1912 and already claims more than 30,000 members. Its President visited the United States a few years ago and attended the meeting of the American Federation of Labour, where he was received as a fraternal delegate from Japan and brought into touch with that powerful organization.

Toyohiko Kagawa is an interesting and significant figure in present day Japan. A Christian minister who studied theology at Princeton, New Jersey, he has thrown himself with eager devotion into movements for improved labour and social conditions. He lives in the poorest quarters of the cities in which he works, makes speeches, preaches sermons, and writes books, pamphlets and newspaper articles on the teachings of Christianity, particularly in relation to social justice and the abolition of war. He has organized Christian mutual aid societies in Kobe and Osaka. He is president of the cotton mill workers of Osaka, head of the industrial department of the Tenant Farmers' Union, organizer of the Labour Farmer Party, president of a peasant school, of a labour school, and of an industrial settlement. His Labour Farmer Party advocates the emancipation of the proletarian class in the social and political fields, reformation by legal means of the system of production and distribution of the land, reconstruction of the parliamentary system, and abolition of the old political parties representing capitalism. The Tenant Farmers' Union, which he helped to organize in 1921 with two hundred poor tenants, has already enrolled over 25,000 members and is adding more

every week. It is becoming a power in local village assemblies. It demands radical changes in land laws, a decrease in land rent from fifty-five to thirty per cent of the produce, and a greater degree of economic dependence than tenant farmers now possess. When the recent suffrage law added nine million voters to the electorate, it was Kagawa who joined Professor Abe of Waseda University in organizing a party for the instruction of the newly enfranchised men.

Kagawa is a Christian Socialist with emphasis on Christian. He stoutly opposes Communism and excludes them from the organizations that he controls. Socialism, however, as it is popularly known in Europe and America has made its appearance in Japan. Several teachers in educational institutions, and even in the imperial universities, are known to entertain socialistic views. Those who hold moderate opinions are not disturbed, but some alarm was felt when, in 1910, a band of men, who professed to be Socialists but who were more nearly anarchists, were discovered to be plotting against the government. Their leader, Kotoku, and twenty-five of his confederates were promptly arrested and given short shift. Libraries were searched and every Socialist book and pamphlet was destroyed, including Kotoku's book entitled *An Argument for the Effacement of Christ*, in which he bitterly arraigned Christianity as a superstitious fable and the enemy of all freedom. The excitement stirred up by this group of fanatics soon died down, but the authorities are keeping their eye on the socialistic propaganda, of which Japan, like Europe and America, has not seen the end.

There are various indications that socialistic ideas are making some progress. Professor Ryoza Okumura, however, says that the socialist movement in Japan today has a decided inclination toward the mild right; that even the left wing labour leaders are becoming milder and more constructive; that students who are most apt to accept liberal ideas are endeavouring more than before to align themselves with the constructive wing; that they are getting tired of propaganda literature and

gatherings, and are more interested in the study of labour problems and in the education of labourers. He is convinced that, from outward appearances, students are losing interest in socialistic ideas, but that a limited number of thinking students are taking increased interest in Socialism. This is partly because of the instinctive revolt of a certain type of youth against the government's strict and sometimes repressive control of student organizations and publications. The Ministry of Education disapproves the discussion of social questions, except in a classroom under the supervision of a teacher who in Japan is a quasi government official. "Any association in which 'dangerous thoughts' are either read or studied is absolutely prohibited," and "private studies are prohibited if the studies concern dangerous thoughts."

Russian agents have undoubtedly fanned the fires of discontent and anti-foreign feeling in Japan, as they have in China and India. They have won some converts to their revolutionary program. But Japan will not become Bolshevistic. The labour leaders are not radicals. Communism demands distribution of wealth, and the typical Japanese has no idea whatever of distributing any wealth that he can get hold of. His problem is not how to divide up property with others but how to acquire it and then hang on to it. Communism, too, demands public ownership of land, and the Japanese tenaciously cling to their land. What Count Keyserling, in the *Travel Diary of a Philosopher*, says of China may be said with equal truth of Japan:

"Every inch of soil is in cultivation, carefully manured, well and professionally tilled, right up to the highest tops of the hills, which, like the pyramids of Egypt, slope down in artificial terraces. . . . There is no other peasantry in the world which gives such an impression of absolute genuineness and of belonging so much to the soil. Here the whole of life and the whole of death take place on the inherited ground. Man belongs to the soil, not the soil to man; it will never let its children go. However much they may increase in

number, they remain upon it, wringing from Nature her scanty gifts by ever more assiduous labour; and when they are dead they return in childlike confidence to what is to them the real womb of their mother. . . . The soil exhales the spirit of his ancestors, it is they who repay his labour and who punish him for his omissions. Thus, the inherited fields are at the same time his history, his memory, his reminiscences; he can deny it as little as he can deny himself; for he is only a part of it."

Intemperance is a more prevalent vice in Japan than the casual visitor realizes, as drinking is usually done in the home at night where the effects are quietly slept off before the next day. Drunkenness is therefore less conspicuous than in western lands, where a greater proportion of the drinking is done in public saloons and other places outside of the home and an intoxicated man reels out on the street. Buddhism is a prohibition religion in theory, but its adherents seldom practise it in Japan. While beer has become popular, sake (rice liquor) is the national beverage. One hundred and sixty million gallons are made in an average year, and the revenue tax is a prolific source of income to the government. Protest against this evil is not wanting. A temperance society was started as early as 1875. There are now over two hundred such societies, and their membership is rapidly growing. The cause has powerful advocates in influential men and women and in several members of the Imperial Diet.

It is gratifying to note the growth of humane movements in Japan. A Red Cross Society, organized in a small way in 1877, now enrolls over 2,000,000 members, including members of the royal family and many of the most distinguished Japanese. Its hospitals, physicians, nurses, and financial resources are prepared to meet almost any emergency. The Japan Society for the Humane Protection of Animals finds congenial soil in a land where Buddhism, at least in theory, opposes the taking of life. The Prison Association of Japan, started a generation ago at the instigation of John C. Berry, an Ameri-

can missionary, has given much study to prison reform, has sent delegates to the meetings of the International Prison Congresses, and has been instrumental in abating some forms of cruel punishments. Societies for the protection of children were later in starting, but are now flourishing. A system of social insurance covers risks on two and a half million workers. Large hearted Japanese are making earnest efforts to ameliorate the condition of orphans and other neglected waifs. Efforts for the blind have a needy field in a country where their number is 141 for every 100,000 of the population, a proportion nearly double that in America and western Europe. Thus the humane movement in Japan is well under way and is gaining strength and momentum every year. Mr. Sakau Moriya, Director of the Social Work Department of the Bureau of Social Affairs in Japan, in an interesting *Review of Social Work in Japan in 1925*, lists a variety of organizations and movements which have the encouragement of the Government. He describes the national conference of social workers, the national meeting of reconciliation workers, the national meeting of representatives of social reform associations, the reformatory education conference, meetings of the chiefs of the sections of social work in the prefectural offices, a society for relieving persons of sixty years or over who were left helpless by the earthquake of 1923, a society for protecting and assisting cripples, a society for aiding discharged soldiers to find employment, an asylum for disabled soldiers, a calamity relief fund, free medical relief for the poor, the Japan Red Cross Society, an employment exchange, vocational guidance for young people, unemployment relief, the Osaka Labourers' Mutual Aid Society, the Kobe Labour Insurance Association, a society for the protection of emigrants, housing associations, public markets, public pawnshops, lodging houses, luncheon rooms and bath houses, a society for the encouragement of thrift, various kinds of social settlement work, several temperance societies, associations for young men and for young women, for child protection and for the reformation of chil-

dren in reformatories—a rather formidable list of activities which shows that modern Japan is actively interested in a wide variety of social movements.

The position of woman is undergoing change like almost everything else in Japan. Happy homes, respect for mothers, and tender care of children have long existed in Japan. Mrs. Edsu Inogaki Sugimoto's volume, *A Daughter of the Samurai*, gives a charming description of the beautiful family life of many cultivated Japanese. "Most entertaining things are written by foreigners about marriage forced upon unwilling brides, and even of marriages by purchase," observes Professor Inazo Nitobe. "I may just as truly amuse and instruct my own people with stories about ambitious American parents practically selling their daughters to European nobles, or of the sorrows of 'marriage de convenance' in Europe. There are certainly more opportunities for American girls to marry the men whom they most love, and, vice versa, for men to take to wife girls whom they like best; but I doubt whether the proportion of happy unions is very different in the two countries."¹

The general fact remains, however, that the status of Japanese women as a class has always been below that of men. A widely circulated volume entitled *Great Learning for Women* declared that "the five worst maladies that affect the female mind are indocility, discontent, slander, jealousy, and silliness. Without doubt these five maladies affect seven or eight out of every ten women." As late as 1871 the Emperor said: "Japanese women are without understanding." The popular notion was that of the Confucian maxim: "It is no undesirable thing for a wife to be stupid, whereas a wise woman is more likely to be a curse in a family than a blessing." Sons were joyously welcomed, but daughters were seldom desired.

In a striking article in the *Shin Nihon*, August, 1917, Marquis Okuma wrote:

¹ *The Japanese Nation*, p. 163.

“ In early days, the intercourse of men and women was little above the animals. . . . Then came Christianity to show the higher path and to give clear, strict teaching about one husband and one wife, which has gradually influenced the world. . . . In feudal times women were hardly regarded as human beings of the same kind as men and were too severely restricted. Women ought to be well educated, but it was thought bad for them to know much, so they were instructed in little except the duty of submission. They were supposed to exist only for the pleasure and use of men, who laid down the rules which suited themselves. The time has come when those old ways will no longer serve us. . . . Women are demanding social and political equality with men. . . . This women's question is not one which can be neglected with impunity. It is chattered about carelessly by young people; but it is plain that sooner or later it will become a problem of burning importance in intimate connection with our practical life.”

Missionaries from the West taught the Christian ideas of the equality of the sexes, and gave an object-lesson in the treatment of their own wives and daughters which Japanese women did not fail to observe. Mission schools for girls were opened. Their attendance was small at first, but in time they became popular. A pioneer in this work for the Christian education of women was Miss Julia N. Crosby of the Woman's Union Missionary Society of America, who, with Mrs. Louise H. Pierson and Mrs. Samuel Pruyn, founded a boarding-school for girls in Yokohama in 1870. The Emperor, in 1917, recognized Miss Crosby's services to Japan by conferring upon her the decoration of the Blue Ribbon.

Many thousands of girls are now being educated in both government and private schools, and highly educated women are to be found in all the leading cities and in many of the smaller towns. The wives of Japanese diplomatic and consular officials and of prominent business men in Europe and America are famous for their cultivated grace of manner. A social function under the auspices of The Japan Society of New York brings together as charming and intelligent a com-

pany of Japanese as one could meet anywhere, and they do not suffer in comparison with their American sisters.

Japanese women, too, like their sisters in England and America, are seeking independent careers. Some of them are entering business, journalism, medicine, nursing, and philanthropy. Stenography, typewriting, and telephoning are largely in their hands. Prominent women are active in social and temperance reform. Madame Yajima was known all over Japan for her able leadership in these reforms. The enlightened and enfranchised women of the new era, in both the East and the West, will not acquiesce in the kind of treatment to which their mothers and grandmothers more or less meekly yielded.

The male "lords of creation" everywhere might as well recognize the fact that the days of their unchallenged domination are over. The Government Bureau of Social Affairs now reports that 1,100,000 women in Japan are engaged in thirty-three professions and occupations, about half of them in Tokyo. Women physicians, midwives and nurses, number 98,000 throughout Japan; teachers of girls' schools 78,000; governmental office assistants 4,500. Those working in commercial lines total 607,000, including 9,300 saleswomen and typists, 34,000 hair-dressers, 1,000 reporters, 200 musicians, 11,000 employees in mining and factory offices, and 514,000 maidservants. Municipal returns estimate film actresses living in Tokyo at 620.

Average monthly wages are officially given as follows: Women physicians in hospitals, over 70 yen; (one yen is about fifty cents American money or two English shillings) nurses, 40 to 100 yen; teachers in schools of secondary grade, 70 to 150 yen; teachers in primary schools, 45 yen; kindergartners, 30 to 75 yen; typists, 30 to 80 yen; reporters for newspapers, 50 to 100 yen; stenographers, 70 to 100 yen; salesgirls with knowledge of English, 50 to 100 yen; radio announcers, 50 to 100 yen; guides, over 100 yen; coiffeurs, 50 to 150 yen; models, 60 to 100 yen; women conductors of street cars, 27 to

50 yen; factory girls, 15 to 70 yen; maid-servants, 8 to 20 yen with board and lodging free.

The marriage tie is more frequently broken in Japan than in Europe and America. This is saying a good deal, for the breaking up of homes in the United States is disgracefully common. Statistics of divorce, compiled by Professor W. B. Bailey of Yale University for the eleven leading nations, show that a dozen years ago the proportion of divorces was three times higher in Japan than in the next highest country, the United States, the ratio being 215 per 100,000 of the population in Japan to 73 in the United States. Since then, conditions have improved in Japan, the latest report giving a divorce rate of .9 per thousand of the population. We wish that we could say that conditions have improved in the United States. That eminent Japanese, Professor Inazo Nitobe, while frankly admitting that "the number of divorces is appalling and a disgrace to our family system," adds: "In a large proportion of our divorces the cause is to be found not in the rupture of conjugal relations but in the custom of a married son living under the same roof with his parents; in short, in the universally notorious relationship between a wife and a mother-in-law!"¹

The social evil is described with startling clearness in U. G. Murphy's book entitled *The Social Evil in Japan*. The author wrote out of the personal knowledge that he had painfully acquired in a struggle of many years to save Japanese girls from the virtual slavery of a prostitute's life. There has been marked improvement in recent years, but immorality is still popularly regarded as only a venial offense. Mr. Sakau Moriya says that "in 1925 the numbers of licensed prostitutes, geisha-girls, and waitresses in our country are respectively estimated at 50,000, 75,000 and 48,000," a total of 173,000 women who are classed as professionally immoral.²

¹ *The Japanese Nation*, p. 164.

² *Review of Social Work in Japan*, pp. 34-35, by Sakau Moriya, Director of Social Work Department of Bureau of Social Affairs, published by the Bureau 1926.

The alleged easier lot of the Japanese courtesan, as compared with that of her American and European sisters, is largely imaginary. It is true that in a land where the social evil is more generally condoned she does not suffer the same sense of shame and that she is not so completely ostracized. But she is the victim of the same maltreatment from brutal keepers; she is involved in the same debts from which she can seldom extricate herself; she contracts the same foul diseases; and, until missionaries took up the struggle in her behalf, she had little better chance of escaping from her keepers and returning to a normal life before she was irretrievably wrecked in health. Young and ignorant girls were persuaded or forced to register as prostitutes at police stations, and were then assigned to the segregated districts. They were required to fulfil the contract which they had thoughtlessly signed, and, if they managed to escape, the police often helped to capture them and send them back.

Many Japanese are unmoral rather than immoral. Galen W. Fisher, formerly Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Tokyo, vouches for the statement that the principal of a large normal school said that he not only patronized houses of ill fame himself but that he advised his teachers to do so, and that he even gave them tickets so that at the end of each month the bills would be sent to him for payment and deducted from their salaries.¹ Captain Bechel, who traveled about Japan for seventeen years, investigated one hundred and seven districts and reported that ninety-six were pestilentially immoral; that phallic worship was still practised in many Buddhist shrines, and that in some districts almost all the adults were tainted with immorality. He speaks of a principal of a school who had several paramours with the knowledge of parents and children alike; of a member of parliament who publicly had two concubines; of a member of a provisional assembly who had two wives and two homes, children in each, and traveled with

¹ Pamphlet, *Japanese Young Men in War and Peace*, published by the International Committee of the Y. M. C. A., New York.

geisha; and of leading men, including priests, soncho (chief of village), doctor, principal of the school, and leading business men who sold a girl of twelve years for ten yen because her parents could not support her and she might become a charge to the village.¹

The reliability of Ernest W. Clement's *Handbook of Modern Japan* is not likely to be questioned by any prudent man. He wrote:

"As is well known, the social evil is licensed, and therefore legalized, in Japan; it is not merely not condemned but actually condoned. In Old Japan, the young girl willing to sell herself to a life of shame to relieve the poverty and distress of her parents would be considered virtuous, because filial piety was regarded as a higher virtue than personal chastity. Nor would the parents who accepted such relief be severely condemned, because the welfare of the family was more important than the condition of the individual. And even in modern Japan, in the eyes of the law, it is no crime to visit a licensed house of ill fame; and visitors to such places hand in their cards and have their names registered just as if they were attending an ordinary public function. Nay, more, an ex-president of the Imperial University and one of the leading philosophers and educators of the day has come out in public print and affirmed that, from the standpoint of science and philosophy, he can see no evil in prostitution per se."²

Ideas of modesty in all countries are influenced to some extent by convention, and American women who would sharply resent the charge of indelicacy often appear at social functions and even on the street in costumes which an Oriental would deem highly immoral. The visitor in Japan should, therefore, not infer too much from the exposure of the person in public places, and in bathing by both men and women. I am not unmindful, too, that there is shameful immorality in the cities of Europe and America, and that most of the foreign settle-

¹ Article, "Japan's Need and Response," in *The Missionary Review of the World*, January, 1917.

² *A Handbook of Modern Japan*, pp. 166-167.

ments in the ports of Asia include sinks of iniquity of which Sodom and Gomorrah might have been ashamed. Hundreds of Asiatic women are kept by dissolute Americans and Europeans, and the arrival of a steamer load of tourists often means a harvest for the brothels of the port. No Asiatic can be viler than a degenerate white man. It is, moreover, unhappily true that, although most American cities have largely broken up the type of commercialized vice that formerly flourished in notorious "red-light" districts, the general level of morality has sagged since the World War.

Nor is Japan alone in licensing prostitutes. Some men in western lands deem governmental regulations under a license system a better way of dealing with the social evil than to permit it to run at large under prohibitory laws which are usually a dead letter. Japan has followed the lead of some European nations in licensing a vice which no government has ever eradicated. But whatever may be the theory, the practical effect of licensure is to advertise vice, make it easy and attractive, and clothe it with official sanction. Making all due allowance for varying customs and methods of dealing with the problem, the general fact is indubitable that the public sentiment of Japan has long been influenced by the idea that lust is a natural appetite which may be almost as properly gratified as the appetite for food and thirst for drink.

The ideas of morality inculcated by missionaries are slowly but surely operating and they are now accepted by an increasing number of intelligent Japanese. Mr. Sakau Moriya, Director of the Social Service Department of the Bureau of Social Affairs in Japan, in describing the efforts of his Department to deal with the problem of prostitution, says: "The movement for abolition of licensed prostitution was first started by the Christian circle, and the practical movement for unrestricted retirement from such a calling has also been under way from about the year 1899. Later, this tendency has been supported by such organizations as the Central Women's Relief Department of the Salvation Army and the

Women's Reform Association of the Japanese Christian Church. As for the protection and guidance of those licensed or unlicensed prostitutes who want to apply themselves to an honest calling, there have been established, besides those above mentioned, about nine organizations, such as the Crittenden Charity Home and the Kobe Women's Friendly Association, which have done a great deal toward the relief of this kind of women in coöperation with the general abolition movement."¹

Miss Ochimi Kubushiro, General Secretary of the Women's Christian Temperance Union, calls attention to the fact that the campaign against impurity began in 1887. Two petitions were then presented to the Government, one to prohibit girls from going abroad for immoral purposes; the other to make moral standards the same for men as for women. Every year since then petitions have been laid before the Government, although Miss Kubushiro says "with little success."² Twelve years ago, when the Tokyo Yoshiwara was burned down, many Japanese, headed by Madame Yajima and Mr. Saburo Shimada, M. P., made a valiant fight against its reërection. In one of the big mass meetings, Madame Yajima appeared in her ceremonial dress ready for any emergency, as she did not know what might not happen on such an occasion. The Yoshiwara was rebuilt, but the opponents had no thought of abandoning their efforts. Women were already organized, and now the men also organized, under the presidency of Professor Abe of Waseda University, adopting the name "Men's Purity League."

The National Christian Council of Japan in 1925 published a booklet in Japanese and English entitled *The System of Licensed Prostitution in Japan*, which was widely distributed. The Men's Purity League and The Women's Christian Tem-

¹ *Review of Social Work in Japan*, pp. 34-35, published by the Bureau of Social Affairs, 1926.

² Article by Ochimi Kubushiro, in *The Japan Christian Quarterly*, October, 1926.

perance Union in 1926 appointed a joint committee which is conducting a vigorous campaign throughout the country. It appeals for "the coöperation of all right-minded citizens, whether they be Christians or otherwise. Our goal is the abolition of legalized vice and the establishment of an equal moral standard for men and women. It is, in short, the setting up of Christ's standard of purity in the customs, law, and life of our beloved country. Christian forces are fighting against this strong social evil with power and faith in the Lord who is the Victor of Justice."¹

Some remedial laws have now been enacted, and restrictive decisions have been handed down by the courts. The "Free Cassation Regulation," issued by the Home Department October 2, 1900, gave licensed women the right to leave resorts without the consent of their keepers, and thousands of girls have availed themselves of this right so that an inmate of a brothel is no longer a legal captive for the period of her contract. Girls under sixteen years of age may not be lawfully licensed at all. Test cases have been fought through the courts which form gratifying precedents for future suits. Rescue homes have been opened, and the number of licensed prostitutes has been greatly reduced. These improvements were obtained against a vehemence of opposition which Mr. Murphy has vividly described. When, in 1916, the authorities of Osaka gave a permit to replace a burned vice district by the erection of brothels on a tract of seventeen acres near the most popular recreation grounds in the city, Christians organized the "To-bita Licensed Quarter Opposition Society," and under the leadership of George Gleason of the Y. M. C. A., and Colonel Yamamuro of the Salvation Army, began a campaign which enlisted the hearty coöperation of many of the best Japanese. Letters were sent to 2,000 leading citizens asking them to make a public declaration of their attitude. Six hundred sent favourable replies, and only three wrote in opposition, but nearly

¹ Article by K. Miyazaki, in *The Japan Christian Quarterly*, October, 1926.

1,400 made no reply. A procession of Japanese women headed by the venerable Madame Yajima, eighty-two years of age, went through the streets to present a petition to the Governor to abandon the scheme. He was "too busy" to see them, but they succeeded in getting access to the chief of police. *The Far East*, a Tokyo publication, reported that though "the matter has now been before the public for months past," it is "remarkable that those in authority have not seen the advisability of determining such an unsavoury business by a concession to public opinion, which has been expressed with unusual force." A Supreme Court ruling that the debts of inmates to their brothel proprietors are binding left a powerful weapon in the hands of keepers, who are as notorious in Japan as elsewhere for cheating and overcharging their girls so as to keep them continually in debt.

The following extract from a report that was published for the Standing Committee of Coöperating Christian Missions in Japan shows how the laws are evaded:

"Strict guard is kept so that inmates cannot get out of the quarters easily without being detected. If detected, they are forced back, the section of the Regulations which provides for the punishment of those interfering with those who wish to secure their freedom being practically overlooked. After their arrival at the police station, the keepers or some of their hirelings follow and threaten, cajole, and plead in turn, in the endeavour to get them to go back. After the report has been accepted and the women are no longer inmates, the keepers often take from them their clothes and leave only thin, dirty dresses and obi. Immediately after one gets free, the keeper almost invariably distrains the property of those who have put their stamps to the contract. This has been the most effectual method used so far. About twenty per cent return to a life of shame, and almost without exception the distraint on the household goods of parents and relatives furnishes the reason. A distraint is likely to take nearly everything so that the hardships endured by those who are so unfortunate as to have their property distrained upon are great, and from the point of view of those who are so low down in the

moral and human scale as to sell their children for vile purposes it is too great a hardship to be endured for the sake of one's offspring."

The popular attitude toward the social evil in Japan was significantly illustrated in September, 1925, when public announcement was made that on the anniversary of the day of the great earthquake and fire in 1923, memorial services would be held for the 600 girls in the Yoshiwara (the segregated vice district in Tokyo) who had lost their lives in that great catastrophe, and that a statue dedicated to them would be unveiled, the announcement concluding with the statement that "in memory of the sad occasion, the whole quarter will suspend business for the day."

Writing in 1926, Dr. Allen K. Faust, President of Miyagi College (Women's), Sendai, Japan, said: "How strong these anti-social forces are (geisha and licensed prostitutes) can best be learned from the actual conditions. In 1924 there were 52,256 licensed prostitutes in Japan and 48,291 barmaids, who may properly be regarded the same as prostitutes. To these numbers must be added that of the private prostitutes—and these are simply countless. In March, 1925, a bill which aimed at the abolition of the licensed brothels was presented to the Diet and was defeated by a vote of 157 to 53."¹

It is not surprising that the Japanese have carried their customs with them to the mainland of Asia. The tendency of men of all races to be more unrestrained abroad than at home is not lacking in the Japanese. The remedial ordinances that have been enacted in recent years in Japan are nominally operative in Korea; but they are seldom enforced in any effective way except in sporadic cases. The Japanese have built houses of prostitution as they have built court-houses and railway stations. Handsome buildings are erected, provided with music and electric lights and made as attractive as any places in the city. Nor are retired locations selected. When they took the Chinese port of Tsingtau from the Germans after

¹ *The New Japanese Womanhood*, p. 135.

the outbreak of the World War in 1914, one of their early acts was to select a spacious tract for a "red-light" section, and to erect several blocks of buildings upon it. The site chosen was near the Presbyterian Mission compound with its residences and schools. Respectful protests from the missionaries were politely received but were unavailing, the Japanese officials not concealing their surprise that such objections should be made. In November, 1910, the Seoul authorities ordered the 130 brothels and immoral restaurants that were scattered over the Japanese quarter to remove to a segregated section. This was an undoubted benefit to the business and residential districts in that part of the city. Unfortunately, the designated site was on a prominent hillside within plain view of a far larger proportion of the capital than the resorts had been before. When brilliantly illuminated, as it is almost every evening, it is the most conspicuous object in the city. Every boy and girl in the missionary schools on the opposite hill cannot help knowing that it is there, and that it is thronged nightly by men who consider themselves respectable.

Reports which I obtained from official sources during my visit in Seoul showed that there was a government tax collected from prostitutes and geisha. A comparison of the figures given me showed that one person in thirty-one of the Japanese population of the capital was then classified as immoral, and that only one in 730 of the Korean population was so classified. It is only fair to say, however, that the very publicity which the Japanese give to the traffic makes it easier to tabulate their statistics than those of the Koreans who are more secretive in this respect.

I am sorry to write so plainly on this unpleasant subject regarding a people whom I respect and admire in many ways. I wish to emphasize the fact that increasing numbers of Japanese lament the virtual partnership of their authorities with the social evil. It is gratifying to note Dr. Allen K. Faust's further testimony that "the opposition to this business is much stronger than this vote (157 to 53) against the bill to abolish

licensed brothels would indicate. Petitions signed by 140,000 people, to prevent the brothels of Tokyo from being rebuilt after the earthquake of 1923, were sent to the Imperial Diet. An Anti-Vice Day was observed at that time. The whole Christian Japanese community and large numbers of non-Christians are vigorously protesting against the social evil. Dr. Kanasugi voiced the sentiment of many Japanese when he characterized the legalized traffic in women as "a national stain." The Awakened Woman's Society has as one of its chief aims the abolition of this evil, and several of the best newspapers have taken up the cudgels against the "slavery of the twentieth century."¹

Judgment of social and economic conditions in Japan should be tempered by the reflection that the nation is emerging from an era of indifference to this subject, that western nations which have known higher moral standards much longer still have much to be ashamed of, and that increasing numbers of Japanese are earnestly trying to bring about a better state of affairs. Bishop Charles H. Brent sadly writes of his observations in the Philippines: "How to deal wisely and effectively with this age-long problem has been the puzzle of the Christian missionary ever since Christian missions were first founded. We ourselves have not yet found the way. You cannot rate the offense there at the same estimate as in the western world. I have often thought with contempt and scorn of the veneer that glosses over the uncleanness of our own country, and wondered what would happen to the self-righteous westerner were he suddenly pressed into the social conditions of the Igorots."² While there is much to regret in the social and industrial conditions of modern Japan, there is also much to encourage the hope that a better day is dawning. The forces of humanity and moral uplift have begun to operate, and they are yearly gaining in vigour and power.

¹ *The New Japanese Womanhood*, pp. 135-136.

² Article, "Sixteen Years in the Philippines," in *The Spirit of Missions*, March, 1918.

A word may be added regarding the policy of segregating social vice, since the Japanese method has been recommended by some Europeans and Americans who, despairing of eradicating the evil, argue that it is better to restrict it to a limited area where it can be isolated and watched, where only deliberately immoral men will seek it, and where women can be medically examined, than it is to have it scattered through a city to contaminate the neighbourhoods of respectable families.

The fact is, however, that "segregation" fails to segregate. An immoral woman likes freedom as well as other people and will operate at large as long as she can. When the police interfere, she will attempt to bribe them; and the experience of a thousand cities proves that she can usually succeed in doing so. Only the most hardened and reckless cases, or the most pitifully ignorant ones, will voluntarily become virtual prisoners in a segregated district. Proof of this appears in the great number of immoral women outside of these districts in Japan and in western cities which have adopted the policy of segregation, no small part of the vice being "out of bounds."

Segregation, too, places the stamp of legal approval upon licentiousness as a recognized business and fosters police corruption, for not only will outside women pay the police to let them alone but brothel keepers will pay for aid in keeping their victims in. The American Social Hygiene Association, after an exhaustive investigation of the subject in Europe and America, declares that segregation increases the demand for prostitutes, enlarges the supply, is a continuous advertisement of vice, creates an illegally privileged class, provides a meeting-place for the idle and vicious, increases illegal traffic in liquor, and is the most prolific cause of public contamination.

The policy of licensing and regulating vice is an equally flat failure. Immoral women are as averse to public registration and its accompanying exactions as they are to segregation, and most of them succeed in avoiding it. Abraham Flexner, of New York, says that "nowhere is more than an unimportant

fraction registered. . . . Time was when regulation prevailed throughout almost the whole of Europe. It has now died out in Great Britain, Holland, Denmark, Norway, and Switzerland. The system is on its last legs in France, Belgium, Germany, Austria-Hungary, Sweden, and Italy. When we are told that regulation is practised in Europe, we may confidently reply that the system had died out in many countries, and is moribund almost everywhere else."

The permanent Advisory Committee of the League of Nations reported in 1922 that licensing of brothels is the chief cause of the traffic in women and girls. The special committee of experts on the international traffic in women and girls presented to the League in March, 1927, a report which confirmed this finding. It declared that "the plain road to removal of this blot upon morality and civilization is abolition of the system. The reason formerly urged in defense of this system can no longer be maintained. It was supposed to afford protection to the public health; but State regulation of vice in this, as in other shapes, no longer commands the confidence of those best qualified to judge. The committee makes an appeal for its abandonment on the ground that at best it is a useless system, and that beyond all question it promotes and feeds the infamous international traffic."

As for the much vaunted medical inspection, Doctor Flexner declares that "it is a farce, and that there is not the least doubt that it spreads more disease than it discovers." The special committee of the League of Nations, above referred to, plainly says that "modern research and experience have convinced specialists that perfunctory visits of medical officers to licensed houses are useless and even dangerous by creating a false sense of security." The grade of physicians who are willing to do that kind of professional work are apt to make careless examinations, especially if they are bribed to do so. Moreover, the beginnings of venereal disease are not always easy of detection. Even if a thorough examination does find a woman free from disease, she may contract it a few

hours afterward and infect several men before her next examination.

The whole method of dealing with the social evil by government licensure and regulation is inherently and thoroughly unsound in theory and a total failure in practice. There is no half-way ground in this matter. The only right way to handle it is to regard it as a sin and crime, to be treated as burglary and murder are treated—something always and everywhere and in all circumstances radically wrong, and to be fought as such wherever and whenever it is found. Compromise of any kind is not only futile as a remedial measure but it actually makes a bad matter worse.

And how, one may wonderingly ask, and in the name of all justice, fairness, and common sense, is vice to be effectively segregated or regulated when only one party to it, the woman, is dealt with, and the other party, the man, is left to roam at will? Society is in far greater danger from licentious men, the majority of whom are also diseased, than it is from fallen women, who are usually the victims of men. Let those who imagine that the social evil can be extirpated, or reduced to a minimum, by forcing a comparative handful of pitifully forlorn girls to live in a segregated quarter, or to go to a police station and publicly register and take out licenses—let them, I say, demand that the far greater number of men who exploit or patronize them be compelled to submit to the same treatment or go to jail. We shall never get anywhere in dealing with the social evil until we realize that it is not so much a woman problem as it is a man problem.

IX

JAPAN IN KOREA

THE Japanese found themselves in Korea in the course of the war with Russia in circumstances roughly analogous to those in which the Americans found themselves in the Philippine Islands after the war with Spain. Military necessity had brought them in and, once in, civil as well as military obligation confronted them. Their first thought was to content themselves with the appointment of Japanese advisers on finances and foreign relations and to leave internal affairs in the hands of the Korean authorities. August 22, 1904, an "Agreement" to this effect was concluded.

This plan did not work satisfactorily and the Japanese concluded that the problem was too difficult to be solved by half-way measures. A draft of a treaty was soon presented which included the appointment of a Japanese to govern Korea under the Emperor, Japanese administrators at all treaty ports, and the transfer of Korean diplomatic affairs to Tokyo. The feeble and frightened monarch signed the convention November 17, 1905. January 29 he issued an appeal to the nations in which he declared that his signature had been forged. This was not true, but he certainly did not sign the document voluntarily.

Great was the excitement among the people when the treaty became known. Several officials committed suicide. Crowds gathered, screaming and tearing their hair. The Japanese wisely left the people to rage without interference, except when stones were thrown or fighting began. Order was gradually restored, but the fires of anger and chagrin long smouldered in secret. Marquis Ito said to representatives of the press:

“Although the new relations between Japan and Korea have now been definitely established by the conclusion of the protectorate treaty, the sovereignty of Korea remains as it was, in the hands of the Korean Emperor. It is a great mistake to look upon the new treaty as a knell sounding the doom of Korea’s existence as a kingdom.” The Korean Emperor, however, refused to be comforted. Weak and incompetent, he was not destitute of royal pride, and he made his palace a centre of intrigue against the Japanese. He was too helpless to do anything that could seriously affect their plans, but he could do quite enough to irritate them.

The American Government was drawn into an awkward relation to the problem. The treaty of May 10, 1883, between the United States and Korea provided that, if other powers dealt unjustly or oppressively with either government, “the other would exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrangement, thus showing their friendly feeling.” On the strength of this treaty Koreans looked to the United States for help in their emergency. Some time before the convention of November 17, the Emperor had sent Mr. Homer B. Hulbert, an American in charge of the government school in Seoul, to make a personal appeal to President Roosevelt. Mr. Hulbert started at once, but the President did not deem it expedient to see him, and the Secretary of State advised him that the Government would not intervene.

The statement that the Tokyo Government asked for the recall of the American Minister at Seoul, the Hon. Horace N. Allen, has been denied; but a hint was doubtless conveyed to Washington, by the indirect methods which diplomacy well understands, that the Japanese would be gratified if a change were made in the American Legation. At any rate, a minister, who in a residence of twenty-one years, fifteen of them in the diplomatic service, had acquired valuable knowledge and experience and was dean of the diplomatic corps, was summarily dropped, and June 10, 1905, Edwin V. Morgan appeared in

Seoul with orders to supersede Allen, his commission being dated the preceding March.

Mr. Morgan's tenure was brief. With all diplomatic matters handled in Tokyo, the occupation of legations in Seoul was gone and the ministers were therefore soon withdrawn. To the indignation of the Koreans and the chagrin of their American sympathizers, the United States was the first to withdraw its Minister. It leaked out afterward that the Japanese Minister at Peking had hinted to the American Minister in that city, Mr. William W. Rockhill, that in view of the Korean hope of American intervention, it would be pleasing to Japan if the United States should be the first nation to close its legation in Seoul as the moral effect upon the Koreans would be great. The Japanese Minister at Washington had dropped an intimation to the same effect. The American Government obligingly complied. November 25, only a week after the convention between Korea and Japan was signed, Morgan was officially notified to leave. American prestige among the Koreans immediately slumped, and among the Japanese it as promptly rose.

Years afterward Mr. Roosevelt justified his course in the following statement:

"Korea is absolutely Japan's. To be sure, by treaty it was solemnly covenanted that Korea should remain independent. But Korea was itself helpless to enforce the treaty, and it was out of the question to suppose that any other nation with no interest of its own at stake would attempt to do for the Koreans what they were utterly unable to do for themselves. Moreover, the treaty rested on the false assumption that Korea could govern herself well. It has already been shown that she could not in any real sense govern herself at all. Japan could not afford to see Korea in the hands of a great foreign power. She regarded her duty to her children and her children's children as overriding her treaty obligations. Therefore, when Japan thought the right time had come, it calmly tore up the treaty and took Korea, with the polite and businesslike efficiency it had already

shown in dealing with Russia, and was afterward to show in dealing with Germany.”¹

The limit of Japanese patience was reached when, in the spring of 1907, the Korean Emperor sent a delegation to the International Conference at The Hague to implore the interference of western nations. There was something pathetic in the appearance of the forlorn but patriotic Koreans pleading for a lost cause; since, of course, the Hague commissioners could not receive them. The Japanese were furious. The Korean Emperor denied that he was responsible for the delegation, but no one believed him. July 18, his Ministers warned him of the danger to which he was exposing the country by his continued opposition to the Japanese, and advised him to abdicate. He listened with mingled rage and consternation; but after long and stormy conferences the humiliated ruler tremblingly affixed his signature to a decree announcing the transfer of the throne to the Crown Prince. The hapless man who ascended the throne in this inglorious manner was even weaker in mind and body than his father. But he was crowned with due ceremonial August 27, and when the Koreans saw that he had cut off his topknot, they felt that their cup of woe was full. Mobs surrounded the palace and it looked as if there would be serious trouble. But Japanese troops were ready, and gradually the tumult subsided, although many of the people remained sullen. July 24, Yi Wan-yung, an able but notoriously corrupt official, acting by authority of the “Emperor” and Prince Ito, signed an “Agreement” which abrogated the Agreement of August 22, 1904, and virtually transferred all power to the Japanese. Formal announcement of annexation to Japan was not made till August 29, 1910; but the proclamation then simply gave official recognition to a fact which had long been recognized.

Critics of Japan have charged her with breaking her plighted word, given in the treaty of February 23, 1904, which included

¹ Article in *The Outlook*, New York, September 23, 1914.

the following pledge: "The Imperial Government of Japan definitively guarantees the independence and territorial integrity of the Korean Empire." But the Foreign Office in Tokyo, in an official statement issued in connection with the promulgation of the treaty of annexation, said: "An earnest and careful examination of the Korean problem has convinced the Japanese Government that the régime of a protectorate cannot be made to adapt itself to the actual condition of affairs in Korea, and that the responsibilities devolving upon Japan for the due administration of that country cannot be justly fulfilled without the complete annexation of Korea to this Empire." Mr. Kotaro Michizuki, a prominent member of the Parliamentary Commission, pointedly declared: "President Roosevelt took the Canal Zone because it was essential for the national defense of the United States. Japan annexed Korea for the same reason. Only Columbia was not menacing the very existence of the United States, while Korea certainly was through her intrigues with Russia."

Thus the curtain fell on the final scene of the passing of old Korea—"this shuttlecock among the nations," as Lord Curzon characterized her, "who treated her from entirely different and wholly irreconcilable standpoints according to their own interests or prejudices, and at whose hands she was alternately—nay even simultaneously—patronized, cajoled, bullied and caressed."¹ Much of the talk about Korean independence is irrelevant. It was indeed pathetic to see an ancient people reduced to vassalage. But Korea's weakness and its position in the Far East rendered domination by some foreign power inevitable. The only question was "under which King, Bezonian," Russia or Japan? The old Emperor and his successor were more fortunate than most deposed sovereigns, for their heads remained on their shoulders. They were officially called Prince Yi and Prince Father Yi, and were given an annual civil list of yen 1,500,000 while they vegetated in retirement in their former capital. Feebleness is conducive

¹ *Problems of the Far East*, p. 188.

to longevity in such circumstances. The father indolently lingered till January 21, 1919, when he was gathered to his ancestors. His son, who then became titular Emperor, was treated with studied courtesy. In 1920 his annual grant was increased to yen 1,800,000. But as an Emperor he was a dolorously pathetic survivor of a bygone era. He died April 25, 1926. The Prince who succeeded to the empty title is living quietly in Tokyo where, with a comfortable income and a Japanese princess wife, he is not disposed to make trouble, and could not even if he would.

In their administration of Korea, the Japanese have been handicapped not only by the chaotic conditions that prevailed but by the fact that the two nations had been hereditary enemies for a thousand years. Japanese invasions had been numerous, and the one in 1592 had wrought such devastation that Korea was a wretched and dilapidated country ever after. The sufferings of the people were severe during the China-Japan War of 1894 and the Russia-Japan War of 1905; and as the Japanese were the victors in both wars, they were naturally held responsible for the resultant distress. Naturally, too, the Japanese who occupied Korea after the Russia-Japan War were soldiers. Military rule is strict everywhere, and especially in the disturbed conditions that follow a war. Filipinos and Americans alike chafed under the rule of the United States army in the Philippines, although the American commanders were men of unquestioned rectitude. The Japanese soldiers regarded Korea as the prize of the war and they had something of that cocky spirit which usually characterizes soldiers after a victorious campaign. White men who remember the conduct of the foreign troops in Peking after the raising of the siege of the legations in 1900 will not be surprised at this. During the period of military occupation there were undoubtedly many cases of brutality, and measures to strengthen Japanese occupation were carried out with scant regard for the feelings of the people.

The camp followers and civilian immigrants who soon poured

in were not the best type of Japanese. Americans know the breed—the lawless characters in the frontier mining camps of a generation ago, who did their ruthless pleasure in Alaska, and became the carpet-baggers in the Southern States after the Civil War. The usually good-natured Mr. Taft characterized the dissolute Americans whom he found in the Philippines, when he became Governor-General, with a sharpness of invective which made them his bitter enemies. He declared that they were the worst obstacle to America's purpose to deal justly with the Filipinos. The same class of Japanese hurried to Korea, and they rode rough-shod over the helpless natives. The course of the Japanese was usually more exemplary in regions where officers of high rank were resident, but officials of lower grade in places remote from the capital were not always so considerate. Doubtless some of the stories of injustice were susceptible of explanation; but the reports were too numerous and explicit to be dismissed as altogether baseless. We know what white men have sometimes done when placed in absolute control of a helpless people, and it is not surprising that some Japanese have showed the same traits in like circumstances.

The establishment of civil rule by Marquis, afterward Prince, Ito in 1906 inaugurated a better era than the unhappy one that followed the Russia-Japan War. He was a remarkable man. As a youth he was eager to learn of the outside world. It was not easy at that time to get permission to leave the country, but at the age of seventeen (1858) he and a friend, who afterward became the famous Count K. Inouye, secretly escaped to a British vessel that was about to sail for England. They persuaded the captain to permit them to work their passage, and they arrived in London friendless and, save for four shillings, penniless. Mr. Hugh Matteson, a Christian merchant who afterward became convener of the Foreign Missionary Society of the English Presbyterian Church, took the two young men into his own home, where they remained for two years. When they returned to their

native land conditions had begun to change and, although they were at first regarded with suspicion, their intelligence and knowledge of European methods ere long made them useful to the government. When the allied fleet captured Shimonoseki in 1864, the Japanese authorities called upon Ito and Inouye to confer with the victors regarding terms. They discharged this delicate duty with such skill that they won high favour. After that their rise was rapid. The list of positions that Ito was called upon to fill at various times during his subsequent career is a striking one: Governor of Hyogo, member of special embassy to Europe to revise treaties, organizer of Japanese banking regulations, Minister of Works in the Imperial Cabinet, framer of the new Constitution, first President of the House of Peers, negotiator of the treaties of Tien-tsin and Shimonoseki with China, President of the Privy Council, representative of Japan at the Diamond Jubilee of Queen Victoria, and five times Prime Minister. No other Japanese bulks so large in the period of transition from feudal to modern Japan, and no other had so influential a part in shaping the national policy in that era of reconstruction.

It was this man, the foremost statesman of the Empire, that at the height of his fame came to Korea as the first Resident-General. During his incumbency of three years he placed a higher class of men in public office, enacted wholesome laws, made roads, built railways, encouraged education, reorganized the courts, systematized the revenues, promoted agriculture and fisheries, suppressed brigands who infested the country districts, and brought order out of financial chaos by placing the currency on a gold basis and planning for a Bank of Korea, which was formally established July 27, 1909. He dealt sternly with the brutal Japanese who had been guilty of maltreatment of Koreans. Many were fined and imprisoned, and one hundred and seven were deported during his term of office.

I had a long conference with Prince Ito. He spoke excellent English and frankly discussed Japanese plans in Korea. He freely admitted that mistakes had been made and that the

Japanese who first went to Korea did some regrettable things; but he earnestly expressed his desire to make his country's rule a real benefit to a people who, he deeply felt, had never had a fair chance.

Viscount Sone, who succeeded Prince Ito in 1908, continued the work along the lines laid down by his distinguished predecessor until he was compelled by ill health to return to Japan, in the spring of 1910, when Lieutenant-General Terauchi was then appointed to this responsible post. He frankly admitted to the Seoul representative of a Tokyo news agency that he "greatly regrets to find that the Japanese residents in Korea are sometimes inclined to despise and oppress the Korean people; that such acts may not be isolated and thus contribute to the injury of the relations between Japanese and Koreans in general." But the revelations in connection with the "Korean Conspiracy Case" in 1911 and 1912 showed that Korea was swarming with secret police and that the lower courts were under police control. The *Shin Nippon* in Japan bluntly said: "The Governor-General's desire is to make the peninsula one big fortress, and he seems to regard all those who are engaged in industrial or commercial work in Korea as mere camp followers within the walls of a barracks."

But criticism of his strict militaristic rule should not fail to do justice to his integrity, his patriotic purpose, and his vigour in carrying out and enlarging the plans for public improvements inaugurated by his predecessors. Under him and his successor, sanitary ordinances have been promulgated and enforced; water and sewerage systems installed; free hospitals and dispensaries opened in the principal cities; and railways, telegraphs and highways extended. There are now 1,430 miles of standard gauge railway in operation in Korea, of which 1,165 are owned by the government and 265 by private companies. Additional lines aggregating 1,437 miles are projected, some of them now under construction. Over two thousand miles of graded highways have been made and new ones are added every year.

Order has been brought out of chaos in land titles and boundaries. Millions of young trees have been set out on the bare hillsides, and April 3 is officially designated as Arbour Day on which Koreans, including school children, are urged to set out trees which the government furnishes. More than two million acres have thus been re-forested and the once barren slopes are now attractively wooded. The far-sighted policy of the Japanese recognized the fact that the Koreans are an agricultural people, that their farming operations were crude in the extreme, and that the prosperity of the country would be enormously increased by a better system. "In order to accomplish this purpose," wrote Governor-General Terauchi, "I caused sericultural schools and agricultural schools to be established. Further, I appointed a large number of experts to the central and provincial offices to teach and guide Koreans in general agricultural industry, sericulture, stock-breeding, irrigation and so forth." Improvement, too, was made in the character of the Japanese population in Korea. Most of the soldiers who fought in the Russia-Japan War were encouraged to return to Japan when their terms of enlistment expired. The adventurers who had flocked in at the close of the war found the changed conditions less favourable to them and began to go back to their native land, and the Japanese who came in their place were of a distinctly better class.

The Japanese officials whom I personally met in Seoul, Taiku, and Pyengyang, impressed me as men of high grade who did not suffer in comparison with many white colonial administrators in similar positions in Asia. Judge Noboru Watanabe, then Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, was a Presbyterian elder, a Christian gentleman of as fine a type as one could find anywhere. His wife, a woman of like culture and faith, was President of the Woman's Christian Temperance Society when their home was in Yokohama. The Japanese Resident at Taiku, Mr. Sabura Hisamitsu, described with enthusiasm a plan of having the Korean magistrates of the forty-one counties under his jurisdiction come to Taiku

once a year for special instruction. He gave me a copy of the printed program and the rules and the regulations which were being taught. They dealt with such subjects as the making and repairing of roads, the erection and care of public buildings, the clerical staff required in offices of various grades, sanitary rules and their enforcement, police regulations, etc.

But the Koreans were not placated by these reforms. They had never been accustomed to such improved conditions and were not interested in them. They resented the domination of their hereditary foes. Patriotic groups were formed in various parts of the country, under such names as Il Chin Hoi, Chung Yun Hoi and Wipying Society. Their slogans were: "Korea for the Koreans." "It is better to die than to be slaves." Bands of desperate men began to roam about and their mountain retreats became caves of Adullam to which lawless characters resorted. Disbanded Korean soldiers joined them and a guerrilla warfare ensued. Attacks were made not only upon Japanese but upon Koreans who were suspected of sympathy with them. These suspicions were easily made the excuse for paying off old scores against personal enemies and for pillaging houses that were believed to contain money. If there was any man who deserved the good-will of the Koreans it was the humane and enlightened Prince Ito, but October 26, 1909, he was assassinated by a Korean fanatic. This crime was followed by repeated efforts to kill other officials, including Korean Cabinet Ministers who had accepted appointment by the Japanese. In March of the following year Durham White Stevens, an American who was diplomatic adviser to the Department of Foreign Affairs in Prince Ito's administration, was shot by a Korean shortly after his arrival in San Francisco, his offense having been the assistance that he had given to the Japanese and an interview in the San Francisco press defending their course in Korea. Again it was demonstrated that misguided patriots may be their country's worst enemies. Even the best intentioned Japanese felt that they could not tolerate disorders and revolutionary acts, how-

ever patriotically intended. In adopting stern measures they may not have chosen the wisest course, but they did what all governments are quite apt to do in such circumstances.

One cannot think unmoved of the grief and despair of the better class of Koreans. Wretched as their country was, it was nevertheless their native land. They had apparently cared little for it as long as they had it to themselves; but when an alien conqueror appeared, the patriotic spirit which had burned low suddenly flamed up. They might have adapted the words of Daniel Webster in his famous address to the jury in the case of Dartmouth College a century ago: "It is a poor little country, but there are those who love it."

The justice of Japanese methods in dealing with the Koreans is a hotly disputed question.¹ The pro-Japanese view was vigorously presented by Professor George T. Ladd of Yale University in a volume entitled *With Marquis Ito In Korea*, and the anti-Japanese view was presented with equal vigour in Professor Homer B. Hulbert's *The Passing of Korea*. Professor Ladd, who went to Korea on the invitation of Prince Ito and whose visit was "personally conducted" by the Japanese, poured his contempt upon the Koreans who manifested only languid interest in his efforts to convince them in a series of lectures what great and good people their Japanese rulers were. Professor Hulbert's point of view was that of deep sympathy with the Koreans, among whom he had lived for many years and whom he regarded as a grossly wronged people, while his opinion of the Japanese, sharpened by some personal experiences, he made "as emphatic as the rules of the House will permit," if I may borrow a phrase of Gladstone's in the British Parliament.

Both writers were right in some things and wrong in others,

¹ Cf. for additional facts, George Kennan, article in *The Outlook*, November 11, 1905; William T. Ellis, article in *The North American Review*, October, 1907; F. A. McKenzie, *The Tragedy of Korea*, pp. 108 sq., and *The Unveiled East*, pp. 33-95; Thomas F. Millard, *The New Far East*, pp. 80-123; B. L. Putnam Weale, *The Truce in the Far East and Its Aftermath*, pp. 40-108.

for both were partisans. Undoubtedly the conduct of the Japanese has been characterized by both good and evil, and it is not well to concentrate attention upon either to the exclusion of the other. The judicious man will seek a balanced judgment between the two extremes. The Japanese justification for taking Korea lay in the facts that, if Japan had not occupied the peninsula, Russia would have done so; that Japan's national safety would have been imperilled by Russian occupation; that Japanese ascendancy was better for the Koreans than Russian ascendancy would have been; that the Korean Government was so hopelessly rotten that there was no prospect of political regeneration from within; and that if Japan did not undertake the work of reconstruction it would not be undertaken at all. It was an extraordinarily difficult task. Korea was then a veritable sink of misgovernment, corruption, filth, and misery. As the Japanese are human beings, it is not surprising that the best of them made mistakes and that the worst committed crimes. It was equally inevitable that some of the best of the Koreans should feel their national pride wounded by the domination of an alien government; that venal officials and indolent peasants should resent the reforms that had to be forced upon them; that some misguided men should resort to violent methods against their new rulers; and that subordinate officials should not always be considerate and humane in carrying out their task.

Some of the acts which offended the Koreans were inevitable. A conquering army in time of war can hardly sweep through a country without incurring the fear and hatred of the native population; and Japan had to do this twice within a decade. Moreover, the Japanese had to create all the external conditions of stable government and civilized life, and to create them against the opposition of a corrupt and degenerate ruling class and the inherited inertia of a people who had so long acquiesced in misgovernment and injustice that they had ceased to care. When the energetic reforms of the Japanese spurred them out of their indolence and apathy and made them go to work and

clean up their filthy alleys, they were as cross as the slum-dwellers of New York and Chicago when sanitary laws order them to cease sweat-shop work in living-rooms, to stop throwing garbage into the streets, and to submit to vaccination and tenement inspection.

Even charges of forced labour and seizure of property without due compensation have two sides. There undoubtedly were instances of great hardship to Koreans who were compelled to leave their fields and to toil on public works, often at a distance from their homes. Some Koreans, too, received little or nothing for land which they were forced to surrender. On the other hand, the Japanese could not have carried out some of the improvements that are of large value to the whole country, such as roads, railways, sanitation, etc., if they had been obliged to depend upon the voluntary labour of Korean peasants, who were admitted by their warmest admirers to be indolent and shiftless, and who, even when diligent and ambitious, did not like Japanese taskmasters. The Japanese claim that they had no intention of forcing Koreans to labour, but that their contractors were given written requests for so many labourers to be presented to Korean officials. The Korean magistrates, however, understood the "requests" as equivalent to demands. Complaints became numerous, and were so well substantiated that an order was issued January 6, 1906, forbidding railway contractors to apply to the Korean authorities for labourers.

As for land, every government has the right to take private property under the law of eminent domain. It ought to pay a fair price for it. The Japanese affirm that they tried to do this, but that the Korean magistrates, through whom the arrangements were made, pocketed the money. Japanese officials, not knowing the Korean language, were obliged to deal through native interpreters and "go-betweens" who were not always honest. The "go-between" might take it for a quarter of its value under threat of Japanese vengeance, collect full price from the Japanese purchaser, and steal the difference. These

considerations do not wholly excuse the Japanese, for they did not always pay fair prices, and they knew the bad character of the native magistrates and "go-betweens"; but it is only just to recognize the difficulties of the situation.

The improved economic and sanitary conditions are strikingly reflected in the growth of the population. When the Japanese protectorate was established in 1906 the reported population was 6,781,671. This was undoubtedly an underestimate of corrupt Korean officials who knew that their districts would be assessed on the basis of their returns and who therefore had an object in reporting as small a population as they dared. But the real figure was probably less than nine millions. The latest census gives the population as 17,626,761. Exports and imports prior to the Japanese occupation were so small as to be almost negligible. Under Japanese guidance they have rapidly increased, the total exports in a recent year having been valued at \$10,913,850, and the imports at \$225,329,000. There has been a serious increase in the cost of living so that the greater prosperity of the country as a whole has not prevented economic distress among multitudes whose small incomes do not enable them to pay the enhanced prices for staple commodities. But this is not peculiar to Korea. It is common to many countries, including Japan itself.

The annual reports of the Government-General, entitled: *Reforms and Progress in Korea*, are interesting reading. The compilers naturally put their best foot forward in reports that are issued for the outside world. Unpleasant things are as skilfully minimized as malaria and mosquitoes are in the growing accounts of summer-resort proprietors in the United States. But, after making due allowances for this common characteristic of all such writings, the general fact remains that the Japanese have done wonders in Korea.

Japan has now made Korea an integral part of the Empire, and has organized every phase of it in accordance with her national characteristics and methods. In pursuance of this policy of assimilation, the Imperial Government in 1916

sanctioned intermarriages by betrothing Princess Nashimoto, a daughter of a Prince of the Japanese Imperial Family, to Prince Yi, Jr., who was Crown Prince when his elder brother was Emperor. The wedding took place January 15, 1919. With the encouragement of such an example, marriages of Japanese and Koreans are becoming more frequent than formerly. It is doubtful whether such unions will become general for the rather matter-of-fact reason that Japanese men deem their own countrywomen far more attractive and congenial than Korean women, whose physical charms average considerably lower than those of Japanese women. The Japanese are making efforts, too, to win the support of prominent Koreans. Men who show a disposition to be loyal to the government are given such positions as they are deemed fitted to occupy. Quite a number of the provincial governors and local officials of various grades are native Koreans. There is usually a Japanese "Resident" close by to "advise" them, but the Korean enjoys the title and show of office. October 9, 1910, Governor-General Terauchi created a Korean peerage of the Empire, and conferred the rank of marquis upon six Koreans, count upon three, viscount upon twenty-two, and baron upon forty-five. The function was made an imposing one with all the ceremony that was calculated to make a deep impression upon the new peers and upon their countrymen. Korean children are urged to attend the free public schools, and promising young men are encouraged to go to Japan for collegiate and technical courses. Korean students may now be found in the Imperial University and in a variety of medical, industrial, normal, and other schools.

Many of the Japanese in Korea shrink from the full application of the policy of equality and assimilation. "Birds of a feather flock together" there as everywhere else, and the Japanese live in sections which are distinct from the Korean towns and have their own clubs, schools, churches, and social life. The average Japanese considers himself superior to the Koreans. The latter are sensitively quick to see this and to

feel hurt by it. It is not surprising, therefore, that in most places the social cleavage is marked. This cleavage is notoriously wide between Americans and Filipinos in the Philippine Islands, in spite of the earnest efforts of the Governor-General in Manila and the beneficent desires of the administration in Washington. How long was it before the English, Scotch, Welsh and Irish peoples were welded into a single nationality in common feeling and purpose? Are the Irish welded in yet? So in Korea, considerable time must pass before the Japanese and Koreans are really one people. Meantime, we believe that the Government-General is honestly trying to develop the policy of assimilation as fast as it deems practicable.

The foreigner who indiscriminately denounces the Japanese may discreetly remember that the alleged Christian nations have not set Japan a very good example in dealing with subject races. To say nothing of French harshness in Madagascar and Spanish oppression in Cuba and the Philippines, is any American proud of his country's treatment of the Indians for two hundred years after the white man came? If there is such an American, his spirit will be chastened by reading some of the voluminous literature on the subject, including Helen Hunt Jackson's *A Century of Dishonour*. And what about the flagrant injustice of our treatment of the Chinese and Japanese on the Pacific coast? As for the Philippines, while the executive department of the American Government has done admirably and we "point with pride" to what has been accomplished, it was a painfully long time before Congress could be induced to pass some laws which meant simple justice to the Filipinos and, as we have already noted, Mr. Taft, when Governor-General, publicly lamented the brutalities committed by some dissolute Americans in the archipelago. Can we reasonably expect Japan to do better by the Koreans than many western nations have done by their conquered peoples?

I am not excusing the Japanese. Faults should not be condoned because other people commit them. I am simply

reminding the reader of the magnitude and difficulty of their task, and that any disposition to be censorious in judging them should be tempered by a frank recognition of the difficulties of the situation. The historian of the next generation will be in better position to take an impartial view than men of to-day, who are in danger of having their judgment warped by the personal feelings that have been aroused.

Trying to look at the matter as fairly as possible now, I believe that the balance inclines heavily in favour of the Japanese. I do not defend some of the things that they have done. I sympathize with the Koreans. They would be unworthy of respect if they did not prefer their national freedom. One can understand why the injustice of their own magistrates seemed less irksome than the stern justice of alien conquerors. Nevertheless I confess to sympathy also with the Japanese. They were forced to occupy Korea to prevent a Russian occupation which would have menaced their own independence as a nation. They are now struggling with their burden against heavy odds, with limited financial resources, and against the dislike and opposition of Koreans, Russians, Chinese, and most of the foreigners in the Far East. While we may as frankly discuss their methods as we would those of our own country in similar circumstances, we should avoid the error of assuming that we can help the Koreans by unjust abuse of their rulers.

It would be narrow and unscientific to estimate the historic value of the Japanese occupation of Korea solely by incidental defects of method or spirit, just as it would be to protest that a transcontinental line of railway should not have been built because the right-of-way injured some man's property, or a brutal foreman committed acts of violence against his person or family. We should view a movement in historic perspective, deprecating indeed the wrongs of the people concerned and visiting full blame upon those who unnecessarily caused them, but recognizing nevertheless that results, even when achieved by imperfect human instruments, are to be measured

rather by their worth to the country and the world than by the follies and crimes of some of the men who had a part in the effort. All great movements, however beneficent in general character and ultimate purpose, involve human agents with their full share of human infirmities. Some of these agents are apt to be selfish, some cruel. The development of a movement, therefore, is usually attended by many individual acts that are wrong. Historic illustrations will at once occur to every student. The Protestant Reformation in Europe was not free from bigotry and passion on the part of the Reformers. The abolition of slavery in the United States was accomplished in a war whose moral majesty was tarnished by many acts of cruelty and passion, and it is an unpleasant chapter in American history that records the nefarious acts of Northern "carpet-baggers" in the South after the war. It was for the best interests of Africa and the world that Great Britain should overthrow the corrupt and reactionary oligarchy that was masquerading under the name of a republic in the Transvaal; but England did many things in that war which her best people do not like to remember. One should not therefore conclude that, because a period of transition is turbulent and some of its agents are blundering or unscrupulous, the movement itself is bad. The Japanese have made some mistakes and they will doubtless make more; but on the whole their work in Korea has been beneficent in many ways.

It would be expecting too much of human nature, however, to assume that millions of people would acquiesce in the extinction of national independence without an occasional flare up of resentment. The general agitation which followed the World War and President Wilson's declaration of the right of self-determination fired the imagination of Koreans as well as other dependent peoples. A revolutionary movement was inaugurated so secretly that Japanese and missionaries alike were caught unawares. The funeral of the old Emperor was the chosen time, and March 1, 1919, independence was proclaimed. Pathos and childishness strangely mingled as the unarmed

crowds (the Koreans are not permitted to have weapons) radiantly shouted and sang as if their mere proclamation had made them free. The result proved anew that Japan will not voluntarily grant Korean independence; that the Koreans cannot secure it by force; and that other governments, having long ago recognized Japanese annexation of the peninsula, will not interfere. The startled Japanese stamped out the movement with a severity which evoked widespread protest not only in Korea but in America and Great Britain. There was little sympathy with the uprising as a political movement, for well-informed observers knew its futility. The protest was against the ruthlessness of the methods employed in suppressing it.¹

No one who knew Prime Minister Hara believed that he would countenance the barbarities that the infuriated gendarmes perpetrated upon the helpless Koreans. Urgent representations were made to him from British and American as well as Korean sources. Of course the accused gendarmes denied the charges and asserted that they had done only what was necessary to put down rebellion and teach the people that it must not be repeated. But while the Imperial Government did nothing that would make the authorities in Korea lose "face," it soon became evident that a more humane course was being followed. Some officers were quietly transferred. Others were apparently cautioned. In August, Field Marshal Viscount Hasegawa, who had succeeded Viscount Terauchi when the latter became Prime Minister of Japan in 1916, was replaced as Governor-General by Admiral Baron Minoru Saito, and Mr. Rentaro Midzuno was appointed Director-General of Administration. The former publicly declared that he would "govern Korea in the interest of the Koreans" and "abolish all forms of discrimination"; that "the gendarmerie, the unpopular gold braids and swords worn by officials will be

¹ Cf. pamphlet—*The Korean Situation*, published by the Commission on Relations with the Orient of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, New York.

discontinued"; and that "all the people will be given impartial justice." Viscount Saito has sincerely tried to carry out this program. Unfortunately, some of the subordinate officials through whom he has had to work, particularly in the local districts, have not been in sympathy with his reforms, so that while there was early improvement in some respects, abusive treatment of suspected Koreans continued for some time. But in 1927 Dr. Robert E. Speer, after a visit in Korea, wrote:

"The policy of the present government is unmistakably honourable and just and kind and designed to win the good-will of the people and to promote their contentment and prosperity. Every one with whom we talked, both Koreans and missionaries, recognized the high-minded and pure-spirited character and purpose of the Governor-General, Viscount Saito, and I do not think any one could talk with him and not be convinced of the sincerity of his efforts to secure justice and progress for Korea."

Indeed, Viscount Saito is reported as having said that Korea likes Japanese rule; that the ardour for independence has died out and is replaced by outspoken loyalty to Japan.¹ One is glad that he feels that way. Under his wise and considerate administration the edge of opposition has undoubtedly been dulled. But while the spirit of independence is far less outspoken than it formerly was, it still exists, and if Viscount Saito were to be succeeded by an unpopular Governor, or if Japan were to become involved in a war with another great power, Korea might easily become turbulent again.² A significant incident occurred when the Korean Emperor Yi died April 25, 1926. The Japanese Government tactfully gave him an elaborate funeral with regal honours and magnificent ceremonies. Prudently anticipating, however, that the obsequies might cause an outburst of Korean resentment against the rulers who had deprived the deceased Emperor of his throne,

¹ *The Christian Movement in Japan, Korea and Formosa*, p. 14.

² December, 1927, Viscount Saito was succeeded by General Hanzo Yamanashi, who announced that there would be no change of policy.

the Japanese massed a large force of police and soldiers and had hundreds of detectives in plain clothes mingle with the throngs of spectators who densely lined the seven miles of streets along which the procession passed. The event justified these precautions. Koreans are an emotional people and their manifestations of grief at funerals are usually demonstrative. In this case, the ordinary manifestations were intensified by mass psychology and feeling rose to a white heat. Students and school children shouted: "Banzai for Korean independence!" Zealous patriots busily distributed anti-Japanese leaflets and the tumult became so ominous that several hundred Koreans were arrested.

However, many intelligent Koreans now appreciate the advantages which the Japanese have made available. Roads, railways, sanitation, hospitals, a stable currency, and public works of various kinds are benefiting the Korean as well as the Japanese. His alien masters are, as a rule, more just with him than the native officials were prior to Japanese occupation. If he is wronged by one of his own countrymen, he is more apt to get justice in the courts without bribing an official than he was in the old days of Korean "independence." The quaint topknot and horsehair hat are disappearing. The flowing white robes are gradually giving way to Japanese costume. The leisurely gentleman, proud of his effeminacy, the huge horn spectacles which proclaimed him a scholar, and the long finger-nails which proved him an idler, is finding himself less an object of admiration in a busier and more practical era in which achievement counts and only the fittest can survive. The Japanese now wisely see that it is good policy to deal gently with those who are still sore of heart as they brood over their country's subjugation and that the policy of sternly punishing every suspected person fans the revolutionary spirit into flame, as the history of Russia proves. He is a wise ruler, as he is a wise parent, who knows when it is better good-naturedly to ignore certain manifestations than it is to make a fuss about them. Criticism of a government, like steam, is

seldom dangerous when it is allowed free vent in the open air. It is when repressed that it develops explosive power.

Koreans have qualities that abundantly repay cultivation. Their political helplessness and their lack of initiative and energy have given the world a wrong impression as to their real ability. They learn readily under favourable conditions and develop rapidly. My long tours of Asia enabled me to compare the Koreans with the average village types of Chinese, Japanese, Filipinos, Siamese, East Indians, and Syrians, and while the Koreans were then more dirty and wretched than the other peoples, they impressed me as quite as capable of development as the typical Asiatic elsewhere. When fairly paid and well treated they work faithfully and intelligently. With just government, a fair chance, and a Christian basis of morals, I believe that the Koreans will develop into a fine people. They are rapidly acquiring the qualities that fit a people for intelligent self-determination. If Japan, as many Japanese desire, is to be regarded as the Great Britain of the Far East, is Korea to be to her an integrally related Scotland, a self-governing and loyal Canada, or a turbulent and revolutionary Ireland? An altruistic and conciliatory policy may weld the peninsula and the Island Empire into a compact nation which will again illustrate the saying that in union there is strength. Not only Japan but all western nations which govern subject peoples may wisely keep in mind the noble ideal expressed in Queen Victoria's Proclamation regarding India in 1858: "It is our earnest desire to administer its (the Indian) government for the benefit of all our subjects resident therein. In their prosperity will be our strength; in their contentment our security; and in their gratitude our best reward."

X

JAPAN IN MANCHURIA AND SIBERIA

MANCHURIA is the great debatable ground of the Far East. Its area of 363,610 square miles is more than double that of Japan, and four times that of Korea. The scenery is as diversified as one might expect in so vast a territory. Certain parts are hilly, and even mountainous, and an immense section is as level as an American prairie. It is one of the finest agricultural regions in the world. Although comparatively undeveloped, it already produces immense quantities of grain. Manchuria could be made the granary of eastern Asia as there is hardly any limit to the staple crops that it could yield.

Minerals are abundant. Coal, iron, mica, lead, copper, gold, silver, asbestos and gypsum are found in various sections, as well as limestone and other rocks well adapted to building purposes. The Chinese have long known of the mineral deposits that lie near the surface or outcrop on hillsides or riverbanks, but their mining methods were crude and influenced by superstitious fear of fung-shui (spirits of earth and air), so that they yielded scanty results. Russians in the north and a few British companies in the south operated more successfully, the latter under concessions from the Chinese Government. Such concessions were not easily secured during the last decade, and it is doubtful whether more will be granted, partly because of the growing unwillingness of the Chinese authorities, but chiefly because the Japanese want these mining privileges. They are already developing a number of mines on a comparatively large scale. The Fushun pits, northeast of Mukden, are turning out great quantities of coal. The quality is not high, but the mining methods are thoroughly modern and the product

is so abundant and cheap that it can be bought almost anywhere in Manchuria and Korea. The Penchi-hu mines work less extensive deposits, but the coal is superior for industrial purposes, while anthracite and natural coke, valuable for smelting, are mined in the neighbourhood of Niusin-tai. Iron ore is found in generous quantities near enough to veins of coal to make foundries profitable. Gold, silver, lead and copper are mined on a smaller scale, but successfully in a number of places. A British mining engineer has characterized as "exceedingly rich" a region thirty-five square miles near Tung-hwa and Hwai-jen, and the report of a Japanese investigator mentions ore whose gold reaches in some cases above 1/10,000 grade and is ninety-nine per cent fine.

The population of Manchuria, estimated to be about 20,000,000, looks large in comparison with Canada, which, with a habitable area about equal to that of Manchuria, has but little more than one-third the population; but compared with Japan, Korea, and the eighteen provinces of China, Manchuria is sparsely settled and could easily support many times its present population. The characteristic type of course is Manchu; but there are great numbers of pure Chinese and the numbers are rapidly increasing, for Manchuria offers cheaper land and better hope of remunerative employment than the more crowded sections of China. The distinction between the Manchu and the Chinese is not so apparent in Manchuria as in China proper. Indeed, I often found it impossible to tell whether men I met upon the streets were Manchus or Chinese. I frequently asked residents to tell me, and they were usually unable to do so except after inquiry. It is easier to distinguish Manchu women, as their manner of dressing the hair is different from that of Chinese women. Manchu women also do not bind their feet; but unbound feet are not always a clue in Manchuria as the Chinese women in that region do not bind their feet so generally as their sisters in central and southern China. The intermingling of the Chinese and the Manchus appears much more complete in

Manchuria than in other parts of China, and the result is a virile type, physically vigorous and mentally alert.

The Manchu dynasty long ruled all China, but in recent years the people of Manchuria have been overawed by the aggressive power first of the Russians and later of the Japanese. Manchuria was helpless before the military strength of the Russian occupation prior to the Russia-Japan War. The common people cared little who their rulers were, knowing that they would get little consideration in any event. The Russians had greater tact in getting along with the Chinese than other foreigners showed, and difficulties were seldom serious, any ruffled dignity of officials being easily allayed by Russian gold. When Japan drove Russia out of Port Arthur and southern Manchuria, the people simply exchanged one master for another. Many of their fields and villages were destroyed; but it was not the policy of either the Japanese or the Russians to molest the Manchurians unnecessarily, and as the contending armies required enormous food-supplies and tens of thousands of carts and labourers, the thrifty inhabitants took shrewd advantage of their opportunity and reaped rich profits from both sides with true Chinese impartiality.

There are several important cities besides innumerable villages. One of the most interesting cities is Mukden, the ancient capital of the Manchu emperors and afterward the seat of a Chinese Viceroy. The fine old wall, though crumbling in places, is still a notable monument of former power. We walked the entire circumference of it during our visit. A few breaks necessitated awkward scrambling, but the view was inspiring and every yard seemed to teem with historic associations, the vanished glories of a great imperial house. The palaces of the emperors are kept in tolerable repair, and were freely showed to us on a card of introduction from the American Consul. A few miles from the city are the tombs of the emperors—massive mounds fronted by the spacious parks and temples and gates which usually mark the last resting-places of Asiatic rulers and which are profoundly im-

pressive with their noble proportions and solemn surroundings. Here also are battlefields of many wars, from the fierce fights of wild tribes far back in a shadowy antiquity to that titanic conflict between Russia and Japan, when, along a front of a hundred miles, huge modern armies grappled in one of the decisive battles of the world. Recent years have brought startling changes to the quaint old city. After gazing with stirred imagination at the relics of ancient wealth and splendour, it seems odd to see a railway station, telegraph and telephone lines, macadamized streets, trolley-cars, and modern public buildings lighted by electricity.

Port Arthur and Dairen have figured prominently in modern history. Kirin has been given prosperity by its coal mines. Antung on the Yalu River handles a heavy volume of Japanese imports. New-chwang, on the river Lia-ho a few miles from the Gulf of Liao-tung, is a shipping-port which has long had a rich trade which the South Manchurian Railway, under Japanese management, has vigorously tried to divert to Dairen. Changchun, formerly a wretched place, rapidly rose in importance after the Russia-Japan War as the point of transition from Japanese to Russian spheres of influence. Here the South Manchurian Railway ended and the Russian State Railway began. Both Russians and Japanese therefore kept their eyes on Changchun. The railways brought not only political and military importance but access to markets for the soya bean which has long been a staple article of food in China and which yields prolifically on the broad, rich fields which stretch for scores of miles in every direction. The beans yield a surprising variety of products and by-products—flour, edible oil, substitutes for butter, lard, coffee, cheese, casein, and candy; paint, varnish, celluloid, glycerine, ink, enamels, waterproof oils, rubber substitutes and explosives. Indeed the soya bean has been called the “modern manna.” Changchun is probably the preëminent bean city of the world. Enormous heaps lying on the dry ground at the shipping season are one of the sights of the Far East. The beans and their product in oil

or cake are shipped to China, Korea, and Japan. A trial shipment to England in 1908 resulted in an extensive foreign demand. In a recent year soya beans to the value of \$117,-455,000 were exported to various countries in Europe and America.

Harbin is another city which owes its importance to foreigners. It is on the main line of the Trans-Siberian Railway from Vladivostok, and at its junction with the line which runs southward through Manchuria. This means that the whole tide of railway travel and freight from Manchuria, China, and Korea passes through Harbin and is transshipped there, Japan adding its quota during the six months of every year that the harbour of Vladivostok is closed by ice. What Changchun is for beans Harbin is for flour, horses, cattle, and sheep. The boundless prairies of northern Manchuria raise millions of bushels of wheat, and the migratory Mongolians of the steppes find in Harbin a market for their vast flocks and herds. During the war with Japan the Russian Government built eight flour-mills at Harbin, with a capacity of 1,700,000 pounds a day, and it largely depended upon them to provide bread for its armies. The wheat is of good quality, but the millers do not make as good flour as Americans. They can make it more cheaply, however, and their customers are not so particular as we are, so that Harbin is likely to remain the centre of flour manufacture for the Far East. When one takes into consideration not only these mills but the great stock-yards and horse-markets, the beet-sugar factories, and the general business for which it is the distributing point, one can easily see that Harbin is a city of no small importance.

After the Russia-Japan War an anomalous condition prevailed. Theoretically, Manchuria remained a part of China. Its officials were appointed by the government at Peking and were supposed to be amenable to it. Practically, the Viceroy and his subordinates were in an embarrassing position. North of Changchun the Russians, until the chaos which followed the revolution of 1917 weakened their hold, were in possession

of the railway and all the leading cities en route. South of Changchun the Japanese held the railway, the fortified city of Port Arthur and Dairen. Both Russians and Japanese did as they pleased in their respective territories, with little regard for the wishes of the Chinese officials. It is true that Japanese jurisdiction is technically limited to a strip from 300 to 500 feet wide along the railway, and a larger area at stations; but as that railway, 436 miles long, is the one thoroughfare from Dairen to Changchun, along which all streams of trade and travel flow and in which practically all the activities of Manchuria centre, the limitation is more nominal than real, and a Chinese magistrate who acted on any other assumption would quickly find himself in hot water.

In 1909 the Honorable Philander Knox, then American Secretary of State, conceived the notion of neutralizing the Manchurian railways under a joint agreement by Russia, Japan, France, Germany, and Great Britain, and he proposed this in a note to these Powers. It was a beautiful mirage, easily suggested by the anomalous condition which prevailed in Manchuria, the overlapping and irritations incident to the relations of Chinese, Japanese, and Russians, and the commercial interests of American and European nations. It was so utterly impracticable that it is amazing that a responsible government official should have seriously urged it, and it is all the more amazing that he should have allowed it to become public before he had confidentially ascertained the attitude of the Powers concerned. While Russia and Japan highly valued the commercial advantages of the railways which they respectively controlled in Manchuria, their chief interest in them was military. The idea that the Russians would consent to having the railway which was their only thoroughfare of approach to the Far East taken out of their hands, and the idea that the Japanese would ever surrender control of the railway which is indispensable to their existence in Manchuria and to the safety of Korea, were utterly visionary.

It is not surprising that the proposal was received with

outward politeness and inward derision in Berlin, Paris, and London, and that in Tokyo and St. Petersburg it was received with emotions which would not come under the motto of the *New York Times*, "All the news that's fit to print." However, the amenities of diplomatic intercourse proved to be equal to the strain. France, Germany, and Great Britain suavely regretted that they were unable to comply with the request. Russia, in January, 1910, solemnly reminded the government of the United States that the Chinese Eastern Railway represented such expenditures of Russian money, was so related to the development of Russian enterprises, and so "served as the principal medium of Russia's connections" that "it is most important to retain the closest control over the line which of course could not be maintained if the railway were transferred to an international syndicate; " . . . that "the principles of the inviolability of China's sovereignty, the policy of the open door and equal commercial opportunities in Manchuria, are not at present threatened in any way; and therefore the questions raised by the government of the United States with regard to the most effective means of defending these principles are not justified by the condition of affairs in Manchuria."

In Tokyo, Count Komura, Minister of Foreign Affairs, blandly explained Japan's refusal in an address in the Diet, January 27, which included the following significant sentences: "While the Imperial Government are determined to adhere to their avowed policy scrupulously to uphold the principle of the open door and equal opportunity in Manchuria, it should be observed that realization of the proposed plan would bring about radical changes in the condition of things in Manchuria which was established by the treaties of Portsmouth and Peking, and would thus be attended with serious consequences in the region affected by the South Manchurian Railway. There have grown up numerous undertakings which have been promoted in the belief that the railway would remain in our possession, and the Imperial Government could

not, with a due sense of their responsibility, agree to abandon the railway in question."

The proposal not only failed, but it had the startling result of bringing Russia and Japan together, as each government wished to retain what it had. For once they had a common interest against the rest of the world, and July 4, 1910, they signed an agreement which recognized their control of their respective railway-lines, delimited their spheres of influence in Manchuria, formed a working agreement which gave each government freedom to consolidate its interests in the region assigned to it, and served as a broad hint to western Secretaries of State that outsiders had better "keep off the grass." Marquis Katsura, then Premier of Japan, denied that the treaty was influenced by the proposal of Mr. Knox, and asserted that it had been under consideration for some time prior to that proposal, "solely with the purpose of affording a reassurance of the friendly relations between Japan and Russia and of insuring peace in the Far East, though at the same time with the practical object of improving traffic connections and working arrangements between the railroads." Whether or not this statement was purely "diplomatic," it is undoubtedly true that the American proposal hastened the consummation of any negotiations that may have been in progress between Japan and Russia and gave both parties added satisfaction when they were concluded. The only satisfaction that the rest of the world could get out of the treaty lay in the reflection that, since Russia and Japan were in Manchuria anyway and intended to stay there, it was better for them to come to some agreement than to keep the region in turmoil by conflicting activities.

Mr. Knox, therefore, instead of opening Manchuria as he had contemplated, simply consolidated Japanese power in Korea and lower Manchuria and Russian power in upper Manchuria. China's interests were wholly ignored. It is true that Marquis Katsura declared that "it is Japan's determined policy to adhere closely to all agreements and treaties with

China and other nations." But this signified nothing when a large section of Chinese territory was calmly divided between two foreign powers. Yint Chang, then the Chinese Minister to Germany, truly said: "The Russo-Japanese agreement of course deals my country a vital blow. It amounts to nothing more or less than the partition of Manchuria between the contracting powers. They talk, it is true, about maintenance of the status quo and have written 'open door' in large beautiful characters across the face of the agreement; but everybody understands that the door is really being slammed shut." A short but significant convention of two articles which was signed July 6, 1916, still further safeguarded the interests of the two governments in the Far East.

Presently a Chinese war lord, Chang Tso-lin, rose above the tumult. A former bandit, he had long been a storm centre in Manchuria. As the power of the Peking Government waned, his power waxed. A bold, strong man, a leader of men and not burdened with scruples, he soon made himself master at Mukden and the rival of other Chinese war lords in the struggle for the overlordship of China. An account of that titanic struggle would lie beyond the scope of this book. Much has been written about it in books that are easily accessible. Suffice it here simply to say that a three-cornered situation soon developed in Manchuria—Japan, Russia and Chang Tso-lin. These three powers were not wholly hostile to one another. The Japanese worked with the other two parties, not indeed in full accord in all respects but quite as smoothly as could reasonably be expected. Indeed the opinion widely prevailed in China that Chang Tso-lin was secretly supported by Japan. As for relations with the Soviet, while Japanese and Russians still hold their respective areas, their relations, outwardly at least, are friendly. An evidence of mutual goodwill was the success of the Japanese in bringing about a settlement of the long-standing issue over northern Saghalien. December 14, 1925, representatives of the two governments signed, in Moscow, a concession contract which gave Japan the

right to exploit the oil and coal resources in this region for upward of fifty years, in return for royalties ranging from five to fifteen per cent on oil and five per cent to eight per cent on coal. Japan thus secures control of vast resources which may play a large rôle in the future development of the Far East.

Has Russia abandoned her purpose to reach the open sea in the Far East? She has not. There are indeed Russians who feel that the whole Manchurian policy of their government has been a mistake, that Manchuria has been a costly burden, and that Russia would be better off without it; but such Russians are comparatively few. No one who understands the character and aspirations of Russia believes that she would fail to move farther south if she could. For the time Russia appears to be on good terms with Japan and the two countries seek certain common interests in an amicable way. But all the reasons which led her to occupy Manchuria and to try to get Korea years ago exist in undiminished force. Climate and geography have not changed. Vladivostok, the terminus of the Trans-Siberian Railway, is still blocked by ice nearly half of the year and is still upon the Japan Sea with no outlet upon the Pacific except through narrow straits which Japan controls. The Russian imperialists, blissfully unaware that they were to fall a few years later, had an irrefragable conviction that they were to inherit the earth. They believed that an outlet to the open sea through Manchuria was indispensable to their rightful position in the Far East, and their determination to secure it had not altered an iota. There might be delay; they would wait. A few decades more or less were a minor matter in realizing an age-old ambition. So Russia proceeded to tighten her hold upon northern Manchuria, developed its agriculture and flour-mills so that they could furnish abundant food-supplies, spent enormous sums in regrading and double-tracking the Trans-Siberian Railway, laying heavier rails, improving rolling-stock and terminal facilities, encouraging her peasants to settle along the

line, aiding them in getting land and making a start, and strengthening the fortifications of Vladivostok until it would be harder to capture than Port Arthur ever was.

The overthrow of the Russian monarchy in 1917 and the chaotic internal conditions which followed has naturally affected Russian influence in Manchuria. There was not, however, and there is not likely to be, any essential change in policy. The Russia of the Soviet is as ambitious as the Russia of the Czar to wield world power and to have an ice free port on the Pacific; but for a time the Bolsheviks had their hands full at home and the zone of Russian domination in Manchuria soon became about as chaotic as European Russia.

Japan, too, is under no less constraint than before to resist the advance of any European nation in Manchuria, and to maintain paramount influence there. It is difficult to understand how any one who knows what they have done and are now doing can imagine that they contemplate anything else than permanent occupation. The Southern Manchurian Railway is one of the best railways in Asia. Its sleeping-cars, its fast locomotives and its excellent road-bed are a delight to the traveler after the so-called "accommodations" which he found in some other countries. The Japanese have expended great sums at Dairen. They have constructed immense docks for shipping, opened new streets and repaved old ones, erected handsome public and private buildings, and in general are making Dairen a model city of the Far East.

Japanese expenditures at Port Arthur are not so much in evidence as at Dairen. Most of the forts where the heavy fighting of the siege was done remain in the state of ruin in which they were left when the Russians surrendered. This is interesting to the visitor, for it enables him to form a clearer idea of the terrific character of the struggle. It is awe-inspiring to stand upon one of those mounds and mark the ruined masonry, the heaps of débris, and the innumerable shell-holes which dot the tops and sides of the hills. It is difficult to understand how flesh and blood could have endured such a

bombardment. It is no wonder that the Russians, brave as they were, found it impossible to stay in forts which must have been belching volcanoes of exploding shells. The fact that the Japanese have left most of these forts in their ruined condition does not prove that Port Arthur is an unguarded position. The most formidable fortification which the Russians developed, those which protected the fortress from the sea, were not seriously injured by the Japanese. The heavy fighting was done over the outer line of forts on the land side, and the other garrisons surrendered when the city and harbour became untenable. The result was that the Japanese obtained the best of the forts in excellent condition. There is little necessity for them to spend much money in further fortifications, for Port Arthur is as impregnable from the sea as it ever was, and the Japanese are in such absolute control of the land approaches that they probably are not apprehensive of the results of such an attack from that direction as they made upon the Russians.

It is difficult to speak positively, however, for, while visitors are freely admitted to the ruined forts, they are not permitted to approach those that are occupied. Occasionally, too, a ruined fort, which had hitherto been open to inspection, is quietly withdrawn from public gaze. No public announcement is made and nothing appears in the newspapers, but the visitor who applies for a pass is politely told that that particular place "is not open today." Critics assert not only that some of the forts are in excellent military condition, with ample stores and munitions, but that from time to time the most important of the ruined forts are quietly refortified. The Japanese deny this and point to evidences of neglect of a place which has lost much of its former importance.

Viewing Japanese operations in southern Manchuria as a whole, that person is innocent indeed who imagines that Japan is doing all that she is doing in southern Manchuria with the expectation of withdrawing in the near future. It would be going too far to say that Japan intends to annex

Manchuria as she annexed Korea. Mr. T. Go, of the South Manchurian Railway, doubtless expressed the prevailing Japanese opinion when he declared at the Williamstown Conference in 1926, that the annexation of Manchuria would not only "be an anachronism in the face of the present world situation" but that it "would be an economic impossibility. What Japan wants in Manchuria is raw materials for industry and food for increasing population." These materials Japan is in a position to secure without assuming the responsibilities and hazards which would necessarily be involved in annexation. It is true that in trade and agriculture the Japanese in Manchuria have not been able to compete successfully with the Chinese, who are willing to work longer hours on less pay and are satisfied with a lower scale of living. Japanese interests in Manchuria have therefore not proved to be very profitable. The railway and the coal mine concessions at Fushun, however, are valuable assets. Branch lines are bringing in additional business and large enterprises are under way. The Chinese are becoming more restless as they see Japan consolidating her power. Their effort to build competing railways has developed friction, and the end is not yet.

The chief reason for Japanese interest is political. The Japanese know perfectly well that if they were to withdraw, the Russians would plan to move down and occupy their old positions, and that the conditions which preceded the Russia-Japan War would sooner or later recur. It is fundamental to sound thinking on this subject to remember that Japan cannot be expected to acquiesce in having any European Power form a wedge between Japan and China and lie along the Korean frontier in such a way as to make Japanese occupation of Korea precarious. It has long been a settled principle of British policy in India not to permit Russia to come down to the Indian frontier. The Japanese are doing what the British are doing with their possessions. The United States does not fortify its Canadian line or have any uneasiness about it, because the Canadians are men of their own race and

speech and we regard them almost as we do our own countrymen. But suppose a nation radically differing from us and known to have plans inimical to our interests should seize Canada, does any one imagine that the United States would be acquiescent? The Japanese have had abundant reason to suspect the plans of Russia, and while it was to the temporary interest of the two nations to work in harmony, the Japanese do not propose to be caught napping if the political whirligig should make another turn.

The Russian Revolution of 1917 brought Japan into Siberia in a way that the revolutionists had not contemplated. While Russia was an ally in the World War, Japan had sold to her enormous quantities of provisions, machinery, and military supplies. At the time of the revolution, over 600,000 tons were piled up at Vladivostok, most of it in the open air, and other huge quantities had been accumulated at Harbin and at various stations as far west at Irkutsk. These supplies could not be sent on with any certainty that they would reach their destination; or, if they did, that there would be any responsible government to pay for them, or that they would not fall into the hands of the Germans to whom they would be equivalent to a substantial reinforcement. Nor was it expedient to leave millions of dollars' worth of provisions and equipment to spoil on the docks and the ground, for warehouse facilities were far from adequate. Japan naturally desired to protect these supplies, many of which fairly belonged to her in the circumstances.

Japan, too, had nationals in Siberia. The Japanese Foreign Office reported that on July 1, 1917, there were 9,717 Japanese subjects in Russian territory. Many of these had acquired business interests in which they expected the protection of their home government.

Another consideration was more serious. Russia had sent many of her German and Austrian prisoners of war into Siberia. Their exact number was unknown. Rumoured estimates ranged from 80,000 to 1,000,000. The latter estimate

was a great exaggeration, but the smaller one was large enough to cause concern. Whatever the number was, the disorganization of the government in Siberia had given these captured soldiers virtual liberty. They were not confined in jails or camps and they enjoyed considerable freedom. The Russian population between Lake Baikal and Vladivostok was only about 3,500,000, including women and children. What was to hinder these capable Germans from organizing under their own officers, taking possession of a large part of Siberia, and possibly moving along the Trans-Siberian Railway to Vladivostok, where there were not only immense accumulations of everything that an army needed but a fortress regarded as one of the most impregnable in the world? An Associated Press despatch from Harbin, February 20, 1918, said that 2,000 Germans had been armed and were drilling at Irkutsk, and, according to an official report received from a foreign consul, the Germans were making preparations to bring much larger forces there.

The alleged danger was probably magnified. It would not have been easy for scattered Germans to conduct effective military operations against a powerful military nation like Japan, many thousands of miles from their home base and with a single line of communication liable to be broken at a dozen places; for many of the Russian revolutionists did not love the Kaiser's brand of autocracy any better than the Czar's. Germany could send no help to her nationals in Siberia, for she had her hands full in Europe. Indeed many foreigners in the Far East felt that the German scare was so exaggerated and was exploited so persistently as to suggest the suspicion of propaganda.

Where the suggestion of intervention originated is a disputed question. Diplomats well understand how to bring about desired situations before committing themselves to written statements that might fall under unfriendly eyes. No authorized person, however, has challenged the statement of Viscount Motono, the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, in

the Imperial Diet, March 26, 1918, that "the general belief that intervention was proposed in Japan is unfounded. . . . The Imperial Government neither suggested nor proposed military action in Siberia. . . . Nevertheless, it regards with gravest apprehension the eastward movement of Germany." A report that 150 Japanese had been killed in a clash with German aided Russian Maximalists at Blagovieschensk in March, 1918, added to the excitement, although it was afterward ascertained that only one Japanese was killed and that only two were wounded. The murder of Mr. Ishido, a Japanese merchant of Vladivostok, April 4, by five Russians, one of whom was in the uniform of a Bolshevik soldier, hastened the crisis, and Admiral Saito, commanding the Japanese naval vessels in the port, promptly landed an armed force to prevent further depredations. British marines also went ashore as Great Britain, too, had a consulate to guard.

When the formal question of intervention came out into the open arena, varying opinions were expressed. The American Government intimated that an occupation of Russian territory would be inconsistent with the motives and aims of the United States in the prosecution of the war, that it was not fighting for the protection of property or for territorial advantage, and that the Allies would be placed in an awkward position if they favoured Japanese occupation of Russian territory in the East while denouncing German invasion of Russian territory in the West; the alleged reasons in both cases being substantially the same. This view found large support in the public press, although a contrary view was vigorously urged.

European opinion showed the same cleavage; but closer contact with the war and clearer realization of its perils gave greater prominence to the consideration of immediate military necessity. It was felt that Germany must be prevented at all hazards from securing a foothold in eastern Siberia, and that Japan was the only nation which could prevent it. This was the prevailing view in France, and it had influential ad-

vocacy in Great Britain. Lord Robert Cecil, British Minister of Blockade, declared: "The Japanese alone can act effectively in the present crisis. It would be in the highest degree foolish, if not criminal, if the Entente failed to take every step possible to frustrate this German scheme."

And yet there had been for some time a growing uneasiness among British merchants and public men about the overshadowing ascendancy which war conditions were giving to Japan in the Far East, an ill-concealed fear that by the time the war ceased British interests in that part of the world would be gone beyond recovery. They now suggested that Vladivostok be occupied by a joint expedition of Japanese, British, and American troops, so that it would be clear that the move would be by the Allies as a whole and that the benefit would not accrue to any one of them alone. Of course, Japan would supply the bulk of the occupying force, but it was urged that even a small force of British and American troops would give an international character to the expedition.

China liked this suggestion and wanted to be represented. She had become an ally by her declaration of war against Germany. If intervention was necessary, who was more vitally concerned than China? Japan acquiesced in this, and March 25, 1918, the Japanese and Chinese Governments entered into an agreement. When knowledge of it leaked out and became the object of suspicion, the Chinese Government authorized the statement, May 19, that "the fear has existed in Japan and China of an eastward intrusion of German influence. On account of the propinquity of their territory, the governments recognized the necessity of a definite arrangement for joint defense. This joint defense concerns military movements in Siberia and Manchuria, and has no reference to other matters. The scheme will become null and void with the termination of the war. . . . The convention does not involve the loss of sovereign territorial rights and Japan gains no privileges." The Japanese Government supplemented this by an official statement, June 8, to the same general effect.

Japan looked askance at the proposal for European and American representation in the expedition, on the ground that it implied distrust of her intentions. And it did. Japan was fully able to do the job herself, and she resented the apparent insinuation that a handful of European and American troops should go along to watch her and to see that she did not take unfair advantage of the opportunity. Japan had cogent reasons, however, for not pressing into Siberia alone against the judgment of her allies. She did not want to jeopardize her amicable relations with Great Britain and the United States. Her statesmen clearly saw that intervention in Siberia was inevitable sooner or later and that when it came, Japan's proximity to the theatre of operations, her ability to use whatever force might be necessary, and the fact that the British and Americans were obliged to concentrate their efforts in France would necessarily give Japan whatever measure of leadership she needed. She could afford to wait, therefore, until the London and Washington governments realized that further delay was dangerous.

The outcome proved the wisdom of Japan's prudence. By the latter part of July conditions in Siberia imperatively required allied action. A considerable number of Czecho-Slovak soldiers refused to accept the humiliating terms of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between Germany and the Russian Revolutionary Government. When the Bolshevik authorities in Petrograd tried to coerce them into obedience, hostilities broke out between the opposing factions. Some of the Czecho-Slovaks kept up the struggle in Russia, and others managed to make their way across Siberia. Some day a story of epic interest may be written regarding that comparative handful of brave and determined men, cut off from all communication with the outside world, trying to keep on good terms with the friendly or neutral peoples through whose territories they had to pass and from whom they had to secure supplies, and opposed all the way not only by German and Austrian influence but by the Bolshevik Red Guards who fiercely fought them at

every opportunity. It was unthinkable that these heroic men should be left to struggle and die unaided, martyrs to their devotion to the cause of the allies.

Fifteen thousand Czecho-Slovaks, finding on their arrival at Vladivostok that the Bolsheviki were in control of the city, marched into it June 30, captured the headquarters of the Soviet, and seized the municipal offices, the bank, and a quantity of ammunition. There was some fighting in which the Czecho-Slovaks had three men killed and 155 wounded; while the Soviet forces had 51 killed and 159 wounded. British, American, Japanese and Chinese warships in the harbour landed small forces to protect their consulates. The victorious Czecho-Slovaks postponed their plans for proceeding to France and began to move westward in order to coöperate with the other Czecho-Slovak forces which were struggling at several points along the Trans-Siberian Railway. The various factions among the Siberians grew more angry and clamorous; the Germans and Austrians redoubled their activity, and the whole country was in a turmoil.

All this time negotiations between the Allied governments were in progress. August 3 the State Department in Washington announced that since "the United States and Japan are the only powers which are just now in a position to act in Siberia in sufficient force to accomplish even such modest objects as those that have been outlined, the Government of the United States has proposed to the Government of Japan that each of the two Governments send a force of a few thousand men to Vladivostok with the purpose of coöperating as a single force in the occupation of Vladivostok and in safeguarding, so far as it may, the country to the rear of the westward-moving Czecho-Slovaks, and the Japanese Government has consented."

The preceding evening, the *Official Gazette* at Tokyo published a declaration emphasizing the Japanese Government's "sincere friendship toward the Russian people;" the danger "that the Central European Empires, taking advantage of

the defenseless and chaotic condition in which Russia has momentarily been placed, are consolidating their hold on that country, and are steadily extending their activities to Russia's eastern possessions; " the necessity of aiding the Czecho-Slovak troops, who " justly command every sympathy and consideration from the co-belligerents, to whom their destiny is a matter of deep and abiding concern; " and closing with the statement: that " the Japanese Government, being anxious to fall in with the desire of the American Government, have decided to proceed at once to make disposition of suitable forces for the proposed mission, and a certain number of these troops will be sent forthwith to Vladivostok. In adopting this course, the Japanese Government remain constant in their desire to promote relations of enduring friendship, and they reaffirm their avowed policy of respecting the territorial integrity of Russia, and of abstaining from all interference in her internal politics. They further declare that upon the realization of the objects above indicated, they will immediately withdraw all Japanese troops from Russian territory, and will leave wholly unimpaired the sovereignty of Russia in all its phases, whether political or military."

The assurances of friendly sentiments toward Russia were of course diplomatic, but they were undoubtedly sincere. In the agreement of July 3, 1916, Russia had delegated to Japan the right of military protection of her eastern possessions, thus enabling Russia to withdraw her military forces from the East for employment on the western front in Europe. The unpublished parts of the agreement recognized Japan's equality of right in the navigation of the three great rivers of northern Manchuria, the Amur, the Nonni, and the Sungari, an important recognition. In view, however, of the fact that, after the Revolution, large sections of Russia, including Siberia, seceded and set up independent governments, a question soon arose as to the precise present meaning of the phrase: " the territorial integrity of Russia." To what extent was Siberia to be deemed a part of Russia?

Japan could not reasonably be blamed for regarding the prospect with anxiety. From the viewpoint of the political and military necessities which her geographical position imposes, she had ample ground for believing that Vladivostok and its hinterland are related to her national safety and development. She had more than once frankly declared that, as compared with western nations, she has a paramount interest in the Far East. One has studied Far Eastern affairs during recent decades to poor advantage if he does not know that occupation of any part of Manchuria, and of a strongly entrenched position at Vladivostok, by a European Power has long been a source of well-founded anxiety to the Japanese. To imagine that they were averse to having an opportunity to end it would be to attribute to them a self-abnegation which few, if any, western nations would show in similar circumstances.

Intervention having been decided upon by the governments concerned, there was no delay in acting. The Japanese, of course, could act easily and quickly, as they had their whole army near by. The British and French Governments contented themselves with comparatively small detachments, chiefly from their available forces in the Far East. The Japanese force was naturally the largest and its general was commander-in-chief of the allied expedition. Vladivostok was occupied as a base, and regiments were pushed out from it to several strategic points, the Japanese occupying Blagovieschensk, the capital of Amur Province, September 18. There were no aggressive operations on a large scale, as the opposition was not sufficiently united, organized and equipped to offer effective resistance. The expedition, therefore, simply took such steps as appeared necessary for the protection of the allied interests and the maintenance of order, while the conflicting parties in Siberia and the anxious governments in Europe were trying to see whether any sort of coherency could be brought out of the chaos and a civil administration established under auspices that would not menace the peace of the Far East.

The close of the World War in November, 1918, and the downfall of the Prussian military autocracy eliminated the German menace from the Far Eastern problem. But Siberia is still Siberia—a vast, fertile, sparsely populated, politically weak and disorganized region, lying just where its relation to Far Eastern problems renders it of crucial importance. In so far as eastern Siberia is concerned, Japan proposes to have a voice in the settlement, just as the United States proposes to have a voice in settling those which affect the western hemisphere. Japan hopes that the reasonableness of her claim will be recognized and respected. She would sincerely regret the necessity of sustaining it by any action which would be deprecated by other powers; but she feels that she cannot be indifferent to the possible bearing of the situation upon her vital national interests. Her limited territory, her overcrowded and rapidly increasing population, and her virtual exclusion from the very large part of the world that is controlled by the European and American nations, compel her to look to the adjoining parts of northern Asia as her most practicable sphere of development.

China has rights there which should not be ignored; but if I were a Japanese I should feel that my country's claim to eastern Siberia and northern Manchuria was stronger than the claim of any western nation. Russia has no title to these regions except that she took them under extorted treaties because she felt that she needed them in the interests of national expansion. China never gave anything more than an enforced acquiescence to Russia's occupation. The people of Manchuria and of eastern Siberia were never consulted at all; and what recognition Japan gave was dictated by temporary military conditions. Of moral right to the region in question, Russia never had more than a shadow. An American can understand how he would feel if a European or Asiatic Power were to occupy Mexico. He would want that Power to get out, and would quite readily salve his conscience if his government had an opportunity to facilitate the ousting.

XI

JAPAN AND THE WORLD WAR

ALL the consequences of the World War of 1914-1918 may not be apparent for another decade, perhaps for a generation, but one that is already apparent is the establishment of Japanese hegemony in the Far East. Japan's former efforts to secure it were hampered by the interests of several European Powers and by their ability to protect them. The war diverted their attention and energy, while it summoned Japan to a great enlargement of her activity just where it could not but accrue to her benefit.

Great Britain early gave Japan a fine opportunity in connection with the German fortified post at Tsingtau in the province of Shantung, China, which had been made one of the most formidable fortifications in the world. Of course the British could not afford to leave the Germans in possession of a naval base from which the immense commerce of the Allies in the Far East could be successfully raided; and as the British had their hands full in Europe, it was natural that they should expect their more conveniently situated ally, Japan, to attend to this matter for them. The Japanese promptly despatched an ultimatum to the Germans, and followed it by a declaration of war August 23, 1914. German artillery would have made an attack from the sea, or a landing within the German concession, a hazardous proceeding. Therefore upon the time-honoured plea of "military necessity," which western nations have so often used, Japan, in spite of China's protests, landed an expeditionary force on Chinese territory a hundred miles north of Tsingtau, and marched overland. The Germans made a sharp resistance, but they did not have enough men to hold

such extensive works against a greatly superior force, and November 7 the Japanese captured the place.

The Japanese not only took Tsingtau and its hinterland but all the German property and concessions in the province, including the railway from Tsingtau to Tsinanfu, on the ground that they could not leave their enemies in possession of valuable privileges in the interior and that it was their duty to take over everything that the Germans had in Shantung, pending the close of the war. They posted detachments of troops along the line and placed a garrison in Tsinanfu, the capital of the province, two hundred and fifty miles in the interior. Substantial stone and concrete barracks were erected at convenient intervals. Courts, post-offices, banks, and numerous commercial enterprises were established. Fifty thousand Japanese were reported to be in or near Tsingtau by the end of 1917. Colonies of varying size were to be found in other important cities, and traders, engineers, and other Japanese on various quests were in evidence in almost every part of the province. The Japanese Government held that it was doing only what was necessary as a war measure; that the arrival of civilians did not imply hostility to China; and that there was no thought of permanent occupation. But the Chinese did not conceal their anxiety, failing to understand how Japanese procedure in Shantung could be reconciled with temporary purposes.

Some surprise was expressed in America because the Japanese Government did not send an army to Europe to the help of her sorely beset allies in the war. Whether Great Britain and France really wanted a Japanese army in France, and whether the Japanese Government really wanted to send one and thus leave itself unable to deal with any emergency that might arise nearer home, are questions on which opinions differ. It should be said, in justice to Japan, that it is a long distance from the Sunrise Kingdom to France; that by the ocean route it would have been difficult to spare enough ships to transport an army large enough to form an appreciable

factor in military operations in which millions of men were engaged on each side, and to keep such an army adequately supplied with munitions, equipment, and the special kind of food to which the Japanese are accustomed. Military men estimated that five tons of shipping were required to transport and maintain one foreign soldier in France, so that 2,500,000 tons would have been needed for 500,000 men; and even that force would have been almost insignificant in comparison with the huge armies of the other allies. America had to commandeered every possible vessel, borrow every one that England could spare, and inaugurate a stupendous ship-building program in order to get her army less than half the distance; and America's resources were far greater than Japan's. As for the land route by the Trans-Siberian Railway, troops sent by that line would have been for Russia, which had ample men of her own. Russia needed rifles, cannon, ammunition, and supplies for an army in the field, and these Japan did sell to her in such quantities that the Trans-Siberian Railway was choked with the traffic.

Toyokishi Iyenaga said in an address in New York that among Japan's reasons for not sending armies to Europe were that it would impair the hard-won military prestige of Japan to put comparatively small forces into the European battle-fields, and that Japan was anxious not to reawaken another "Yellow Peril" propaganda with the old one almost dead. "Japan is keeping safe the channel of communication from Aden to Shanghai, and her troops are kept ready in case of need for sustaining the status quo in India." He significantly added: "Japan would not send her troops as mercenaries. We are, to be sure, all united in a common cause. But I feel confident that even the United States will want a quid pro quo. It has been said that through the war Japan has already gained a commanding position in the Orient, but this position has never been recognized. At present we are holding our troops to safeguard allied interests in the East."

As a matter of fact Japan did give considerable assistance

to the Allies, probably all that they expected or desired. In addition to furnishing indispensable supplies to Russia during the period of the latter's participation in the war, Japan drove Germany out of China, seized the German colonies in the Far East, swept her naval and mercantile shipping from the Pacific Ocean, kept that important part of the world open for the commerce of the allied nations and the transport of Australian and New Zealand troops, maintained at heavy cost her own army and navy on a war basis, ready for instant action in case her allies should desire it, and, according to official figures given out in August, 1918, advanced credits to her allies amounting to yen 1,186,000,000 (\$593,000,000), of which Great Britain received \$371,149,000, Russia \$127,084,000, and France about \$78,000,000. If it is objected that all these things were to Japan's advantage, we reply that this was Japan's good fortune and none the less to the advantage of her allies, especially as they enabled Great Britain, France, and Italy to concentrate their naval strength in European waters where they most needed it.

Another phase of the greatly enhanced position which Japan attained as a result of the European War is the control of the trade of the Far East. She was zealously seeking it before the war broke out, and had already secured a substantial share. Nevertheless, the British were still the chief factors in the commerce of eastern Asia, although they were meeting increasingly vigorous competition from the Germans as well as the Japanese. At the beginning of the war there were 244 German companies in China, 3,740 German residents, and a capital investment of \$256,760,000. The enforced withdrawal of the German ships and the absorption of the British in the European conflict naturally resulted in eliminating German companies and ships altogether, and in transferring a large part of British energies and shipping to places nearer home. This left the Japanese a free field and they naturally, and indeed of economic necessity, took over the bulk of the trade that was formerly conducted by British as well as by German firms. In

doing so they did what white men, Americans included, have repeatedly done wherever they have had a chance. Like the United States, Japan at once found an unlimited demand at high prices for munitions and every staple article that she could produce, and her export trade quickly rose to huge proportions. The whole of the China trade simply fell into Japanese hands. India was flooded with Japanese matches, toys, cigarettes, glassware, silk, cotton, and leather goods. Shipments to South America were more than doubled.

An interesting illustration of Japanese shrewdness, which a Connecticut Yankee might envy, was given in a deal in copper. The war caused an extraordinary demand for this metal and sent the price soaring. The coin in common circulation in China is the copper "cash," about the size of an English penny and so small in value that a gold dollar bought anywhere from fifteen hundred to two thousand according to the rate of exchange. In my travels in the interior of China I had to have an extra donkey to carry the cash needed for my party, and its load had to be replenished several times at the money-changers' in the cities through which I passed, bullion silver being carried along for this purpose. It was said that the copper cash in the Province of Shantung alone would weigh nearly fifty thousand tons. To buy these cash of the Chinese and sell them to the Europeans, who needed the copper for shells, would yield a handsome profit. The Japanese proceeded to do it. The *Manchuria Daily News* reported that in a single year the purchases amounted to 25,600 tons, and that the transaction was completed at a profit of yen 2,167,000 (\$1,083,500).

This is only an incident in many and varied operations which ramified widely throughout China. Mr. C. E. Benjamin, general passenger agent of the trans-Pacific business of the Canadian Pacific Ocean Service, stated in March, 1917, after his return from a visit to the Far East: "The Japanese small traders and traveling merchants are swarming over China, especially throughout the Yangtze River district, which really

includes the most important part of China commercially. They move where they like, far beyond the trading limits established by treaty. They come and go as they will, with small regard for the restrictions of Chinese regulations or written conventions, under the protection of the vigilant and courageous government at Tokyo. The Japanese have acquired extensive holdings along the Yangtze and now have sufficient troops garrisoned at Hankow to enforce any demand they may make."

Prior to the war, forty per cent of China's coasting trade of taels 1,200,000,000 was carried in British ships, and only ten per cent in Japanese; while of China's importations of cotton goods, seventy per cent was from Europe and America and twenty per cent from Japan. Mr. Yoshida, of the Japanese Department of Commerce and Agriculture, who reported these facts, added with pardonable gratification: "Things have been developing in favour of Japan since the outbreak of hostilities."

Many people in Great Britain were so preoccupied by the war that they were slow to concern themselves very much with this situation; but British residents in the Far East knew all about it, and they looked upon Japanese absorption of British trade with emotions which can better be imagined than described.

Russia, too, soon became a profitable customer of Japan. Before the war, she had been buying Japanese goods at the rate of yen 120,000,000 a year, and now this trade received a great impetus, as Russia needed vast quantities of war munitions, besides various kinds of manufactured goods. The usual channels of trade with western Europe and the United States were cut off by Germany, but the Trans-Siberian Railway remained an open line from Japan. The result was that Russia began to buy in Japan, and presently long freight-trains were loaded with Japanese rifles, ammunition, chemicals, hospital supplies, clothing, copper and leather goods, and a variety of other manufactured products. By the end of 1917

Japan had furnished Russia munitions and other supplies to the value of \$300,000,000. As Russia had comparatively little to sell to Japan in return, Japan's favourable balance was a comfortable sum for a nation that had been in financial straits.

Nor did Japan suffer in competition with her greatest free rival, the United States. American imports from Japan in the second year of the war were \$182,090,737, an increase of 73 per cent over the preceding year, while American exports to Japan were \$108,755,000, a gain of 136 per cent. The balance of trade was therefore against the United States to the tune of \$73,335,737.

In these circumstances, Japan began to heap up the wealth that she so greatly needed. One steamship company declared dividends of 360 per cent, and another paid dividends at the rate of 720 per cent. A metal refining company declared 200 per cent, besides writing off for a large part of its plant. Manufacturing concerns increased their plants, employed more operatives, and ran at high pressure. Japan's ocean shipping, which aggregated 1,030,000 tons in 1905, had reached 1,690,000 in 1915, and is now over 2,000,000 tons, and her 224 shipyards work night and day. In a single year 182 steamships were under construction and seventy-two with an aggregate tonnage of 333,841 were launched. Bank clearings showed a gain of 78 per cent. Postal savings at the close of the war were yen 299,860,776 greater than in 1914, and had passed the half billion mark. The number of depositors had become 18,464,431, an increase of 5,493,524; and their average deposit had risen nearly a hundred per cent. Japan, like the United States, suddenly passed from a borrowing to a creditor nation. Foreign indebtedness was considerably reduced, and large purchases were made of the bonds and treasury notes issued by her European Allies. By the beginning of 1918 the gold holdings of the government and the Bank of Japan were over \$400,000,000.

Viscount Yataro Mishima, governor of the Bank of Japan, stated in his Annual Report in 1918 that Japan took \$230,-

000,000 of the war loans of Great Britain, France, and Russia in 1917, while in addition \$340,000,000 was furnished as capital for new business enterprises. The amount of Japan's national loans floated during that year was about \$120,000,000, and issues of debentures by various companies and of municipal bonds aggregated about \$70,000,000. He truly said that "this clearly indicates that the augmentation in our resources is really remarkable." He estimated that, including the trade in Korea and Taiwan, exports for the year aggregated \$831,450,000, and imports \$543,660,000, the total being about \$1,375,110,000. Compared with the results of the previous year, these figures showed an increase of \$244,970,000 on the side of exports, and \$146,730,000 on that of imports. Imports of gold and silver aggregated \$196,110,000, and exports \$76,865,000.

Of course, the war trade was abnormal, but Japan's added wealth, her increased industrial equipment and efficiency, and her preëminence in Asiatic markets remain as national assets of immense value. Every year increases her ability to manufacture what the world needs, to ship it where it is needed, and to sell it in competition with business men of western nations.

Significant also in its effect not only upon the Far East but upon the world at large was the ascendancy of the Japanese in Chinese governmental affairs. Possession of the strategic base which Germany held in the Province of Shantung was a political and military advantage of high value; but this was not all. Early in the year 1915, the world was startled to learn that on January 18 Japan had made twenty-one demands upon the government of China. They were arranged in five groups. The first group related to the interests which Japan had won from Germany in Shantung; the second to "the special position enjoyed by Japan in South Manchuria and Eastern Inner Mongolia"; the third to the Hanyehping Iron and Steel Company; the fourth required China "not to cede or lease to a third Power any harbour or bay or island along the coast of China"; and the fifth asked China to "employ

influential Japanese as advisers in political, financial and military affairs"; to agree that "the police departments of important places in China shall be jointly administered by Japanese and Chinese"; to "purchase from Japan 50 per cent or more of munitions of war needed by the Chinese Government," "Japanese experts to be employed and Japanese material to be purchased"; to grant Japan the right to construct certain railways; to give Japanese hospitals, churches, and schools the right to own land in the interior of China; to consult Japan before borrowing foreign capital for mines, railways, and harbour work; and to permit Japanese to propagate Buddhism in China.

These demands threw the Chinese into the utmost consternation, as they were understood to mean the impairment of Chinese sovereignty and the virtual overlordship of Japan. President Yuan Shih Kai protested against several of them and flatly refused to sign those in Group V. Representatives of the American and British Governments used their friendly offices with the Japanese, and April 26 the Japanese presented a revised list, in which some of the most objectionable of the original demands were modified, and a few were dropped. May 1 the Chinese Government accepted some of the demands, but dealt with others in a way that was not satisfactory to the Japanese, who May 7 presented an ultimatum closing with the peremptory statement: "The Imperial Government hereby again offer their advice and hope that the Chinese Government, upon this advice, will give a satisfactory reply by six o'clock P. M. on the 9th day of May. It is hereby declared that if no satisfactory reply is received before or at the specified time, the Imperial Government will take steps they may deem necessary."

The Chinese felt that they were in a grievous case. They did not want to yield; but they knew that they were helpless, with no military or naval strength to withstand the disciplined and efficient forces of the Japanese. They knew, too, that they could get no assistance from western nations. The British

made no secret of their concern; but Japan was their ally in the World War, and they did not deem it prudent to offend her. The American Government intimated its anxiety and the American press was outspoken in protest; but nobody was in a position to interpose effective objection.

Reams of explanations have been written from the Japanese viewpoint, and other reams of criticism from the Chinese viewpoint. Sidney L. Gulick says: "I have it on pretty high authority that Group V was put up for purposes of trading. Japan arranged that Yuan Shih Kai could say to China that he had forced Japan to back down on the most important demands and thus 'save his face' for having yielded the rest." Unfortunately, China was not in a position to "trade" with a fair chance, and Yuan Shih Kai's "face" was beyond saving.

The position of the Japanese, as explained to me by several prominent Japanese, may be epitomized as follows: China is huge in population and resources, but lacking in national unity and efficiency. In this age, when international relations are founded upon force and each government is seeking its own interests with scant regard for the rights of others, China cannot take care of herself. European nations have made repeated aggressions upon her, and today they occupy her most valuable harbours. In the capital itself, the foreign legations are virtually fortified posts, armed, provisioned and guarded by military forces in a way that would not be permitted in the capital of any government able to defend itself from such an insult. Further foreign aggressions are probable and China cannot resist them. It is equally clear that the government is not strong enough to develop the resources of the country and to organize its industries and life as they ought to be developed and organized both for the sake of China and for that of other nations which need her products. In these circumstances, China must have guidance and protection from the outside, or else continue in a state of disorganization equally injurious to herself and dangerous to the peace of the world. The Japanese are the proper ones to give this assistance. They are

close at hand, a sister Asiatic people, with large interests in China, and with their own safety involved in Chinese affairs. It is therefore the duty of Japan to do in China what imperatively needs to be done. It is to be regretted that the Chinese do not appreciate the necessity for Japan's assistance and organizing ability; but Japan cannot permit herself to be diverted from her plain national and international obligations by the jealousy or obtuseness of Chinese officials. The United States Government has its Monroe Doctrine and has repeatedly given notice that it will not permit any other nation to obtain further territories in Mexico, Central or South America, or to secure concessions or make loans which would give a right to impinge upon the territory or sovereignty of any nation in the western hemisphere. China is Japan's Monroe Doctrine. It is even more vital to Japan than South America is to the United States. Just as the United States will not permit any other Power to interfere in South America, so Japan will not permit any other Power to interfere in China.

I have not attempted to quote the exact words of the Japanese with whom I talked. I have simply given my impression of the substance of the position that they took, and I believe it to be approximately correct. What they said certainly justified such an interpretation. I am confirmed in this opinion by the following statement of Mr. K. Yoshizawa, Counselor of the Japanese Legation in Peking:

“There are only two world powers now which can give attention to China in any appreciable degree. They are Japan and the United States. . . . But Japan, for geographical reasons and because of her political and other relations in the past, is in a more convenient position than America to assist China. The responsibility of Japan, therefore, is very great. Japan should treat China as if she were Japan's own relative. This task requires a great deal of patience on the part of Japan. Japan must care for China as a mother cares for her child. It is my idea that we should be patient with China. If she listens to our friendly suggestions, she should be encouraged; if she does not, she should be chastised as a father punishes his way-

ward son. I expect to assist Baron Hayashi, my chief, in Peking with that policy in mind."

During Viscount Kikujiro Ishii's visit in America, he disclaimed a press report that in one of his addresses he had announced a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for Asia. He declared:

"There is this fundamental difference between the Monroe Doctrine of the United States as to Central and South America and the enunciation of Japan's attitude toward China. In the first, there is on the part of the United States no engagement or promise, while in the other Japan voluntarily announces that Japan will herself engage not to violate the political or territorial integrity of her neighbour and to observe the principle of the open door and equal opportunity, asking at the same time other nations to respect these principles. Therefore, gentlemen, you will mark the wide difference and agree with me, I am sure, that the use of the term is somewhat loose and misleading."

I am glad to quote Viscount Ishii's disclaimer. However, the use of the Monroe Doctrine, as an illustration of Japan's relations to China, was first suggested by the Japanese themselves, and it has been repeatedly pressed by them. At any rate, Americans will doubtless say at once that if Japan means for China only what the United States means by its Monroe Doctrine, they have no objection whatever, but, on the contrary, hearty sympathy. As a matter of fact, our country does not interfere with the internal affairs of any other nation in this hemisphere. It demands no concessions from them, appoints no advisers, and stations no soldiers within their territories. The American policy is that each nation should be left absolutely free to work out its own destiny. The United States in the Monroe Doctrine simply says to other powers: "Hands off." The demands which Japan made upon China went much farther than this. It is impossible to read them and conclude that Japan contemplated nothing more in China than the United States contemplates in the western hemisphere.

Jeremiah W. Jenks said that "information from authoritative sources was to the effect that at the very time that Viscount Ishii was making his most eloquent addresses in this country, Japanese agents in Peking were crowding Chinese Government officials by every device known to those skilful negotiators."

More recent years have witnessed a notable change in Japanese policy in China. It has become more considerate and conciliatory. The change dates from the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments in 1921. Japan sent a strong delegation to the Conference and entered whole-heartedly into its deliberations. China's relations with Japan, which had been severely strained by the circumstances described on preceding pages, were noticeably improved at Washington. While some of China's grievances were not officially before the Conference itself, advantage was taken of the opportunity to bring about private conferences between the Chinese and Japanese delegates and friendly advisers. The Chinese publicly expressed themselves as very happy over the outcome. They were particularly gratified by the agreement to revise the customs and to abolish extra-territorial laws and foreign courts, if an International Commission should find the way clear, and to withdraw alien post-offices. Japan had one hundred and twenty-four post-offices in China; France thirteen; Great Britain twelve; and America one. All these foreign holdings and operations in China, and the garrisons of foreign soldiers in Peking, Tientsin, Hangchow and other cities, were deeply resented by China as infringements on her sovereignty. The most acute of all the problems was the Japanese control of the sacred Province of Shantung. This problem, which more than once has threatened to precipitate war, was, after more than a score of futile conferences between the Chinese and Japanese delegates, finally adjusted, through the good offices of the American Secretary of State, in a mutually satisfactory way. Said one of the Chinese delegates, Dr. C. H. Wang:

"We came here empty-handed, and we leave with three treaties which are all in China's favour. We came here with the confidence of America's sympathy and friendship for us, and we leave this country with renewed confidence that the friendship between the two peoples of America and China will be perpetual. We came here with a message of good-will from the Chinese people to the American people, and we go back with a like message of good-will from the American people to the Chinese people."

Critics of Japan cynically doubted whether the fair promises of the Japanese delegation would ever be carried out, but Japan did carry them out in fine spirit. The agreement was ratified by the Imperial Government May 20, 1922. Indeed, the Government did not wait for the formal ratification of the agreement. In accordance with the program arranged March 28 in Peking by representatives of the Japanese and Chinese Governments, the withdrawal of troops began in April and was completed May 4, the final contingent sailing from Tsingtau May 9. Thus within three months after the signing of the Shantung agreement in Washington, there remained no Japanese forces in Shantung outside of the former German leased territory, and the Japanese Government agreed to remove even the Tsingtau garrison simultaneously with the administration of the leased territory by the Chinese authorities. There has never been a better illustration of entire good faith in carrying out a diplomatic agreement. That some other parts of the Washington agreement have not yet been carried into effect has been due not to Japan but to the fact that the demoralized conditions in China blocked the efforts of the International Commission which was composed of representatives of European and American nations as well as of Japan.

During all the troubled period that followed in China on account of the conflicting ambitions of Chinese war lords, Japan scrupulously avoided undue interference, taking no advantage of the demoralization of the country, and strictly limiting itself to the protection of Japanese subjects and prop-

erty as the American and other Governments did. From present indications, China still has a long and rough road to travel before reaching a period of stability under a responsible central government, but her difficulties are not being unnecessarily increased by Japan. And yet Japan's interests in China are large. There are approximately four thousand Japanese firms in China representing extensive banking, shipping, manufacturing and other enterprises, and the number of Japanese nationals is now reported as two hundred thousand. Japan knows that it is to her interest to be on friendly terms with so great a country near at hand. In an address to the Imperial Diet, January 17, 1927, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Baron K. Shidehara, said:

"While expressly reserving for ourselves the position to which we are entitled, we are prepared to consider the legitimate aspirations of the Chinese people with full sympathy and understanding in the interest of Sino-Japanese friendly relations. Japan's policy covering all questions of relations between Japan and China may be summarized:

"First—Respect the sovereignty and territorial integrity of China and scrupulously avoid all interference in her domestic strife.

"Second—Promote the solidarity and economic rapprochement between the two nations.

"Third—Entertain sympathetically and helpfully the just aspirations of the Chinese people and coöperate in efforts of realization of such aspirations.

"Fourth—Maintain an attitude of patience and toleration in the present situation in China and at the same time protect Japan's legitimate and essential rights and interests by all reasonable means at the disposal of the Government."

Whatever may have been true in the past, the present policy of Japan is one of friendly coöperation with China and a disposition to avoid any unnecessary or irritating interference.

XII

EARLY JAPANESE-AMERICAN RELATIONS

RELATIONS between Japan and the United States began most auspiciously. I need not repeat the familiar story of the famous expedition which President Millard Fillmore sent to Japan in 1852 and 1853 under that sailor-diplomat, Commodore Matthew C. Perry. While it consisted of naval vessels whose saluting guns at first aroused the wildest excitement and alarm among the then untutored Japanese, the object of the expedition was distinctively peaceful in purpose, and it issued in peaceful conclusions. Americans are justly proud that Japan's first treaty with a western nation was the treaty of March 31, 1854, with the United States.

Happy was it also for relations of good-will that the first American Minister to Japan was Townsend Harris—merchant, educator, and philanthropist as well as diplomat, who was appointed Consul-General in 1855, and commissioned as Minister upon the ratification of the treaty of 1858, and who brought to his difficult and delicate task a real genius for dealing with Asiatic peoples. His courage in remaining at his post in a time of danger when other foreigners fled, his genuine faith in the Japanese, and his tactful determination to win their confidence gave him a prestige in Japan which still abides. It enabled him, in 1858, to secure a commercial treaty, and January 1, 1859, the opening of three treaty ports in which foreigners could reside. The Honorable John W. Foster said, in his history of *American Diplomacy in the Orient*, that while the genius of Perry had unbarred the gate of the Island Empire and left it ajar, it was the skill of Harris which threw it open to the commercial enterprise of the world; that he reflected great honour upon his country and justly deserves to

rank among the first diplomats of the world, if such rank is measured by accomplishment.

This good beginning was followed by what William H. Seward called "the tutorship of the United States in Japan," "based on deeper and broader principles of philanthropy than have hitherto been practised in the intercourse of nations." Noble was the group of men and women from America who laid broad and deep the foundations of progress and friendship—Hepburn, Brown, Verbeck, Murray, and others of like character and devotion.

All went smoothly in the relations of the two countries until comparatively recent years, when the Japanese began to emigrate. In this era of easy international travel most nations have overflowed their boundaries, and subjects of the more alert and ambitious ones have gone to many different lands. The Japanese lived a secluded life until a few decades ago; but when their isolation ceased, enterprising Japanese began to roam afar. The pressure of expanding population in a limited territory added strong incentive. A generation ago there were not more than 20,000 Japanese outside of Japan, and most of them were in Korea. At the last available report, the number residing abroad was 594,680 distributed as follows: 209,840 in North and South America, 254,072 in Asia, 156,921 in Australia, 3,804 in Europe and 49 in Africa. Half of the population of the Hawaiian Islands is Japanese, 128,068 out of 255,912.

These emigrants met with varying degrees of welcome in the countries in which they settled. Industrious and self-reliant, they had no difficulty in gaining a foothold; but while their strong qualities were everywhere recognized, they were seldom popular. For that matter, are European and American residents in Asia popular? Differences in race, language, religion, and social customs are not conducive to sympathetic personal relations anywhere.

In the United States the strain became acute. Some Americans, who had regarded a Japanese in Japan as a picturesquely attractive figure, changed their minds when he settled next

door with his different scale of living and standards of conduct. Japanese students, merchants, and professional men have aroused no particular antagonism in America, and they freely reside where they please. But 95 per cent of the Japanese in California were peasant farmers, fruit-raisers, truck-gardeners, and labourers, only five per cent being classed as officials, students, and professional men.¹ Willing to work longer hours than white men and to accept lower wages, their successful competition speedily excited the wrath and race prejudice of their American neighbours. Social ostracism intensifies the natural disposition of men to associate with their own kind, and so the Japanese perforce segregate themselves in groups which are distinct from the rest of the population. Practically all the cities and considerable towns in California include these groups, as well as many rural communities. Of the 71,952 Japanese reported in the last census as in California, about two-fifths were in and around Los Angeles, one-fifth in San Francisco and its vicinity, and the remainder scattered through various towns and villages chiefly in the Sacramento and San Joaquin valleys. 45,414 were males and 26,538 were females.

The story of the agitation on the Pacific coast is not pleasant reading. Angry recriminations, mob violence, inimical legislation, and indignant protests have marked the course of events. A detailed account would lie beyond the scope of this volume. Abundant material is available for the reader in numerous books and magazine articles.² Suffice it here to indicate certain facts and conclusions that impress me as essential to an understanding of the problem:

First. Unrestricted immigration and land-ownership by Asiatics who enter into industrial competition with Americans, who represent lower standards of living, and who cannot or

¹ Special State Investigation, cited by Gulick and Scherer.

² The following are worthy of special mention: *The Japanese Crisis*, by James A. B. Scherer; *The Japanese Problem in the United States*, by H. A. Willis; *Japanese Expansion and American Policies*, by J. F. Abbott; *Asia at the Door*, by K. K. Kawakami; and *The American-Japanese Problem* and *America and the Orient*, both by Sidney L. Gulick.

will not assimilate with them, is clearly impracticable. It is not a question of equality or brotherhood, but of economic and social adjustments which are insoluble under present conditions.

Second. The Japanese Government does not ask for such unrestricted immigration and land-ownership. It would rather have its surplus labouring population go to Korea, Formosa, and China, where every additional Japanese helps to strengthen Japanese interests. The emigrants to America are not only lost to the nation, except for the money that they send back to their relatives, but the majority of them are of a grade which high-class Japanese do not care to have considered as representative of their people. The business and professional men in such cities as New York and Washington are fine types of intelligent and cultured Japanese; but of the mass of labourers Marquis Okuma frankly said: "We are not proud of the Japanese emigrants who go to America. They are coolies. They do not understand what trouble they have been giving to the Japanese nation by their presence in America. Somebody in Japan set the bad example of conducting an emigration business. . . . The emigration question, at all events, should be treated merely as an emigration question, and not as one either political or diplomatic."

The editor of the Osaka *Mainichi* was equally outspoken:

"It is desirable to eliminate emigration not only from the treaty but to prevent emigration to America. Emigration is not a thing to be looked upon with favour. It means nothing but the exportation of coolies. It parades the lowest mass of the Japanese people in foreign countries, and furnishes the ground for various international embroglios. . . . Because emigration has been conducted as a business, horrible crimes have been disclosed here and there, impairing Japan's fair name. The exportation of coolies is a disgrace to the nation."

Third. There is no issue over naturalization. Japan does

not ask us to naturalize her subjects, as she prefers to have them remain subjects of Japan.

Fourth. What, then, does the Japanese Government want? Just this and nothing more: that American laws shall not discriminate against Japanese as compared with immigrants of other nationalities. No self-respecting government can acquiesce in having its subjects singled out for exclusion from privileges that are freely granted to subjects of other governments. "The real question at issue therefore is between a discriminatory and a non-discriminatory alien land law." Japan is perfectly willing to have her people in the United States treated in the same way as other aliens are treated. It is the differential treatment that is objectionable. Marquis Okuma said this in so many words in reply to a question by the representative of the *New York Times*: "If you ask me what we want, then I must say frankly that we want equal treatment with the European nations. We want you to cease to exercise racial discrimination." "Racial discrimination" is precisely what America is exercising now. Laws bear against the Japanese and Chinese which do not bear against peoples of many other nationalities. Courts naturalize as American citizens all comers from Europe and South America, and also Turks, Hindus, Persians, Mexicans and Hottentots—but not Japanese or Chinese. Can we wonder that these high-spirited people are deeply wounded when we exclude them from those privileges that we readily grant to immigrants of inferior type? Only a very few of the Japanese would apply for naturalization if the laws permitted them to do so; for most of them do not want to change their allegiance. But their inclusion in the permissive law which opens the door to other races would alter what Doctor Sidney L. Gulick has well called "the entire psychological attitude" of the Japanese toward us. Immigration could be and should be handled as a separate problem. The Japanese ask nothing more here than America freely accords to Tartars and Zulus.

Fifth. Popular feeling lays the blame upon labour unions.

But the unions are not so zealous as people imagine, for the reason that they are composed of city mechanics and other skilled workmen while most of the objectionable Japanese are peasant farmers and labourers in the rural districts. Dr. James A. B. Scherer, after seven years' study of this question in California, said, what will be news to most people in the eastern section of the United States, that the labour unions in California as well as the Japanese Government would be entirely satisfied with a law excluding all aliens from land-ownership, but that the effort to pass such a law has been blocked by banks, trust companies, chambers of commerce, and other large business interests which fear that it would prevent the investment of foreign capital in the State. He deplores the fact that a grave international issue is thus subordinated to commercial interests which in his opinion would not be so seriously injured as they imagine.¹

Sixth. There is no danger whatever of a deluge of Japanese immigration. By the "Gentlemen's Agreement" of November, 1907, Japan consented to refuse passports to coolies who desire to go to the United States. The Japanese Ambassador in Washington made the following declaration in signing the treaty of February 21, 1911: "In proceeding this day to the signature of the treaty of commerce and navigation . . . the undersigned has the honour to declare that the Imperial Japanese Government are fully prepared to maintain with equal effectiveness the limitation and control which they have for the past three years exercised in regulation of the labourers to the United States." The Japanese Government scrupulously kept this agreement. The right of Japanese in America to send for "picture brides" was sometimes abused, but there has been negligible emigration of labouring men to the United States for years, and the total Japanese population in this country is steadily decreasing. In a recent period of seven years 15,139 more Japanese men left America than arrived. When some overzealous members of Congress tried to have

¹ *The Japanese Crisis*, pp. 97-102, 110.

a clause inserted in the Burnett Bill, in 1916, which would give legal recognition to the "Gentlemen's Agreement," Japan vigorously protested. It would keep its coolies out of its own volition but it would resent an order to do so. The Premier of Japan, then Marquis Okuma, characterized "the indirect reference to Japan in the Burnett Bill as insulting," and declared: "It is time for the people of the United States to wake up to a sense of justice and throw over racial prejudice." The objectionable clause in the bill was finally dropped, but the discussion left an unpleasant memory.

Seventh. When a State fails to give proper protection to aliens residing within its borders, or passes a law which contravenes rights that are guaranteed to them by treaty, it will not do for our Federal Government to answer just protests by pleading that it cannot coerce a sovereign State in such matters. Either the United States form a nation or they do not. If they do, the national government may be justly held responsible when its citizens violate treaties which it has made with other nations. If we are not a nation, then the offended government has the right to deal directly with the particular State which committed or condoned the offense. America itself has acted on this principle with Japan. In 1863, the Daimyo of Choshu fired on some American, French and Dutch merchant vessels which were passing the Strait of Shimonoseki. When their governments demanded his punishment, the Japanese Government replied that it had no control over the local authorities in such matters. The foreign governments then declared that if the government of Japan could not deal with the Daimyo, they could and would. The result was that a squadron of American, French, Dutch and British warships bombarded the Daimyo's forts, completely demolished them, and compelled the payment of an indemnity of \$3,000,000. The United States ultimately returned its share; but the humiliating fact of punishment remained. Japanese memory is not short, and when Japan is told by the Government of the United States that it cannot interfere with the State of

California, the Japanese feel that they have a historical precedent, to which we ourselves have been a party, for saying that if the Federal Government cannot control its constituent parts, the Japanese Government may proceed to do so. If our laws do not permit our Federal Government to prevent one or more of its constituent states from embroiling the whole country with other countries, a law authorizing it to do so should be enacted without further delay. Some years ago the American Bar Association endorsed a bill to empower the Federal Government to deal directly in all criminal cases in which aliens are involved. It ought to have been passed.

Eighth. This controversy has brought severer strain upon our relations with Japan than the American people realize. The Japanese do not conceal their irritation and resentment. "Any attempt to force the issue at the present time may lead to very undesirable results," significantly remarked one of America's best friends in Japan, Marquis Okuma. Mr. Naoichi Masaoka has published, under the title *Japan to America*, a symposium by thirty-five representative citizens of Japan on the relations between Japan and the United States. The volume abounds in references to the historical friendship of the Japanese toward America and the sincere desire of the writers that it should continue unbroken; but throughout there is a distinct intimation that Japan is rankling under a sense of deep injustice. A characteristic utterance is that of Professor Shigeo Suyehiro, professor in the law school of the Kyoto Imperial University: "In recent years, America has been treating us in a way rather unpleasant to us. In more than one instance it was only with a lingering sense of gratitude for her past friendship that we endured what we could not otherwise have endured. . . . If she rejects it (our claim for justice) I am afraid that the day will come when our friendship toward her shall cease."¹ Even the kindly Baron Ei-ichi Shibusawa wrote: "These things (anti-Japanese legislation) cause us anxiety. . . . There will not be any change in

¹ *Japan to America*, pp. 57 and 61.

our friendship toward America; but the masses of the people may become enraged if the strained relations continue long.”¹ And after his return to Japan from his visit to the United States in 1916, he sadly said: “Owing to a lack of thorough understanding on both sides of the Pacific, the two nations are dangerously drifting apart.”

Baron Shibusawa's fear that “the masses of the people may become enraged” has come perilously near fulfilment. Many of the newspapers in Japan have been vehement in their expressions of popular indignation, and have demanded summary measures. More than once there has been ground for anxiety lest some overt act, perhaps not important in itself, might fan national passion into a flame that the government might find it difficult to control. “There is,” observes Mr. T. P. O’Conner, “in individual as well as in national character, one type which is always liable to give us some unpleasant surprises. You meet a man or a woman who is apparently soft, yielding, and self-controlled. You may try them with a certain want of consideration for their feelings; and, finding that you are met with nothing but the same agreeable smile and unquestioning docility, you rush to the conclusion that they are incapable of a moment of fierce anger or volcanic passion. But you find yourself suddenly and unexpectedly awakened. What you have not realized is that what you have said or done has been profoundly resented, and that, though the resentment has not been expressed, it has deepened in consequence; and that some fine day it bursts forth with all the rage and devastation of a volcano. . . . And when a broad minded Japanese discusses with you, in the confidence of private conversation, the character of his people, this is also the view he takes. Marquis Okuma, for instance, discussing this very question with the author, summed up the character of his people in these words: ‘The Japanese are not cruel but they are turbulent, vindictive and irascible’; a portrait which, though terse, is sufficient to reveal to Europeans how little

¹ *Japan to America*, pp. 32 and 33.

they have grasped the depths in Japanese life." Dr. Scherer, who quotes this opinion, adds: "This fact of the Japanese temperament is the focal point of importance in this whole discussion. All Europeans or Americans that have lived among Japanese and had even a modicum of sympathetic discernment will agree with Mr. O'Conner."¹ It is simply just and sensible that intelligent Americans should do everything in their power to prevent mobs and demagogues from exasperating beyond endurance a proud and sensitive people who ought to be our friends.

The strain between the United States and Japan was sharpened by controversy over China. Mutual suspicions were rife and Japan's policies in China were severely criticised. This controversy was happily allayed by the visit to the United States of a Japanese commission headed by Viscount Kikujiro Ishii in 1917. He won golden opinions by his affable manners and tactful speeches. His brief address at the tomb of Washington, August 26, will live in literature. The conferences in Washington resulted in an agreement which was set forth in Mr. Robert Lansing's note of November 2 as Secretary of State, to Viscount Ishii, which included the following paragraph:

"The governments of the United States and Japan recognize that territorial propinquity creates special relations between countries, and, consequently, the government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China, particularly in the part to which her possessions are contiguous. The governments of the United States and Japan deny that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China and they declare, furthermore, that they always adhere to the principle of the so-called 'Open Door' or equal opportunity for commerce and industry in China."

Viscount Ishii confirmed this statement in a note to Mr. Lansing. The agreement was hailed with immense satisfaction

¹ *The Japanese Crisis*, p. 63.

by the American and Japanese peoples. In a public statement accompanying the announcement of the correspondence, Mr. Lansing said:

"There had unquestionably been growing up between the peoples of the two countries a feeling of suspicion as to the motives inducing the activities of the other in the Far East, a feeling which, if unchecked, promised to develop a serious situation which would jeopardize the ancient friendship of the two nations. The visit of Viscount Ishii and his colleagues has accomplished a great change of opinion in this country. In a few days the propaganda of years has been undone, and both nations are now able to see how near they came to being led into the trap which had been skilfully set for them."

The Japanese view was expressed by Mr. Kenkichi Mori, who said:

"The United States has established a notable precedent by recognizing Japan's special position in China with a view to the general weal of the Chinese people. . . . The main idea of the agreement runs, roughly speaking, parallel to that which is embodied in the American declaration of paramountcy on this side of the Atlantic. Just as the United States has acquiesced in the retaining of the colonies by European countries on this hemisphere but objects to the acquisition of new ones, so Japan is willing to maintain the Hay Doctrine, recognizing the interests of the powers previously acquired in Chinese territory, but she is loath to permit hereafter any third power to secure territory or special privilege which may run counter to the principle already enunciated."

China, however, heard of the agreement with very different emotions; nor was her agitation lessened by the fact that the Chinese Foreign Office in Peking received its first intimation of the agreement from Japanese sources before either the American Minister in Peking or the Chinese Minister in Washington knew about it, a circumstance which considerably impaired the "face" of these two diplomats. November 12, the Chinese Minister in Washington, Mr. V. K. Wellington Koo,

lodged formal protest at the American Department of State, concluding with the statement that "it is again declared that the Chinese Government will not allow herself to be bound by any agreement entered into by other nations." Tang Shao Yi indignantly declared that the Washington Government had "sold China out."

All conjectures regarding motive, however, should take into account the fact that President Wilson and Secretary of State Lansing were real friends of China who were not disposed to adopt any course which they felt would be unjust to China or jeopardize the good relations which they earnestly desired to exist between the two countries. Moreover, some of China's best friends regarded the agreement with favour. That devoted advocate of China's interests, Jeremiah W. Jenks, said: "A careful study of the situation seems to show that no concessions whatever were made, that generally accepted facts were recognized, and that no harm has been done to Chinese interests." Bishop James W. Bashford, of Peking, also strongly pro-Chinese, expressed the opinion that the note would result in good.

It is unfortunate that varying interpretations have been placed upon the agreement by the interested parties. The Japanese emphasize the clause: "The Government of the United States recognizes that Japan has special interests in China," and regard it as equivalent to conceding their paramountcy; while Americans emphasize the clauses which "adhere to the principle of the 'Open Door' for commerce and industry," and "deny any purpose to infringe in any way the independence or territorial integrity of China." However, the agreement undoubtedly greatly improved the relations of the United States and Japan, and all concerned had reason to be relieved and gratified, although the fundamental causes of disagreement still remained.

XIII

JAPANESE PROTEST AGAINST AMERICA'S EXCLUSION LAW

UNHAPPILY the improvement in American-Japanese relations proved to be of short duration. Several controversies after the World War revived and intensified the strain.

The Shantung Question. The Japanese resented American criticism of their course in Shantung in the World War. Americans believed that the German concessions should have reverted to China, but the Japanese felt that they had as much right in Shantung as the United States had in the Philippines; that the British and French Governments had agreed that concession of German possessions in Shantung would be made to Japan in the peace treaty; that the Conference in Paris confirmed this agreement; that President Wilson opposed it and acquiesced only when he was outvoted; and that hostile American public opinion seriously complicated the course that Japan was justified in taking under the treaty and the necessities of her national position. Japan's subsequent withdrawal from Shantung, described in Chapter XI, eliminated this bone of contention, but it caused irritation for a time.

The Siberian Question. In the Siberian Expedition, referred to in Chapter X, the American and Japanese soldiers speedily clashed. The officers were studiously courteous, but the feeling between the men of the rank and file was bitter. The American soldiers came back haters of the Japanese and, scattered as they were in various parts of the country, they made unfavourable reports in their respective communities and the local posts of the American Legion.

The Yap Question. This small, obscure and sparsely populated island, 800 miles east of the Philippines, suddenly came into international prominence. It is a station on the cable lines between our Pacific Coast and the Far East, so that the government that holds it can read, and, if it chooses, censor every private, commercial and official message that Americans and their government send to China, Korea, Japan, and the Philippines. Japan took a mandate for Yap under another secret agreement during the war, in accordance with which Great Britain and France pledged to Japan all the Pacific Islands north of the equator. The American Government vigorously objected, insisting that it was not bound by an agreement in which it had no part and which was prejudicial to its interests, and that Yap should be internationalized. The controversy waxed warm. The Japanese insisted on the validity of their title and the American Government set forth its position in Secretary of State Colby's note to the Council of the League of Nations, and in several communications to Tokyo. It was not until February 11, 1922, that the dispute was amicably settled by the signing of a treaty which recognized Japan's mandate but provided for equality of opportunity and privilege for Americans as in other mandated territories of the same class, guaranteed equal use of the cables and the right of the United States to establish a radio station.

The Korean Question. Americans protested against the harshness with which Japanese police dealt with an unarmed people in suppressing the revolutionary movement of 1919. In turn, the Japanese resented the acquiescence of America in the use of the United States as a base for a political propaganda by the Provisional Government of the alleged Korean Republic whose object was the severance of Korea from Japan. Time is settling this question partly by the wise and beneficent policy of the Japanese Governor-General, Admiral Saito, described in Chapter IX, partly by the sullenly reluctant acquiescence of the Korean revolutionists in the hopelessness of their cause, and partly by the growing opinion

in the United States that, under present conditions, Japanese control is inevitable and that Japanese administration is now on the whole about as efficient and as well intentioned as British administration in India and American administration in the Philippines.

Anti-Japanese Legislation. The California Alien Land Law of November 2, 1920, gave great offence. It forbade the sale and lease of agricultural land to Japanese. Guardians of minor Japanese children, who are American citizens by virtue of birth in the United States and in whose names their parents might purchase land or make leases, must be American citizens appointed by the courts. Japanese or Chinese are not to purchase shares or stock in any company, association or corporation entitled to hold or acquire agricultural land. Substantially similar bills were passed by the legislatures of half a dozen other States. A test case was carried to the Supreme Court in Washington. That tribunal held that it was not its province to deal with the merits of the California law but only with its constitutionality, and that the law could not be nullified on that account. The case was therefore decided in favour of the State. Unwise and unfair legislation is not necessarily unconstitutional. It is interesting to note that the law not only worked considerable hardship to many Japanese who had acquired land in good faith under existing law, but that it also worked hardship to Americans whose lands were being cultivated under leases by Japanese and who could not secure white labour to take the place of the Japanese labour that had been displaced. Japanese could continue to work under employment of white owners, but many of them did not wish to do so. The people of the State generally were also affected because large quantities of fruits and vegetables were raised by Japanese on leased land and the cancellation of the leases resulted in smaller output and consequent raising of prices.

Anti-Japanese agitators also proposed to amend the Federal Constitution so as to deny American citizenship to American-

born Asiatics. Bills to this effect were introduced in both Houses of Congress. These drastic measures had the powerful support of the American Legion, the chain of newspapers owned by William Randolph Hearst, and a number of active anti-Japanese politicians and other agitators.

The Japanese Government plainly intimated its anxiety lest all this propaganda might precipitate a crisis, and that public opinion in Japan was becoming so aroused that it might get beyond control. The American and Japanese ambassadors (Morris and Shidehara) laboured amicably together for months in Washington, in 1920, in an earnest effort to arrive at a settlement that would be satisfactory to both nations. Their joint report was submitted in January, 1921, to the Foreign Offices of their respective governments. According to unofficial report its three essential points were: First, tightening the "Gentlemen's Agreement" so as to prohibit further immigration of Japanese labouring men; second, giving full civil and property rights to the Japanese now in America, or who may hereafter come, in the privileged classes of merchants, professors, students, officials, etc.; third, extension of the alien land laws so that they will apply to aliens of all nationalities and not discriminate against Japanese. It was believed that all three of these points would be approved by the Japanese Government; that the first would be acceptable to the anti-Japanese advocates in America but that the second and third would not be acceptable to them. Senators Johnson of California and Borah of Idaho promptly announced their vehement opposition. The report still slumbers in official archives. Whether, if such a treaty had been drafted, the President would have submitted it to the Senate, and whether, in that event, the Senate would have ratified it, who knows? The outlook for a solution of the pending problems along these lines is not bright.

But all these causes of strain paled before the Selective Immigration Act passed by the American Congress in 1924. It dealt with the whole question of immigration from all coun-

tries, which admittedly needed regulation, and fixed the annual quota of immigrants from each country at two per cent of the nationals of each country who were reported in the United States by the census of 1890. This provision was to run until June 30, 1927 (in February, 1927, this date was changed to June 30, 1928), after which the quotas are to be reapportioned on the basis of national origins, under which a total immigration of 150,000 per year is to be distributed proportionately among the different nations "in accordance with the proportion of the total representatives of the racial stock of that country to the total white population of the United States" at the census of 1920. Exempted classes are students of eighteen years of age and over who come with proper credentials to approved schools in the United States, travelers for temporary residence, merchants, clergymen, and immigrants "previously lawfully admitted to the United States and returning from a temporary visit abroad."

This would have been unobjectionable to Japan if the quota of Japanese immigrants had been determined on the same basis as the quotas of other nationalities. Unfortunately, the Act excluded Asiatics who under existing law were ineligible to citizenship. While this clause applied equally to Japan, China, and India, every one knew that it was aimed at Japan. To make matters worse, the Act abrogated "the Gentlemen's Agreement" of 1907. The Government of Japan was known to be willing to consider any reasonable modification of the Agreement which the American Government might desire; but a brusque abrogation without consultation was deemed insulting.

While the bill was pending in the House of Representatives, Charles E. Hughes, then Secretary of State, in a letter dated February 8, 1924, to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration, frankly declared that "the restrictions of the proposed measure, in view of their application under the definition of 'immigrants,' are in conflict with treaty provisions"; that "there can be no question that such a statutory

exclusion will be deeply resented by the Japanese people"; that "it would be idle to insist that the provision is not aimed at the Japanese"; that "the Japanese are a sensitive people and unquestionably would regard such a legislative enactment as fixing a stigma upon them"; that "such legislative action would largely undo the work of the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments which so greatly improved our relations with Japan"; that "the manifestation of American interest and generosity in providing relief to the sufferers in the recent earthquake disaster in Japan would not avail to diminish the resentment which would follow the enactment of such a measure, as this enactment would be regarded as an insult not to be palliated by any act of charity." Similar protests were made by many missionary and other organizations and by thousands of individual Americans. But the politicians in Congress were deaf to all protests.

Fuel was added to the flame by a well meant but unfortunate protest by the Japanese Ambassador in Washington, Mr. Hanihara, who, in a letter which became public, intimated that grave consequences might ensue. This, so far from sobering the advocates of the bill, was sharply resented as a threat. Passion ran high and the bill was passed. Hope was entertained that the President would veto it, especially as it was assumed that the Secretary of State would not have written such a letter to the Chairman of the House Committee on Immigration without his approval. But while he expressed regret that the Act included the objectionable sections, he felt that as a whole it was so essential to the proper regulation of immigration from many lands that he could not wisely veto it and he therefore affixed his signature.

The apprehensions of the Secretary of State and of all other well-informed men were quickly realized. Japanese resentment was strong and found prompt and emphatic expression. A veritable storm of anger swept over Japan. All Americans in the Empire were made to feel it, and for a time their position was extremely uncomfortable. Popular indignation

became so hot that every American interest in the country was jeopardized and, in some instances, personal violence was threatened. But the Imperial Government did its best to restrain overt acts, and the storm of anger gradually subsided.

Missionaries were involved in the general wave of anti-American feeling, and a few even feared that missionary work in Japan was irretrievably ruined. But the Japanese soon discovered that the missionaries and their supporting boards and constituencies in America deeply deplored the Act of Congress. Representatives of the mission boards, at a meeting in New York June 13, 1924, unanimously adopted a declaration "deploping the recent action of Congress" as "discriminatory," "unnecessarily offensive to a friendly nation," and "misrepresenting the friendly and Christian sentiment of the people of the United States."

The Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America, December 11, 1925, adopted a declaration to the same effect. These and similar resolutions by other bodies and the outspoken protests of the secretaries of missionary boards were widely published in Japan and made a favourable impression. Intelligent Japanese knew that the missionaries were rendering an unselfish service for Japan and that it would be folly to penalize it and the missionaries who were their best friends because thoughtless or reckless politicians in the United States had done a grievous wrong. Indeed when the anti-American demonstrations were at their height, Japanese in several cities called upon the American missionaries and assured them that they were not the objects of the popular indignation, that they should go on with their work as usual, and that they would not be molested.

Missionaries have therefore continued their work, but they are conscious of a definite change of attitude toward America. It would be a mistake to suppose that the subsidence of popular manifestations of anger indicates any lessening of resentment on the part of the Japanese. Some defenders of the law have indeed asserted that the Japanese have acquiesced in the

Act of Congress; that they deprecate any further agitation on the subject; and that the controversy would die out if it were not kept alive by missionary interests in America against the judgment of the Japanese themselves.

This is directly contrary to the opinion of men who are in a position to speak from personal knowledge, as the following recent statements testify: Dr. Rudolf B. Teusler, Director of St. Luke's International Hospital, Tokyo:

"Although there is not so much public discussion, there remains throughout the whole Japanese Empire widespread dissatisfaction and a feeling of resentment against the United States. The enactment of the Japanese exclusion clause has undoubtedly injured our business relations with Japan, the work of Christian missions, and the feeling of friendship and confidence in the United States which was increasing with very satisfactory momentum previous to the passing of the Immigration Act. The Japanese do not forget. They feel that they have been treated in an unfair and very ungenerous way, and until this feeling is removed it constitutes a direct obstacle to more friendly feelings between Japan and the United States."

The Rev. William Axling, D. D., an American Baptist missionary in Japan for twenty-five years:

"There has been no change whatever in the attitude of Japanese leaders toward that law, no sign that they are becoming reconciled to it. In a two-hour conference with an important group of Japan's foremost citizens some frankly said that America's present imperialistic attitude is the most outstanding problem of the Pacific. Practically all present spoke and indicated that while they are exercising marvelous self-control the wound inflicted by the exclusion law has in no way healed and does not give promise of healing."

Mr. J. Merle Davis, born in Japan, for many years Y. M. C. A. Secretary in Tokyo and now Executive Secretary of the Institute of Pacific Relations:

"The Exclusion Act dealt a sorer wound than the earthquake

to Japan. Time, hard work and heavy taxes will heal the scars of the one, but the other wound cannot heal as long as Japanese nature remains what it is. The situation is accepted with outward calm, but with inward heartburning and revolt. I heard the same phrase repeatedly from Japanese of different types and interests: 'You may think that the exclusion question is settled, but it is not settled for us Japanese and never will be settled until it is settled right.'"

The Rev. David B. Schneder, D. D., for a quarter of a century President of the North Japan College, Sendai:

"Is there any plan under consideration that will tend to satisfy the Japanese people? I ask because I am really concerned. There is developing a 'psychology,' especially among the more intelligent people, that will produce increasing coolness toward America. . . . It is a serious situation. Of one thing I am sure, and that is that the hostile feeling aroused by the exclusion measure will not die out; it may slumber, but whenever anything special occurs, it will reassert itself."

The Japan Mission Council of the Methodist Episcopal Church adopted a resolution which included the following:

"Since it is sometimes asserted that the Japanese people have now accepted the situation created by the American immigration legislation of 1924 and that whatever feeling of dissatisfaction still exists is due to . . . the attitude of American missions in Japan and to the continued discussion promoted by the Federal Council of Churches of Christ in America; and since it has also been reported that American sentiment in Japan is opposed to the further agitation of the immigration matter, we declare that resentment is not diminishing. Missionaries are not agitating to keep alive among the Japanese the grief and indignation which they have been feeling. On the contrary, we have been able somewhat to assuage indignation with the assurance that whatever of unfairness has entered into American legislation will surely be rectified in time when the situation and the implication of these laws are more thoroughly understood. . . . Some remedy for this un-American and un-Christian attitude should be sought."

The testimony of men like these, long resident in Japan, familiar with the Japanese people and language, reading the vernacular newspapers, and mingling with men and women of all classes, may safely be set over against the unsupported assertions of anti-Japanese agitators in America with whom the wish is father to the thought. If, however, missionary disinterestedness is questioned, let representative Japanese speak for themselves.

In an editorial July 1, 1926, entitled "After Two Years," in the Osaka *Mainichi*, a daily paper with a circulation exceeding a million copies, the editor declared:

"July 1 is the day which gave Japan an unpleasant impression and disgraced the honour of the United States. It was this day in 1924 that the Immigration Law containing Japanese exclusion clauses of the United States came into force. The pain is becoming more and more acute as time goes on. Japan and her people will never forgive nor forget the insult and injustice to which they have been subjected. The immigration question is not a problem of statistics. The honour and prestige of this Empire are involved in it. However great material profits may be proffered us and however friendly America may become, Japan and the Japanese will not be enticed to exchange justice for these worldly things. International democracy, which Japan has persistently pursued since the restoration of Meiji, will not permit her to be humiliated by disgraceful discrimination."

Viscount Shibusawa, long known for his friendly sentiments toward America, said, in an interview published in the *Baltimore Sun*, April 24, 1926:

"While the original affront to Japan was bad enough, the assumption in America that the passage of time has wiped out the sting for Japan is worse. A proud and sensitive people are doubly offended when it is assumed that they can so easily forget what seems a direct and personal attack. . . . Of late years the Japanese belief that the United States is above all else a nation standing for international justice has been severely strained. The resentment

aroused in my country has done much to wipe out the memory of past friendships. And it is well to realize that this resentment is as strong now as when the Immigration Act was passed. It has been a hard blow for those of us who are eager to cement even more firmly the bonds between the two nations. Fortunately the damage done is not and must not be irreparable; but it is for the United States to ameliorate the situation. We cannot take the lead. The objection is primarily to the phrasing of legislation in such a form as to make the recognition of a difference appear to the Japanese like a public definition of inferiority."

Mr. Fletcher S. Brockman, Secretary of the International Committee of the Young Men's Christian Association, and Dr. James H. Franklin, Secretary of the American Baptist Board of Foreign Missions, on their return from visits to Japan in June, 1926, and April, 1927, respectively, stated that Viscount Shibusawa had made statements to the same effect to them. Dr. William Axling adds: "Viscount Shibusawa was greatly disturbed over the fact that you (an American correspondent) should even have raised the question as to whether the Japanese were becoming reconciled. He expressed the fear lest the self-restrained attitude on the part of the Japanese concerning this matter should be misunderstood even by their best American friends."

Baron K. Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, in an address at the reopening of the Imperial Diet, January 21, 1926, declared that the Government's views regarding the clause in the United States Immigration Act barring Japanese was unchanged, the Government regretting the Act, which "seems irreconcilable with the rules of international comity and justice." In an address to the Diet a year later, January, 1927, he said: "I regret that the question of discriminatory treatment involved in the United States Immigration Act of 1924 remains unadjusted."

At a conference with Dr. James H. Franklin in Tokyo, April 4, 1927, and in reply to his question whether Japanese resentment had abated, the following opinions were expressed:

Viscount Kaneko:

"Japanese people can never forget the injustice and inhumanity of Americans as long as this discrimination lasts. If there were any Japanese who may say that Japanese people have already forgot the soreness once felt, he is a very shallow-minded observer of the time spirit. The reason why our people are maintaining a calm attitude on the question is simply because they are desirous to see this question solved through a peaceful method, making every possible effort to press down a radical movement. Even now, it would be an easy matter to cause people to rise in mass if we speak out against this Immigration Law."

Dr. J. Soyeda:

"Our silence is largely due to the desire on our part to solve this immigration question peacefully, depending as to the method of solution on the good offices of our American friends whose advice to us has been to keep silence and behave patiently. If some of us break our silence there is no telling what nation-wide anti-American uprising may take place."

Dr. I. Nitobe:

"The Immigration Law deeply hurt the feelings of Japanese people. For my part, I shall never again set my feet on American soil as long as the Law remains in the present form, not because I hate America but because I am banned. This is the feeling of many intelligent Japanese."

What would remedy the wrong and satisfy the Japanese? Simply the extension to Japanese immigration of the quotas in the Selective Immigration Act of 1924. Japan asks no exceptional treatment whatever, only what America accords to European nations. If this were done, the annual quota of immigrants from Japan who could be admitted to the United States would be 146 a year till July 1, 1928, after which the revised quota, if applied to Japan, would admit 150 Japanese.

It is amazing and humiliating that any Americans are willing to insult a friendly nation and jeopardize their country's relations with it merely to keep 150 Japanese a year out of the United States. It is urged that if the principle of the quota were extended to Japan, it would have to be to China and India. This does not necessarily follow. But if it did, what of it? Only the minimum quotas of one hundred from each country could then enter. Could anything be more ridiculous than the attempt to make a mountain of danger to a nation of 118,000,000 people out of such a mole-hill of fact?

Is there any prospect that the principle will be extended, at least to the Japanese? Dr. Schneder is not the only one who is anxiously asking this question. It may as well be frankly admitted that Congress as it is now constituted will do nothing. We do not believe that the average congressman is at all concerned about the immigration of 150 Japanese, but the great political parties are so nearly balanced that a comparatively small change of votes may mean success or failure at the polls. As for the people of California, some citizens of that State deny that there is as much Japanese sentiment there as agitators allege. Dr. Tyler Dennett estimates that only 20 per cent are really anti-Japanese, that an equal number are pro-Japanese, and that 60 per cent are indifferent. Anti-Japanese propagandists, however, have succeeded in convincing party leaders that the vote of California would be affected by a re-opening of the question of Japanese immigration. Politicians vividly remember that California turned the scale in the Wilson-Hughes campaign, and they are therefore mortally afraid of any measure that might affect another election. This may account, in part at least, for the small opposition in Congress to the objectionable clause in the Immigration Act of 1924, and for the unwillingness of present-day politicians to do anything that might alienate California votes. And so a matter of international justice and honour is subordinated to local partisan politics.

Whatever may be the chances of reconsideration, the people

of Japan should understand that a majority of the Christian people of America profoundly deplore the action of Congress. This does not mean that they favour unrestricted immigration. They do not. Neither do the Japanese. But immigration is not the question at issue. The real issue is whether the question should be amicably and courteously adjusted by negotiations between the two countries instead of being brusquely and insultingly handled as Congress handled it. An educational campaign to develop public sentiment on this subject requires time, and it would be unwise to give the Japanese the impression that it will succeed in the near future. But we have confidence in the ultimate fairness and good sense of the American people. The Commission on International Justice and Goodwill of the Federal Council of the Churches of Christ in America, the American Council of the World Alliance for Promoting International Friendship Through the Churches, the Church Peace Union, the American Committee on American-Japanese Relations, the missionary boards of many denominations, various other agencies and many individual men and women are not disposed to be silent until a grievous wrong has been righted.

It is interesting to note the repercussion of the Immigration Law in other parts of Asia. Dr. E. Stanley Jones of India writes:

“Nothing spoke louder to that whole eastern world than the recent action of Congress in passing the ill-advised and unchristian Immigration Law. I wish America could see what she did in that bit of hasty legislation. Up to that time America held the moral leadership of the East. It was a moral asset to be an American. . . . In one moment by this Immigration Law we renounced the leadership that was in our hands. We talk as if this were a Japanese problem, but India and China are put in the same position as Japan. . . .

“The fact is that the East is not keen to flood America. I was talking to an Indian official, the vice-president of the Legislative Assembly. He said: ‘We do not care how many of our people go

to America. We do not want them to go, but we do not want them nationally insulted if they do go.'

" . . . I go back to the East with a heavy heart, knowing that I shall have to apologize for the attitude of the land of my birth to the land of my adoption. I shall meet it in every public meeting at question time, in nearly every personal conversation and in the changed attitude of sullen indifference. This legislation has broken our arms as we stretch them out in friendliness and good-will toward the nations of the East."¹

It should be noted that Japanese laws do not discriminate against Americans in Japan. Foreigners of all nationalities alike are eligible to citizenship. Aliens may lease property for 999 years. While they cannot hold title in their own names, they can hold it through a juridical person composed of not less than five persons all of whom may be aliens. But the point is not the right to own or lease land but discrimination between nationalities, denying to some what is given to others. Japanese laws are strict but they apply equally to residents of all nations. American laws do not. Hence the grievance.

An ordinance promulgating a new Japanese alien land law was issued in Tokyo, November 3, 1926, to take effect on November 10, since which date all foreign nationals without exception are permitted to own land in Japan, except in areas designated "necessary for national defense." This law, as passed by the Diet in the Spring of 1925, contained a clause which left it optional to the Government to bring into effect an Imperial Rescript placing foreigners on a reciprocal basis so that American citizens of states where Japanese subjects are prevented from owning land would be deprived of such rights in Japan. The ordinance issued November 3 promulgating the law was not accompanied by this optional rescript. Whether the Government will yet issue it remains to be seen. If it should, the American Government would have no right to complain. But it would be unfortunate if Japan were to punish friendly Americans in Japan for discriminatory legis-

¹ *The Christ of the Indian Road*, pp. 108-112.

lation in a few western states in America which is as much deplored by most of the Americans in Japan as by the Japanese themselves.

It may be noted in passing that the bill authorizing Japanese in other countries to expatriate themselves was introduced into the Japanese Diet before the American Congress had abrogated "The Gentlemen's Agreement" in the manner which gave such just offense to the Japanese.

A Japanese in the consular service told me December 17, 1925, that the Japanese consulates in America had recently received instructions that when a Japanese child is born in the United States it is not considered a subject of Japan unless the parents register the child at a Japanese consulate within two weeks. If they do not do so within that period, the child is not regarded as a Japanese subject and the only way it can become a citizen of Japan is to go through the process of naturalization, which is permitted to any Japanese over the age of seventeen. To my question what proportion of the Japanese children born in this country are so registered, the reply was that the number is unknown since there is no record of those that do not register. The United States census of 1920 gave 111,000 as the total number of Japanese in America, but the present number is believed to be about 150,000. The law has reduced immigration to such narrow limits that the chief increase now is by birth. Five thousand Japanese children are said to be born in California every year, and the total number of Japanese born in the United States is estimated at 50,000. Their status under American law is that of American citizens with the right to vote on reaching the age of twenty-one. Most of them, however, are now under twenty years of age. They form a good proportion of the 1,200 Japanese students in American colleges and universities. About one-fifth of these are in colleges on the Pacific Coast and four-fifths in eastern colleges. The one-fifth on the Pacific Coast are chiefly those who are born in America, but the four-fifths in the eastern colleges are nearly all from Japan. The pre-

ponderance in the East is partly due to the fact that, while Japanese students can enter the educational institutions on the Pacific Coast, they are reported to be socially ostracized, but in the eastern colleges there is no such ostracism. The eastern colleges are therefore naturally preferred by Japanese students.

One is glad to know, however, that American courts are not influenced by the race prejudice that sometimes sways legislative bodies. The son of a prominent Denver family was hanged, February 4, 1927, for killing a Japanese woman. When Japanese in the Hawaiian Islands appealed to the courts against a law passed in 1920 restricting the freedom of foreign language schools, the Federal District Court in Hawaii issued an injunction temporarily restraining its enforcement. The advocates of the law took their case to the Federal Circuit Court, which affirmed the action of the District Court. They then carried it to the Supreme Court of the United States which, in a decision handed down February 21, 1927, declared the law unconstitutional. Justice McReynolds, in delivering the unanimous opinion of the Court, said "that Japanese parents had a right to direct the education of their children without unreasonable restrictions and that the plan to bring foreign language schools under direct governmental control could not be sustained."

One is also glad to think of the unselfish contributions which many Americans have made to Japan. Dr. Guido Verbeck, whose eminent services were so gratefully recognized by the Imperial Government, although of Dutch birth, went from America. Dr. James C. Hepburn, physician, translator and lexicographer, gained to an extraordinary degree the esteem of all classes of people. A decoration, bestowed upon him on his ninetieth birthday "for services to spiritual and educational causes in Japan," was the Imperial crowning of a useful life. Dr. John C. Berry, a pioneer of modern medicine and a promoter of reforms, received appreciative recognition on various occasions and an Imperial decoration. John Hyde De Forest

manifested such understanding of the Japanese and advocated such an ideal of patriotism that he also was decorated by the Emperor. Among early educators, Captain L. L. Janes, of the United States Army, inspired a group of students known as the Kumamoto Band who became influential in both Church and State. Colonel Jerome D. Davis became a formative factor in the lives of many young Japanese. When the Japanese decided to create modern elementary schools, they looked to America as their model and invited David Murray of Rutgers College, New Brunswick, New Jersey, to lay the foundations of the system. Commissioners were sent to the United States to study our educational methods at first hand. Among these was Viscount Mori, who later became Minister of Education and one of the most influential men of his day. He formed a close attachment with Joseph Neesima, another American trained educator, and while in the Imperial Cabinet he repeatedly turned to him for counsel on educational policy. From early years the Government of Japan engaged Americans as teachers in its middle and higher schools. The total number has been well over four hundred. These American teachers have exerted a lasting influence upon a multitude of Japanese youth and demonstrated the intimate relations between education and moral values.

The prompt and generous relief which the American Government and people gave after the disastrous earthquake of 1923, and the munificent gift of \$2,000,000 by Mr. John D. Rockefeller, Jr., to restore the library of the Imperial University, made a very happy impression. A bequest of \$2,500 to the Imperial Academy, the establishment of scholarships for the interchange of students between Japan and America, and various other evidences of friendly feeling might be cited. The Dolls' Festival of Japanese girls, an annual event in which the whole nation joyously participates, was signalized in 1927 by the presentation of 12,641 beautiful dolls given by the children of the United States to the children of Japan. The misgivings of some Americans, as to whether such a gift

would be appreciated from a people whose government had offensively discriminated against Japan in the Selective Immigration Act, were effectively dispelled when the dolls were publicly received by the Minister of Education in a memorable official function. The dolls were then distributed by the government among the girls of the kindergarten and primary schools amid many manifestations of delighted interest on the part of parents as well as children. The Vice-Minister of Education, Mr. Matsuura, wrote:

“ The scene of the presentation of the American dolls . . . by small children of both countries was very touching and beautiful. Forty-nine sweet American girls, each carrying a doll in her arms, came out on the platform and handed the dolls over to as many of the Japanese children, who came in from the opposite entrance. Miss Betty Ballantine, daughter of the American Consul-General in Tokyo, addressed the Japanese children with a message of friendship; and Miss Yukiko Tokugawa, granddaughter of Prince Tokugawa, thanked her on behalf of the Japanese children. The American children sang a doll song in English, while Japanese girls sang a welcome to your dolls in Japanese. . . . The large hall was crowded with guests. The presence of seven of Their Imperial Highnesses was a great honour to us. Besides, there were Mr. Okada, our Minister of Education, Baron K. Shidehara, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Marquis Komura, Baron Y. Sakatani, Governors Hiratsuka and Ikeda of Tokyo and Kanagawa prefectures, and other high officials. The reception was a great success, which reflects that your noble project is warmly appreciated by us all. It is my firm belief that this kind of thing will bring better understanding and warmer friendship between the nations of America and Japan.”

That these, and other letters to the same effect, were more than merely polite expression of thanks is evident from their character and also from a letter of the American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Charles MacVeagh, who wrote to Dr. Gulick: “ The effect of the doll messengers to Japan was very profound. The project was one of the most valuable expressions of national good feeling which I have ever met.” The Japanese

gave further evidence of their appreciation by sending to America fifty-eight dolls beautifully arrayed in court attire of silken garments, with miniature ceremonial tea drinking outfits and other accessories. One of them, nearly three feet in height, the gift of Princess Teru a daughter of the Emperor, was valued at \$350. The others, valued at \$200 each, were given by 2,610,000 girls in the kindergarten and elementary schools. Every one of the forty-seven prefectures was represented in the collection, six of the dolls being named for the largest cities of the Empire and one each for Korea and Formosa. They were brought to America by M. Sekiya, Director of the Government Bureau of General Education, arriving in San Francisco November 25, 1927, and were exhibited in several cities. The delight of American children and the appreciation of their parents can be better imagined than described.

Prominent among American expressions of good-will toward Japan is the missionary work in Japan, whose unselfish character and helpful purpose are recognized by all intelligent and unprejudiced men whether they are personally interested in it or not. It is therefore germane to the present discussion to note that of the 1,250 Protestant missionaries in Japan, 981 are Americans, high types of American Christian character and culture, men and women who have the confidence of the Japanese and who are exerting large influence for good. For the maintenance of missionary work in Japan American missionary societies are contributing over \$3,000,000 annually, and their property investments for schools, churches, land and residences aggregate over \$6,000,000. Japanese testimonials to the beneficent character of this missionary work have been numerous and emphatic, as we shall note in a later chapter.

Mr. Cyrus E. Woods, who was American Ambassador to Japan 1923-1924, publicly said, April 27, 1927: "Our missionaries in the Far East are, of course, preaching the Gospel of Christ; but they are also doing an important work in addition to that. They are the true interpreters of American thought to those who have no means of understanding it

otherwise. They are the real American ambassadors. When China becomes stabilized they will be more necessary there than ever before. Our Japanese Exclusion Act has made them very essential in Japan."

We of course recognize the large influence for good which has been exerted in Japan by men and women of other nationalities, notably by the British and other Europeans. It would be absurd to claim that Americans alone deserve credit for every helpful contribution that foreigners have made to Japan. But at a time when so much criticism of America is rife in Japan and so much criticism of Japan is rife in America, and when so many civilian busybodies and militaristic jingoes are industriously trying to create ill-will between the two peoples, it may not be amiss to call attention to the fact that American Christians have done and are doing a great work for Japan from purely altruistic motives.

XIV

THE WAR BOGEY

FOR years there has been a belief in Europe and the Far East, and among some people in the United States, that war between America and Japan is inevitable. Some of the prophecies belong to the category of thoughts that are fathered by a wish. Those who fear and dislike the Japanese are eager to see some nation fight her, and have selected America as the one which they would like to have undertake the task. Men who have a financial interest in promoting war scares, and politicians who are looking for opportunities to attract attention to themselves "patriotically" declaim about "the Japanese Peril." Strongly as every sane man must deplore agitation of this sort, it would be foolish to shut our eyes to its possibilities of mischief. Wars are seldom caused by rational motives. The questions in dispute between Japan and America are susceptible of solution by peaceful methods, but disputes between nations easily become complicated by jealousies and suspicions until that intangible but tremendously potent force euphemistically termed "national honour" becomes involved on one or both sides, and then reason disappears in the flaming fires of passion.

Perhaps we should not attach conclusive weight to the public utterances of government officials in either country. This is not because they do not know the facts, but because their position compels them to put forth reassuring sentiments whether they accord with the facts or not. He must be a credulous student of international relations who innocently imagines that a government would prematurely precipitate hostilities by publicly saying that war was in prospect. The history of diplomatic relations shows that down to the firing

of the first gun, official declarations abound in high-sounding sentences about "the friendly intentions of my Government and the distinguished consideration which the courteous proposal of Your Excellency's note will promptly receive?" etc. We must therefore look for the broad underlying facts of the situation which make for war or peace.

Beginning with our own country, even the critics usually credit the people of the United States with peaceful intentions toward Japan. Americans are eager to extend their influence in the Pacific seas, but they are after dollars, not territory. The Philippines came into their possession as an unforeseen incident in a war with Spain, and were in no sense either the object or the occasion of the war. In spite of a certain swagger and temper, the American people are not disposed to rush into actual hostilities with any nation. A certain Congressman talked himself hoarse in warning his countrymen of the dire consequences to which they were exposed from Japanese designs; but the country listened with languid amusement. The average American is convinced that such a conflict could bring absolutely nothing that he wants but only things that he does not want. I venture the assertion that the militarists who talk most confidently of war have no idea of attacking Japan. Their only thought is that Japan may attack America.

Nor does Japan want war with the United States. She wishes to pay off her debts, strengthen her financial position, and develop her manufactures and foreign trade. Friendly America is valuable to her as a source of supplies for raw material and a profitable market for manufactured goods. Nearly all of Japan's exported tea is sold in America, ninety-five per cent of her exported raw silk, and an important part of other products. More than one-third of Japan's total exports go to the United States. She buys from us, too, many supplies that she requires, twenty-five per cent of her imports coming from America, a higher proportion than from any other country. She has largely developed her cotton-manufactures, and she depends upon the United States for the best grades

of raw cotton. Her soldiers in the Russia-Japan War ate beef from Chicago and bread from Minneapolis flour. Hostilities with America would destroy this trade, and might result in conditions which would prevent a resumption of it on the scale that it is now attaining. Therefore Japan, like England, desires a peace that will leave her mercantile marine an undisturbed ocean pathway. Nor does Japan overlook the fact that the United States is now the greatest reservoir of capital in the world. Japan needs money. Europe, impoverished and exhausted by war, cannot supply it; America can.

Japan values, too, her friendship with Great Britain. It is her largest asset in international affairs. Would Great Britain support her in a war with America? Japan knows quite well that she would not, and that it would be highly imprudent to run the risk of alienating such an invaluable ally. Moreover, Japan needs time and freedom for matters that engage her attention nearer home. Korea, Formosa, and China present problems and anxieties that cannot be evaded. The Japanese know that they have formidable competitors in several European Powers, that it will be no easy task to bring the millions of Koreans into a state of mind that will keep them quiet in the event of another war, and that the Chinese are increasingly jealous of them. They well understand that in their struggle with Russia they were victorious by a very narrow margin; that President Roosevelt's intervention brought peace just when they had reached their maximum of effort, and that they had a powerful support in the sympathy of most of the western nations which they probably would not have again. Having attained her present political ambition, Japan is not inclined to jeopardize it unnecessarily by the uncertainties of another war.

Military difficulties, too, should not be left out of account. Grant that Japan, which can keep her movements secret as America cannot, could land an army on our Pacific coast before our government could mobilize either a fleet or a military force to prevent it. How could Japan feed and maintain that

army at fighting size after it got there? The best army in the world, separated from its base of supplies by 4,500 miles of ocean, would be in a plight to which such wise generals as the Japanese, daring as they are, would be slow to subject themselves.

Americans finally came to the conclusion that they ought to have the Hawaiian Islands, and it would not be surprising if in time the Japanese come to feel that, for similar reasons, they ought to have the Philippines. But the conditions are hardly parallel, for the Hawaiian Islands did not belong to another friendly nation, and the ruling class was composed of men of American blood and speech who had been seeking annexation for many years. Whatever deeper causes might have led to annexation, the immediate cause was pressure from the Islands themselves, to which the American Government, after much hesitation, finally yielded. The Philippine Islands are alien to Japan in both government and people, and could only be taken by force in a great war. Japan has no notion of taking them in that way. It is true that the Philippines are so close to Japan that the Japanese might plead almost as vital an interest in them as Americans plead in the West Indies. It is also true that Japan could take the Philippines at any time, for the American military and naval force in the archipelago is entirely inadequate for such a contingency. Thanks to republican institutions, the Washington government could not make the preparations that would be required to hold the archipelago against attack, without a publicity and duration of congressional debates which would advertise its purpose to the world months before adequate action could be taken. Meantime, Japan has the troops, the ships for transports, the naval vessels to escort them, and the ability to act with promptness and secrecy which would enable her to have half a million soldiers in the Philippines before the United States could know anything about the expedition. If war should break out from other causes, doubtless the first act of Japan would be the occupation of the Philippines, just as her

first act in the war with Russia was the occupation of Korea. Nor would the occupation of the Hawaiian Islands be a very difficult task, since forty-four per cent of the population of the islands is now Japanese, including a large proportion of men. But we are confident that Japan has no such intentions and that there will be no war if Americans keep their senses.

The Japanese, in spite of their martial spirit, are not as eager to fight other nations as their critics are wont to allege. Japan has had comparatively few foreign wars. Indeed she had none at all between her invasion of Korea in the sixteenth century and her war with China at the end of the nineteenth. For the last three hundred years, during which Europe and America were repeatedly convulsed by bloody strife, Japan had no internal revolution of any importance, except the necessary conflict which resulted in the overthrow of the Shogun, the fall of feudalism, and the rise of modern Japan. Japan did not begin hostilities against Russia until she had been humiliated and endangered and goaded for years in ways that no western nation would have tolerated. Then Japan fought as a last resort after every other means had been exhausted. It would be absurd to represent the Japanese as a meek and gentle people. They have clearly shown their ability to take care of themselves against all comers. When they did begin to fight Russia, they continued in a fashion which should make other nations think twice before pushing them into war again. We must remember, too, that their comparative isolation until recent years exempted them from most of the occasions for international complications to which the more closely related European peoples are constantly exposed. But making all due allowance for these considerations, the historic fact remains that the Japanese, with all their undoubted genius for war, have not shown a disposition to go into it for light reasons.

At the famous Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments in Washington in 1921 the Japanese delegates entered whole-heartedly into the discussions and concurred in the agreement that was made. The Japanese Government approved it



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and loyally carried it out in every particular, although it involved the scrapping of some of its formidable battleships. When, in February, 1927, President Coolidge invited the major powers to attend another conference at Geneva to negotiate an agreement for the limitation of armament in the classes of naval vessels that were not covered by the Washington treaty, Japan promptly accepted in a note which included the following fine statement: "The Japanese Government fully shares with the American Government the views expressed in that memorandum on the desirability of an agreement calculated to complete the work of the Washington Conference for the prevention of competitive naval building. It cordially welcomes the initiative taken by the American Government for the institution among the five powers of negotiations looking to such desirable end. It will be happy to take part in these negotiations through their representatives invested with full powers to negotiate and to conclude an agreement on the subject."

During the serious disturbances in China in 1927, when the Nationalist and Northern armies were contending for the mastery and all foreign interests, including Japanese, were disastrously affected, properties destroyed and lives sacrificed, when several foreign newspapers and many European and American business men were strenuously insisting on forcible intervention, which some governments were understood to be disposed to make, the Japanese Government, although having large interests at stake, scrupulously refrained from aggressive action. Cynics remarked that this was simply good politics with a view to the enhanced influence in China which it would give Japan when peace was restored. But if such a wise and conciliatory course was good politics for the Japanese it was equally good for other governments. It is significant of Japan's pacific disposition that her Government was as careful as was the American Government to avoid any attempt to take advantage of the tumult in China to further her own interests.

It is a particularly hopeful sign that peace sentiment in Japan is strong among students. There are twenty-seven organized chapters of the League of Nations Association in the colleges and universities, and thousands of the young men and women who will be among the nation's leaders in the next generation are committed to the policy of settling international disputes at Geneva instead of on the battlefield.

The American missionaries resident in Japan are in a position to know the attitude of the people. In 1907, when sensational newspapers in America were frantically predicting a Japanese attack upon the United States, one hundred and ten missionaries in Japan, representing more than twenty American Christian organizations, and residing in all sections of the Empire, published the following statement:

"As Americans residing in Japan, we feel bound to do all that is in our power to remove misunderstandings and suspicions which are intended to interrupt the long standing friendship between this nation and our own. Hence we wish to bear testimony to the sobriety, sense of international justice, and freedom from aggressive designs exhibited by the great majority of the Japanese people, and to their faith in the traditional justice and equity of the United States. Moreover, we desire to place on record our profound appreciation of the kind treatment which we experience at the hands of both government and people; our belief that the alleged 'belligerent attitude' of the Japanese does not represent the real sentiments of the nation; and our ardent hope that local and spasmodic misunderstandings may not be allowed to affect in the slightest degree the natural and historic friendship of the two neighbours on opposite sides of the Pacific."

At the semicentennial celebration of Protestant missions in Japan, October, 1909, a resolution was unanimously adopted which included the following sentences:

"While the Government and people of Japan have maintained a general attitude of cordial friendship for the United States, there has sprung up in some quarters of the latter country a spirit of dis-

trust of Japan. . . . In this day of extensive and increasing commingling of races and civilizations, one of the prime problems is the maintenance of amicable international relations. Essential to this are not only just and honest dealings between governments but also, as far as practicable, the prevention as well as the removal of race jealousy and misunderstanding between the peoples themselves. False or even exaggerated reports of the customs, beliefs or actions of other nations are fruitful causes of contempt, ill-will, animosity, and even war. If libel on an individual is a grave offence, how much more grave is libel on a nation."

But let us have an end of the absurd talk that Japan dare not fight because she knows that she would be committing suicide if she did. She knows nothing of the kind and, if she did, the knowledge would not deter her a minute. Any one who understands the Japanese temperament knows that a Japanese never takes danger into account when he believes that the honour of his country is involved. No other people in the world so readily sacrifice their lives. This spirit pervades the whole Japanese nation. Japan did not hesitate to fight Russia when she was much weaker than she is today, and when she believed that Russia was much stronger than America is today. Americans should not lay the flattering unction to their souls that the Japanese are afraid of them. The Japanese are as calmly confident of their ability to fight any nation on earth as the most vainglorious American.

It is easy to say that the Japanese could not send over and maintain an army over here, but if that be true neither could the United States send over and maintain an army in Japan. The wildest jingo would not be wild enough to propose such a madcap undertaking. We do not believe that the Japanese will declare war, and we are sure that America will not. What Japan could say in substance would be: "Very well, since you will not treat our nationals in America with justice and satisfy our reasonable demands, we shall not go to America to fight you, but we shall shut you out of the Far East, and if you do not like it you can come over to our side and fight us."

Fair-minded Americans can help to ward off difficulties by refusing to countenance some of the reports that are current. It is true that there are ominous facts that cannot be denied. But something depends upon the way that facts are manipulated; as in the alphabet, the same letters may spell either lived or devil. Many of the common allegations regarding Japan are not facts at all. It is painful to note the credulity with which the wildest statements are received. For example, a metropolitan daily newspaper in the United States published an article whose truthfulness was said to be vouched for by "a ranking officer of the United States Army and a ranking officer of the United States Navy." This article declared that "there are 55,000 trained Japanese troops in the Philippines." As a matter of fact, the War Department of the United States Government reported the total Japanese population in the Philippines at that time as less than 8,000. Another statement was: "There are in the Hawaiian Islands 80,000 Japanese, all of whom have received army instructions and they know their duty." The census then gave the total Japanese population in the Hawaiian Islands as 89,715, of whom 24,881 were women, and 33,288 were children. "There are already 61,000 trained Japanese troops in California," said the article. There were at that time not as many Japanese as that in California, including men, women and children. Emphasizing the danger that the Japanese would seize the Hawaiian Islands, the writer said: "The Hawaiian Islands are only distant from San Francisco a few hours." Every schoolboy knows that they are distant five days. And yet such preposterous allegations as these were solemnly printed and widely quoted as illustrative of our alleged peril from a Japanese invasion.

Carl Crow, in his book entitled *Japan and America*, asserts that "Japan and the United States are champions of such opposing aims and interests" that "one of the two countries must recede from its present position." His closing chapter is entitled "Is Japan a Menace?" and he does not conceal his opinion that it is. He says that "the situation is much

the same as that which existed between England and Germany before the outbreak of the European War "; that " for every just cause of quarrel Germany had against England, Japan has half a dozen against us "; that in the Japanese vernacular there is " a steady outpouring of vilification and abuse of the United States "; and that " Japanese friendship for the United States exists only in the meaningless conventional phrases of diplomatic usage, in the propaganda of Japanese statesmen and American peace-at-any-price advocates, and in the wine-warmed sentiments of Japanese-American banquets."

Let us hope that the Japanese laugh with us at the Hawaiian canard and that they know Mr. Crow's animus too well to be disturbed by it. But what were they to think when the former commander-in-chief of the American Army publicly said that the military and naval program of Congress called for five million dollars a day for a year; when the Chairman of the House Committee on Military Affairs defended this huge expenditure by declaring that America must be prepared for war; when another congressman urged the strengthening of fortifications to guard against " the Yellow Peril "; when Rear Admiral John A. Rodgers, retired, declared in a widely published address that " if our successors remain a virile people as the world fills up, they will remain armed to take what they want at the expense of others, and that the United States would have to engage in imperialist conquests when its population passes the 200,000,000 mark "; and when some Californians and members of the American Legion openly asserted that since war must come, it had better come now while we have four million trained men who could quickly be called back to the ranks. Recklessly incendiary talk by jingoes? Yes, but so wars are made.

A naval officer told me that expectation of war with Japan is general among American army and navy officers. A prominent Japanese, in 1926, seriously asked an American visitor in Japan: " Is it true, as many Japanese believe, that America really intends to crush Japan? " The average American is

astonished by such a question. He has never dreamed of such a thing. But can one wonder that the Japanese were disturbed when they read the bellicose utterances of rear admirals of the American navy in public speeches and letters to the press? The fact that these officers were on the retired list did not minimize the significance of their opinions since the impression prevailed that they were simply more free to speak than when they were in active service.

What, too, were the Japanese to think when they read in their newspapers reports of the debates and newspaper discussions on the national defense act which became a law June 4, 1920; and that on June 8, 1921, the American Secretary of War, the Hon. John W. Weeks, in an address to the graduating class of New York University, after professing a desire for peace, declared that "under present conditions it would be the height of folly for the United States to be the first to disarm"; that "the time has come when this country must have a definite military policy"; that "in some parts of the world, there are developing large excesses of population requiring expansion of territory; that the future can only add to the requirements of nations for increased territory; and that there can be no assurance, notwithstanding our own disinterestedness and desire for peace, that our wealth will not be craved by others less fortunate."

The next day the newspapers throughout the country discussed this speech as a direct reference to possible war with Japan. Other nations assume that the public statements of cabinet ministers are authoritative, and such a pronouncement by a Secretary of War was naturally construed as ominous.

As if such a declaration was not enough, the Navy Department in 1924 announced plans for a great demonstration of America's naval power the following year in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands. The press not only in Japan but in Europe and the United States immediately interpreted this as a demonstration against Japan. To a veritable deluge of criticism, the Secretary of the Navy blandly replied that the Department

was simply carrying out plans for a maneuver that had long been in preparation and that was desirable in the interest of practice. In the strained relation that then existed between the United States and Japan, it was amazing that the Navy Department should blazon preparations for a huge demonstration of American warships in the Pacific Ocean whose only other naval power is Japan. One hardly knows whether to credit the plan to the sheer stupidity of thoughtless men or to a deliberate desire to serve notice on Japan that if she wanted to fight, America was ready, by jingo! If the object of the maneuvers was simply practice why was it not staged in the Atlantic Ocean or the Gulf of Mexico where it would not be interpreted in relation to Japan? In reply to the vigorous protests that were sent to the Government by many organizations and individuals, Mr. C. B. Slemph, then Secretary to the President, sent a statement of Admiral Okada of the Japanese navy to the effect that Japan was not in the least disturbed by the proposed maneuvers! One can imagine the impassive countenance of the Japanese Admiral when he made that diplomatic statement, and the grin of Mr. Slemph as he suavely quoted it.

Mr. Frank J. Hogan, chief counsel for the defense in the trial of Albert B. Fall and Edward L. Doheny for alleged conspiracy in connection with an oil lease, made the following ominous statement to the jury November 24, 1926:

"On December 5, 1921, Edwin Denby, Secretary of the Navy, held an important conference with high naval officers, pursuant to the news cabled from the Far East by Admiral Gleaves commanding the Asiatic Squadron, that the Japanese War Office had instructed the Japanese fleet with a view of attacking the United States, the first offence to be made against Hawaii. The report was guarded with such secrecy that even the request for copies was denied when called for by the United States District Court of Los Angeles."

The accuracy of this extraordinary charge was promptly challenged; but that it was soberly made by an eminent law-

yer in behalf of his clients, one of whom, Fall, was in 1921 Secretary of the Interior in the Cabinet of President Harding, made a sensation of the first magnitude. Whether the charge was true or false, European as well as Japanese critics believed it to be true and deemed the denials purely "diplomatic." This impression was strengthened when, on December 4, Captain John K. Robison stated on the witness stand:

"I had previously obtained from Mr. Denby authority to divulge, under pledge of secrecy, to Mr. Doheny on this occasion, or on the first favourable occasion, certain international conditions as they had been reported to us, which conditions I did in part disclose to Mr. Doheny at that time. . . . In trying to persuade Mr. Doheny to make a bid on the project for strengthening the fortifications at Pearl Harbour, I informed him of the sort of defense that it was necessary for us to accomplish in order to prevent the possibility of an invasion of the Pacific Coast."

The fact that on the very date of the alleged secret conference, December 5, 1921, another Cabinet Minister, the Honorable Charles E. Hughes, then Secretary of State, was participating in the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, to which he had made his famous proposals for peace, a Conference which President Harding had opened with warm expressions of friendliness, while leading many Americans to doubt Mr. Hogan's statement, led foreign observers to doubt the good faith of the American Government.

On the very day, January 29, 1927, that President Coolidge in Washington, in an address at the semi-annual meeting of the business organization of the government, said: "As a nation we are advocates of peace. Not only should we refrain from any act which might be construed as calling for competition in armament, but rather should we bend our every effort to eliminate forever any such competition. . . . Surely the best interests of all are found in directing to the channels of public welfare moneys which would otherwise be spent without reproductive results." On that very day, at a meeting of

the Republican Club in New York, two Major Generals, a Brigadier General, and a Rear Admiral deplored the weakness of the army and navy, demanded a policy of military and naval preparedness, and sharply criticised the "pernicious efforts" of those who opposed it. The Rear Admiral arraigned the peace movement as a process of "national emasculation," declared that war would come in fourteen years, condemned the Washington Conference at which "the United States relinquished her position of national security" and "was outwitted by Japan and England" in disregard of the warnings of the General Board of the Navy.

When one reflects that statements like these and many others of like tenor were promptly cabled to Japan and published in its newspapers, can one wonder that Dr. William Axling wrote: "I am constantly learning of expressions of conviction by responsible men that America is preparing for war with Japan. Many of these men are leaders in the peace movement. They believe that America will force the issue so that war cannot be avoided. They are thoroughly familiar with the growing military and naval policies and budgets of the United States and of the Reserve Officers' Training Corps."

The *Tokyo Mainichi*, one of the influential newspapers in Japan, commenting on the war-scare testimony in the Fall-Doheny trial in Washington and the testimony of Captain Robison concerning the strategic importance of the Pearl Harbour base as a factor in the oil reserve leasing policy, said in an editorial December 11, 1926:

"Since the lease was granted for the purpose of securing the navy's oil supply for an emergency in the Pacific in the same year as the Washington Conference, it now becomes plain that while the American Government was anxiously trying to have world naval armaments limited the American navy was trying to increase its strength in the form of an oil supply. Whatever may be said of the navy's position, there is no denying the fact that America was guilty of double-dealing in so far as the spirit in which the arms limitation conference was called is concerned. Although Japan will not by any means change

her attitude toward the limitation agreement, it is now up to America to make clear her position, especially as regards the meaning of the Pacific war peril as feared by American naval authorities. If Japan is really the object of a Pacific war peril we would like to know it for future reference."

The situation was further intensified when in the winter of 1927, the advocates of a strong navy launched a propaganda for ten new cruisers, and Congress, against the advice of President Coolidge insisted on an appropriation for the immediate construction of at least three of them. The arguments were the familiar ones of the peril of unpreparedness and the necessity for a larger navy for defense. Defense against what? What other nation on earth is likely to attack America? At a time when the world is war weary, when every consideration of statesmanship and humanity dictates the cultivation of the spirit of peace and international good-will, it is nothing less than wicked to foster suspicion and a sense of peril from an imaginary foe. One cannot year after year trumpet from the housetops the imperative need of military and naval preparedness, sharpen weapons of warfare, admire them and add to them without creating a war psychology, a chip on the shoulder disposition, which sooner or later, at some real or imaginary provocation, will demand bloody expression. President Nicholas Murray Butler of Columbia University well said:

"There could be no more inappropriate moment than this to talk about enlarging our naval forces. It makes no difference whether the ratio ought to be 5-5-3 or 5-5-3.9 or 5-4-3.2, this is not the time to talk about it. There is such a thing as a psychological moment, and now when the eyes of the world are fixed on what is to follow Locarno, how that is to be made permanent and built into the institutional and intellectual life of Europe, what could be more distressing, what more disheartening than to find the American Republic concerned, not with Locarno, but with the pre-war psychology of armaments. It suggests once more the recurring question which it is so difficult satisfactorily to answer: Can men learn?"¹

¹ Address, January 10, 1927.

That some officials could not learn was still further illustrated when, December 14, 1927, the Secretary of the Navy presented to Congress "a bill to provide for increase of the naval establishment" which called for four five-year programs of enlargement at a total cost of \$2,900,000,000. "Since the German naval law of 1897," commented Viscount Rothermere of London, "no such program of marine armaments has been launched in time of peace." The Secretary of War followed the startling proposal of his naval colleague by sending a letter to Congress, December 26, urging a law to encourage private factories to manufacture munitions, on the ground that the government plants could not turn out a sufficient supply in case of war! What war? "It is disheartening indeed," said President Butler December 31, "to find the Congress of the United States asked to defy all that is best and highest in our public opinion and to enter upon a policy of naval expenditure which, in the nature of the case, could only be a policy of waste at home and interpreted as a policy of threat abroad." Another representative American, George W. Wickersham, former Attorney General of the United States, declared January 3, 1928, that "the proposal that we have the greatest navy in the world is an appalling thing to come from the people of the United States. . . . We must give up the awful privilege of disturbing the world's peace."

Men like these voice the real attitude of the people of the United States. But so much talk of war naturally arouses suspicion in Japan. The sensational press in both countries has fanned the flame of prejudice. T. Kagawa, Japan's famous social worker, said after a visit to the United States that America "utterly fails to understand Japan; not a single newspaper reports Japanese affairs in a friendly spirit." Evidently he did not read some of our best newspapers. Journals like the *New York Times*, and several others that might be mentioned, are just and intelligent in their discussions of Japanese questions. But that many American papers have not dealt fairly with Japan and have thereby contributed

to misunderstanding and prejudice is unhappily true. It is also unhappily true that many newspapers in Japan do not report American affairs "in a friendly spirit" and thereby add their contribution to misunderstanding and prejudice.

We earnestly hope that our country will have no trouble with Japan over the immigration question. If we do, America will not be free from blame. American relations with Japan are undoubtedly in a sensitive state, but we believe with Dr. Scherer that "our Japanese problem will vanish into thin air if we substitute in dealing with it the spirit of the gentleman and statesman for that of the journalist one of whose writers was actually audacious enough to boast in a published book that his paymaster brought on the American war with Spain."¹ The Honorable Elihu Root, formerly Secretary of State, gives this significant testimony: "For many years I was very familiar with our own Department of Foreign Affairs. During that time there were many difficult, perplexing and doubtful questions to be discussed and settled between the United States and Japan. During all that period there never was a moment when the Government of Japan was not frank, sincere, friendly, and most solicitous not to enlarge but to minimize and do away with all causes of controversy."² Fair-minded people in both countries will concur in the fine statement of Dr. Inazo Nitobe that "it is not by mutual faultfinding or by exaggerating each other's peculiarities that we can arrive at understanding or appreciation. Not by antipathy but by sympathy, not by hostility but by hospitality, not by enmity but by amity, does one race come to know the heart of the other."

¹ *The Japanese Crisis*, pp. 63-64.

² Address, October 21, 1917.

XV

THE RELIGIONS OF JAPAN

THREE religions are now officially recognized in Japan. Christianity, the last of the three to enter the country, is discussed in other chapters. We now consider the others. Buddhism entered Japan from Korea 552 A. D. The new faith encountered opposition and spread slowly, but the Korean missionaries were persistent. By 684 a cabinet minister gave Buddhism distinction by building a chapel, appointing two Korean priests to minister in it, and encouraging his daughter to become a nun. After that Buddhism rapidly gained headway until it became the dominant religion of the country. As in China, it did not prevail in a pure form but was mingled with Confucian ancestor-worship and with a variety of beliefs and practices, many of them animistic, which made it a queer jumble of miscellaneous odds and ends of religious beliefs and customs. In reply to a question from a contributor, the editor of the *Rinri Koenshu* said: "Present-day Buddhism in Japan is very complex, and it is difficult to say in a word what its characteristics are."

To the eye of a visitor Buddhism in Japan appears strong. The Bureau of Religions, in the Government Department of Education, gives the number of Buddhists as 48,000,000 and the number of temples as 171,626. These temples are conspicuously in evidence. Some are noble in proportions and elaborate in ceremonies. The number of priests connected with these temples is reported to be 53,268. Many others are engaged in teaching, preaching, and other duties. Nuns are also numerous. The total number of priests and nuns is placed at 180,129—a great establishment indeed. Statues of Buddha are innumerable—statues sitting and reclining, statues of wood

and iron and stone and marble and bronze and alabaster, and of every conceivable size from tiny images that can be put in a vest pocket to the colossal figure at Kamakura, made in the year 1252, fifty feet in height, body of bronze and eyes of gold—

“ A statue solid-set
And moulded in colossal calm.”

In the “ dim religious light ” of the larger temples these huge figures (one I saw was 145 feet long and overlaid with thin sheets of pure gold), look down upon the worshipper with a solemn, majestic impassiveness, a timeless, unmoved calm which impress even a western traveler, and help him to understand in some measure the awe which these vast statues excite in the minds of the people.

Nara, with its spacious park and venerable trees and picturesque temple and huge Buddha, so impressed Phillips Brooks that he wrote: “ No one of all the world’s sacred places has so stirred my soul as has Nara.”

But a religion is supposed to be a moral force. Is Buddhism one? Whatever influence in purifying conduct it may ever have had has sadly dwindled. While it retained its temples and priests and external pomp, it became impotent from the viewpoint of vital faith and regenerative power. How widely modern Buddhism separates religion and conduct painfully appears in the attitude of its priests toward immorality. There are undoubtedly pure priests, and it would be grossly unjust to make an indiscriminate charge against the whole class; but there are some stubborn facts that cannot be successfully challenged. When, in 1916, Buddhist and Shinto leaders in Osaka were asked to coöperate in the effort to prevent the rebuilding of the vice district, which had been burned, they declined to do so, although some individual Japanese of these faiths gave hearty assistance. Indeed the head priest of a great Shinto shrine actually performed a ceremony of propi-

tiation over the grounds of the proposed new prostitute quarters. I was credibly informed that it is not uncommon to open a new resort of vice with religious ceremonies conducted by Buddhist priests, and that priests often visit brothels to collect alms from the inmates.

The neighbourhood of some of the large temples reeks with brothels, which are so numerous and whose inmates are so openly aggressive in soliciting men who are on their way to and from the temples that it is impossible to doubt that such juxtaposition to places of worship implies, if not direct connivance, at least absence of protest from the temple authorities and a conception of religion which sees no incongruity between Buddhist observances and houses of prostitution. "When the patriotic youth of new Japan, wishing to pay homage at the most fashionable shrines of Ise, are compelled to reach the spot by passing along a road lined on both sides with legalized brothels, it looks as if official encouragement to impurity was offered, or at least temptation was presented, to the rising generation."¹

One of the incidental but nevertheless interesting results of Christian missionary work in Japan is an attempt on the part of leading Buddhists to revive and purify their religion. This is partly due to the diffusion of the teachings of Christianity, in whose light the Buddhist leaders see more clearly the decay and moral weakness of their own faith, and are led to go back to its original teachings and to bring into new prominence some of the ethical precepts of its founders. A stronger motive is self-defense, for Christianity's doctrines and the standards of conduct which it inculcates compel Buddhism to undertake radical reforms or to give up altogether. The Japanese mind has begun to be less indifferent to religious questions, and signs of awakening and unrest are multiplying. Would-be reformers have sprung up and are advocating all sorts of religious vagaries. Doctor Anezaki, professor in the Imperial University, commented in 1917 upon the significant fact that

¹ Ernest W. Clement in *A Handbook of Modern Japan*, p. 167.

eight or ten new fanatical, superstitious movements were just budding out which had not been noticed by the public press.

Buddhist leaders became alarmed. They began to use the printing press, to distribute leaflets, and issue periodicals. They did not mince words in attempting to shame their people into activity. The first number of *Jiyu Bukkyo*, a Buddhist magazine which appeared in Kobe in October, 1916, frankly said in a leading editorial: "Buddhism is like a hotel near the railway but between stations. Once it was a famous hostelry, but the advent of the railway has left it stranded and the whole neighbourhood suffers from neglect. Even should a wayfarer drop in he will find no comfort, for the place is not able to renew its furnishings and it has become worn out and obsolete. Just so is Japanese Buddhism—passed by and ignored by modern progress and unable to afford spiritual refreshment. True, there are still some intellectuals, people like university professors, who profess Buddhism, but they are very few, the great majority of Buddhists being but blind followers of tradition. They do as their fathers did, being too ignorant to know what changes science has wrought in the world, while their tradition is so dead that it has no influence on their lives."

Buddhism in many lands has incorporated the ideas of other faiths as a sponge absorbs water, and Japanese Buddhism is no exception. The methods of Christianity have been freely borrowed. Recognizing the advantage of Sunday-schools, a fund of a million yen (\$500,000) was raised to establish them, and within a period of six months over 800 were started, with an enrolment of 120,000 children. The regulations for Sunday-schools, promulgated in 1914, include the following:

"Art. II. The aim of the Sunday-schools is to cultivate the character of the pupils according to the doctrine of our sect (Shin-shiu).

"Art. III. To attain the aim above mentioned, the Sunday-schools should make some connection with the primary schools and the

pupils' homes, and on Sunday give lessons on religion and morality. If local conditions allow, hand work and manners are to be taught besides.

"Art. IV. There shall be a superintendent in each Sunday-school, and the superior of a temple or a teacher only can take charge of it.

"Art. VII. Every school should make an educational report twice a year.

"Art. VIII. The expenses of the School shall be defrayed out of the contributions of the supporters and subscriptions to the local temple."

The extent of the copying of Christian material is curiously illustrated in the songs that are provided for these Buddhist Sunday-schools. Some of them are taken almost bodily from the Christian hymn-book—words, tune, meter, and chorus, the only change being the substitution of the name Buddha for Jesus and the omission of an occasional stanza whose Christian meaning cannot be twisted to fit Buddhist teachings. It is odd to enter a Buddhist school and find, as one visitor did, a hundred and fifty children lustily singing:

"Buddha loves me, this I know ;"

and to note that the organist is playing the tune from a Christian hymnal. If it be true that imitation is the sincerest form of flattery, Christian missionaries have abundant reason to feel flattered.

The Young Men's Christian Association has been made the model of the Young Men's Buddhist Association, which has grown rapidly in membership and influence. Professor Kaneka Umaji, of Waseda University, wrote in the *Seinem Yuben*:

"I am glad that you (the promoters) have taken up the task of finding a new Buddhism which shall march hand in hand with the progress of civilization. Ancient, divided, and often corrupt, the Buddhism we have known awaits your reforms to regain its influence. To me, Buddhism with its profound philosophy and its spiritual

power over men and women is the best of all religions. Yet with sorrow I confess that it fails to serve the youth of today. It is a sun obscured in clouds. It has been left behind by a progressive world. Not a few young men, having sought in vain, have desperately flung their lives away in a deep cataract pool or before a running train. Buddhism must therefore be reformed."

Buddhist Women's Associations have also been organized. There are eight such associations in Tokyo, the oldest having been formed in 1886. A Buddhist Union represents and coordinates some of the modern movements, and at the third general meeting of its central committee in May, 1917, one of the main subjects of discussion was "how to perfect the establishment of the Buddhist Protective Association."

The candour of the leaders of the new movement has gone further and compared Christian and Buddhist missionary work to the latter's disadvantage. Mokushoko Shonin plainly wrote as follows in the *Shin Nippon*:

"Christian missionaries go into the remotest parts of the earth to increase their converts, braving all dangers and discomforts. But what do the Buddhist priests of Japan? Are men really alive who are content to exist upon the remuneration they receive for reading prayers they do not understand at funerals? So mechanical is their performance that they make prayers at piece-work rates. They drink and dissipate, to pay for which they resort to ways of getting money from which even laymen shrink. There are black sheep doubtless in the Christian ministry, but in the bulk there is no comparison. Christian workers constantly strike for the amelioration of social conditions—to rescue women, to educate the poor, to succor orphans, and the Buddhist priests loiter far in their rear. . . . Buddhist preachers appeal only to the old and uneducated whom they tell of the delights of paradise, but they have no message for this life. Their preaching places often remain closed for months at a time."

How far the reformers can succeed in galvanizing the moribund body of Buddhism into some kind of life remains to be seen. They are certainly trying hard. Realizing that only

educated men can influence modern Japan and compete with the highly trained Christian leaders, they have founded five colleges to whose graduates they can look for future leadership, and they are actively at work in many fields of effort. They are publishing one daily and two weekly papers, several monthly and quarterly periodicals, and many pamphlets. Public lectures are given, summer schools are conducted, and special occasions are magnified in every possible way. The Shinshiu sect of Buddhists in 1911 celebrated with elaborate ceremonies the six hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the death of its founder at Kyoto. Vast multitudes attended; but observers noted that they were almost wholly from the country towns and villages and that there were very few young people.

Among the activities of modern Japanese Buddhists is an effort to rehabilitate Buddhism in Korea, where it had fallen into disrepute and had long since disappeared as a national faith, its only vestiges today being a few remote mountain monasteries and here and there a ruined temple or a dirty priest slinking like an outcast in the outskirts of some town. A number of Japanese Buddhist missionaries were sent to Korea some years ago. Others followed, and the effort has been earnestly pressed. A western Christian's estimate of the true character and the poor promise of the enterprise might not be deemed impartial. Fortunately, it is not necessary for me to appraise it as this has been done by two Japanese newspapers whose freedom from bias is not likely to be challenged. The *Japan Times* said:

"It is extremely doubtful that the Buddhist religion, or at least the grossly unphilosophical and superstitious part of it which alone can be taught by average priests, will do any good to Koreans. . . . The case would be different if Buddhism, however degraded in its form now, had in any way been helpful in bringing about the modern civilization of Japan. But whatever pretensions it may set forth in other directions, it certainly and absolutely has no claim to make in this particular respect, that is, in the work of the moral, intellectual and social elevation of new Japan. In Korea we are now to do the

same work over again, and it is most preposterous for Buddhist bonzes to come forward with their uncalled-for service and with the claim that they can and will do in Korea what they have not done, and never have even tried to do, in Japan. There will be enough to worry about in Korea for some time to come, and the sending out there these bonzes can only make the situation worse."

The *Seoul Press* had this to say:

"Having some knowledge of the present condition of Buddhism in Japan, we find it rather hard to entertain any great hope as to the future of the religion in this country. We believe few will contradict us when we say that Buddhism is on the wane. . . . The only time educated people repair to a Buddhist temple is when they attend the funeral or other religious service for some one dear to them. Buddhism is dying in Japan, and scarcely holds its place as a religion in the minds of the Japanese younger men. It is not a power having great influence in the shaping of their moral character and spurring them to a higher, nobler and purer life. Inasmuch as Buddhism is in such a condition in Japan, it is reasonable, we think, to entertain some doubt as to the success of the proposed propaganda of the religion in this country."

Many Japanese are openly sceptical regarding the ability of Buddhism to adapt itself to modern conditions in either Korea or Japan. An editorial in the *Kirisuto Kycho* said that there was a general expectation that religion would be changed as a result of the World War, and it asked: "Will Buddhism, the religion of Japan from ancient times, be able to undergo a change sufficient to enable it to lead the new Japan?" The writer declares "that such a revival is scarcely within the range of possibility. Buddhism is absolutely opposed, as a religion, to the present life. Whatever efforts the Buddhists may put forth to meet the needs of the new times, their most important scriptural teachings contradict such efforts by their antagonism to the present life."

Nevertheless, Mr. Nakashoji, Minister of Agriculture and Commerce, said in an address at a meeting of Buddhists: "I

feel regret on account of the evils that lead the nation to devote itself to the almighty dollar. With the coming in of new ideas disorder has arisen here and there. . . . At this time, the Buddhist religious leaders are going to do their utmost in order to destroy such evil tendencies."

Every open-minded Christian will applaud such a purpose. If Buddhism is to exist at all, and it undoubtedly is for some time yet, it is better to have it clean than unclean, a friend rather than a foe of morality. In so far as the reform movement leads earnest souls to remain in the faith of their fathers rather than to abandon it, the reform may check decay. Some Japanese are now being influenced to do this who otherwise would have renounced Buddhism. This is not a light thing since it encourages men to imagine that they can appropriate the social results of Christianity without the deeper truths and obligations from which the results flow. A Christless morality may again illustrate the aphorism that the good is the enemy of the best.

On the other hand, reformed Buddhism is so manifestly a half-way house, so evidently an imitation of Christianity, and the road beyond it is so clear and straight, that thoughtful Japanese who really desire a virile religion of transforming power are not likely to be content with such a weak compromise as "revived" Buddhism offers. It has no roots, if I may change the figure, and is merely attempting to tie the fruits of Christianity to the withered branches of a dead tree. Marquis Okuma may be assumed to know, and he frankly said: "To be sure, Japan had her religions and Buddhism prospered greatly; but this prosperity was largely through political means. Now this creed has been practically rejected by the better classes, who, being spiritually thirsty, have nothing to drink."

The other great national faith of Japan is Shintoism. Mr. Setsuzo Sawada, Counsellor of the Japanese Embassy in Washington, defines it as "primarily a system of nature and ancestor worship, involving deification of progenitors. The

Shintoist believes that his ancestors are living; that they know all about him and perceive, as well as endeavour to guide, his every action, and that he should always be governed by their example and counsel. The spirits of the dead are all elevated to the rank of gods. There are three prevailing types of Shinto deity: the national gods, the communal gods, and the family gods. The first comprise in the main spirits of the departed rulers or national heroes, while the second are the spirits of great personages who have been great benefactors of the province or community, and the third are those of ancestors of each individual family. To walk in the footsteps of these gods under their guidance, is the substance of this cult."¹

The Government Bureau of Religions states that there are 17,000,000 Shintoists in Japan, and Mr. Sawada gives the number of Shinto shrines as 115,000, and of priests, preachers and teachers, 74,619.

Is Shintoism a religion? No one ever thought of arguing that it is not until the Christians in Japan objected to the observances of Shinto rites on the ground that they are incompatible with Christianity. Then Shinto advocates declared that its ceremonies are to be regarded as patriotic and social rather than religious, and that every loyal Japanese could observe them without disloyalty to his religious convictions. Finally, the Government took a hand in the discussion by officially distinguishing between state Shintoism and religious Shintoism, and it divided the Bureau of Shrines and Temples into the Bureau of Shrines and the Bureau of Religions, thus taking Shintoism out of the category of religion and putting it into the category of state institutions. Thereafter, ceremonies at the shrines were under the supervision of government officials.

This, however, did not end the discussion. Historically, the Japanese have for centuries regarded Shinto "as the way of the gods." The general Christian view has been admirably stated by the Right Reverend J. G. Combaz, Bishop of the

¹ Article in the *Japanese Student Bulletin*, February 15, 1927.

Roman Catholic Church at Nagasaki, in an article in which he gives full and sympathetic recognition to the intentions of the government in regard to Shinto as simply a form of patriotic and social observance; but he declares that "nevertheless, however generous our frame of mind may be with regard to this view of the shrines, we cannot give our support to it." And he assigns the following reasons:

"For several thousand years the officials and the people alike have looked upon them as sanctuaries and places of worship and as institutions founded upon the supernatural. This being so, how can the nature of shrines be changed by a single government edict? One may change the label on a bottle, but the contents will not be changed thereby. In the official edict it is said that shrines are dedicated to the worship of the gods of the Empire for the public observance of festivals and for public worship. The use of the term 'worship' is sufficient evidence of the religious nature of the performance. It is also officially said that the object of the shrines is to pay respect to gods who have rendered meritorious service to the State, to the Imperial House and to ancestors. Is not such reverence of a religious nature? . . . The fact that government officials, and not Shinto priests, conduct the ceremonies does not deprive them of their religious nature. In the ancient Roman Empire also, officials took charge of such shrines. But this was done in order to render the rites more impressive to the popular mind and to give dignity to their observance. They did precisely what the priests were accustomed to do and were, in fact, assisted by the priests. The shrines, therefore, could not be devoid of religious character."

This view finds ample support in the opinions of men who cannot be charged with religious bias. That keen analyst of Japanese life and character, Lafcadio Hearn, wrote in *Kokoro*: "Stated in the simplest possible form, the peculiar element of truth in Shinto is the belief that the world of the living is directly governed by the world of the dead; that every impulse or act of man is the work of a god, and that all the dead become gods are the basic ideas of the cult."

That high Japanese authority, Professor T. Inouye, says:

7 "Shrines are the vehicles which give expression to the Shinto spirit and our religious institutions. The religious rites practised in connection with them are all alike religious ceremonials. It is clearly a mistake to put the shrines outside the category of religion." Professor K. Kakehi expresses a like opinion.

"Reverence for shrines," he says, "is religious in nature, and the view that reverence paid to them is not religious is meaningless. It is a high form of religion even from the scientific point of view." Significance, too, must be given to the fact that when, in 1912, the Vice-Minister of Home Affairs called a conference of the religious leaders of the Empire, to be described in a later chapter, he invited representatives of Shintoism as well as of Buddhism and Christianity; and that in his public statement regarding the conference he used these words:

"Shintoism, Buddhism and Christianity are all religions. . . . Shintoism and Buddhism have long had a recognized place as religions of the Japanese people."

We concur, and we believe with all Protestant missionaries and Japanese Christians, in the statement of Bishop Combaz that "as long as the Japanese stand firm on their historic past, no one can find fault with them, much less can any one expect them to be disloyal to their own country. But we deeply regret that the Japanese still retain a mythology long ago given up by other countries as being unreasonable and untrustworthy; and not only so, but with a certain coercion this mythology is required to be recognized."

It is interesting to note that the increase of national prosperity and power resulting from the World War is redounding to the benefit of Shintoism. A prominent Japanese said at the time:

"The present war has led some of us to agnosticism or national Shintoism. Shintoism has made great progress at the expense of

Christianity by the support of our Imperial Court and the Government, and the Ise Shrine and influential professors in the Imperial University. National spirit combined with the faith of old Shintoism has risen in power, and is attracting the attention of intelligent Japanese young men. This phenomenon cannot be ignored by those who care about the spiritual welfare of our people."

The Government is effectively utilizing Shintoism as a means of increasing the spirit of loyalty. Dr. Genchi Kato, the Japanese author of a notable volume on this subject, characterizes Shinto as "the peculiar religious patriotism of the Japanese people glorifying their Emperor as the centre of faith." He adds: "The vital essence of Shinto manifests itself in an expression of that unique spirit of national service of the Japanese people, which is not only mere morality but is their religion, culminating in Mikadoism or their own peculiar form of loyalty or patriotism toward the Emperor."¹

It is not surprising therefore that Shintoism has the powerful support of the Government, of the official class generally, and of influential public men and professors in the Imperial universities. Politicians in the United States who advocate "one hundred per cent Americanism" find their counterparts in Japanese who interpret one hundred per cent patriotism in terms of Shinto. (Whether Shintoism be viewed as a religion or as an expression of loyalty to the Emperor and the spirits of his deceased ancestors, it is likely to remain a force in Japanese life and psychology which will not soon pass away.) And yet strong as it is as a national cult, it is losing many of the younger men.) The report of the principal of a government school stated that in the first-year class there were forty-seven believers in Shintoism; in the second-year class thirty-one; in the third-year class eleven; in the fourth-year class eight, and in the fifth class, the graduating class, only three. These statistics show how education is affecting Shintoism even in the government schools which are supposed to be most favourable to it.

¹ *A Study of Shinto, the Religion of the Japanese Nation*, by Genchi Kato, Tokyo, December, 1926.

XVI

ROMAN CATHOLIC AND RUSSIAN ORTHODOX MISSIONS IN JAPAN

A SEPARATE volume would be required to tell in any adequate way the story of Christian missions in Japan. Indeed, Otis Cary devoted two volumes to his admirable *History of Christianity in Japan*, and the books that have been published by various writers upon particular phases of the work and the lives of notable missionaries would fill a fair-sized library. It is a stirring record, abounding in incident, full of human interest, and far-reaching in reconstructive influence.

To Roman Catholics belongs the credit of making the first effort to carry the Gospel to Japan. It was a Jesuit who bore it. One of the five devoted souls whom Ignatius Loyola associated with himself in founding the Society of Jesus in the dark and stormy years of the sixteenth century was the immortal Francis Xavier. A gifted youth, educated at the University of Paris, he turned away from the allurements of secular life and took the rigid vows of chastity, poverty, obedience, and readiness to go wherever in the world he might be sent. When the King of Portugal asked the Jesuits to send missionaries to his newly won possessions in India, Loyola ordered Xavier to respond. He started for Lisbon on a day's notice, and reached Goa, May 6, 1542. His seven years in India were characterized by indefatigable labours and by such apparent success that he wrote:

"The multitude of those who become converts to the faith of Jesus Christ is so great that my arms often grow weary with baptizing and I am unable to speak any longer; . . . I have baptized a whole village in a day." But the kind of Christians that were made in this wholesale fashion is indicated

in his dejected report to Loyola in 1549: "The experience that I have of these countries shows me clearly that there is no possible hope of perpetuating the Society here by means of the native Indians. Christianity itself will survive only so long as we remain and live here—we who have already come or those whom you shall send."

In this despairing mood he met, during a visit to Malacca, a wandering Japanese whose name he gave as Anjiro, but whom later writers have called Yajiro, who, after killing a man in Japan, had fled in a Portuguese ship to Malacca, where he was baptized. From him Xavier learned much of Japan. "If I went to Japan, would the people become Christians?" he asked. And Anjiro replied: "My people would not immediately become Christians; but they would first ask you a multitude of questions, weighing carefully your answers and your claims. Above all, they would observe whether your conduct agreed with your words. If you should satisfy them on these points by suitable replies to their inquiries and by a life above reproach—then, as soon as the matter was known and fully examined, the King (Daimyo), the nobles, and the educated people would become Christians. Six months would suffice; for the nation is one that always follows the guidance of reason."

Flaming with zeal stimulated by this opinion, Xavier quickly sailed for Japan accompanied by two other Jesuits, Father Cosmo Torres and Brother Juan Fernandez, and by three Japanese, including Anjiro. After a voyage so stormy that the little vessel was more than once in imminent danger of foundering, they arrived at Kagoshima August 15, 1549. It was a memorable day in the history of Japan and of Christianity when these heroic men landed, the first messengers of Christ to a people who were destined to become one of the great nations of the earth. After twenty-seven months of incessant labour, Xavier sailed November 20, 1551, for India, where he selected more missionaries for Japan. He then departed for China, but died on the way to Chang-chuang on an

island near Macao, November 27, 1552. Fernandez and Torres remained in Japan till their deaths in 1567 and 1570, respectively.

The mission work thus begun was steadily pressed and the little band of pioneers was gradually enlarged by later arrivals. The Japanese appear to have welcomed the missionaries with surprising cordiality. Xavier had written: "We have been received by the Governor (Capitan) of the city and by the Commandant (Alcayde) with much kindness and friendship, as we have also been by all the people."

The novelty of the strangers' appearance attracted crowds. Converts were soon enrolled. The experiences of the missionaries were varied, and for a score of years fair progress was made, although discouragements and occasional perils were not wanting. The decade beginning with the year 1571 was one of more rapid growth. Converts became numerous. The Jesuits made special effort to reach the higher classes and with considerable success. Among the Christians were such dignitaries as Takayama Yusho and his son and successor, Takayama Ukon, the feudal lords of Takatsuki, Konishi Yukinaga and Kuroda Yoshitaka, celebrated generals in the army, and a number of civil officials of rank and influence.

In the reign of Toyotomi Hideyoshi in the later years of the sixteenth century, the tide turned. Various reasons for this change of attitude have been assigned. Defenders of the missionaries dwell upon the resentment aroused by dissolute European traders and the wrath of Hideyoshi because Christian Japanese girls refused to pander to his licentious desires. There was wide suspicion that the priests represented the political ambitions of their governments; a suspicion to which their course lent some colour, for they were active in court circles. The zeal of the missionaries was not always tempered by tactful consideration of the customs and sacred institutions of the people. They were relentless in their attacks upon Buddhist priests and worship, while their wholesale methods of baptism on superficial acquiescence in Christian formulas brought into

the church multitudes whose standards of conduct were little, and in many instances not at all, better than those of the non-Christians about them. The Japanese Department of Education, in a *History of the Empire of Japan* issued in 1893, assigned the following reason for the reversal of popular attitude toward Christianity: "When Hideyoshi in the course of his campaign against Shimazu reached Hakata, the Christian priests showed such an arrogant demeanour that Hideyoshi, enraged by their conduct, ordered that they should leave Japan by a certain day and prohibited the people from embracing Christianity."

At any rate, the following edict was promulgated July 25, 1587:

"Having learned from our faithful counsellors that foreign religious teachers have come into our estates where they preach a law contrary to that of Japan, and that they have even had the audacity to destroy temples dedicated to our Kami and Hotoke, although this outrage merits the most extreme punishment, wishing nevertheless to show them mercy we order that under pain of death they quit Japan within twenty days. During that space of time no harm nor hurt will be done them; but at the expiration of that term, we order that if any of them be found in our states they shall be seized and punished as the greatest criminals. As for the Portuguese merchants, we permit them to enter our ports, there to continue their accustomed trade and to remain in our estates provided our affairs need this; but we forbid them to bring any foreign religious teachers into the country under the penalty of the confiscation of their ships and goods."

The period of persecution which then began continued with varying degrees of intensity and vindictiveness throughout the reign of Hideyoshi and his successors, Ieyasu and Hidetada, till, by the year 1715, Christianity in Japan appeared to be almost exterminated. Most of the missionaries were deported, and those who sought to remain were hunted down like wild beasts. Many of the Japanese Christians recanted, some because their profession of faith had been merely nominal, and

others because their courage was not great enough to enable them to face the frightful ordeal with which a remorseless government confronted them. But multitudes were faithful to the end. They were persecuted without mercy—stripped of their possessions, burned, beheaded, crucified, thrown from cliffs, and subjected to every other form of torture and death that fanatical ingenuity could devise. The history of Christian martyrdoms contains no more tragically sublime manifestations of constancy than those which Japan affords. When, December 9, 1603, an executioner went to the house of Simon Takeda after midnight with an order to execute him because he had refused an offer of life if he would recant, we read that he thanked the executioner, knelt and prayed before a picture of Christ, awakened his mother and his wife, arrayed himself in ceremonial robes, begged his family and servants to forgive him for any wrong that he had done them, and said to his wife: "The hour for separation has come. I go before you and thus show the road by which you also should reach Paradise. I will pray to God for you. I hope that ere long you will follow in my footsteps."

He then calmly bared his neck for the executioner's sword. As his head fell on the mat, his mother laid her hand on it and exclaimed: "Oh, my fortunate son, you have been deemed worthy to give your life for God's service. How blessed am I, sinful woman though I am, that I should be the mother of a martyr and that I can offer as a sacrifice this my only son, for whom during these many years I have so lovingly cared." Both mother and wife were crucified before another night fell.¹

It is difficult to ascertain just how many Christians there were in Japan during the various stages of Roman Catholic missionary efforts, or how many suffered martyrdom. Ecclesiastical statistics were not kept with such care as they now are. Doubtless, too, many records were lost or destroyed in the persecutions, while the Roman Catholic custom of counting

¹ For a detailed account of these persecutions, see Otis Cary's *History of Christianity in Japan*, Vol. I, pp. 98-257.

all persons who have been baptized in infancy as well as in later years does not always make the reported numbers indicative of actual strength. Certain it is, however, that the missionaries had a large following in Japan in the seventeenth century, and that several thousand Christians were executed for their faith or died as the result of the hardships which the persecutions involved. For more than a century Christianity in Japan almost disappeared. A few believers remained in hiding from hostile eyes. Occasionally, little groups gathered and sometimes friendly neighbours let them live in peace. Now and then a daring priest went more or less furtively among them, giving counsel and encouragement. But enmity of Christianity was deeply rooted among officials and common people. Suspected Japanese were compelled to trample upon the cross or the image of the Virgin Mary. Edicts and sign-boards forbade Christian profession or teaching under dire penalties. One tablet bore the oft-quoted inscription: "So long as the sun warms the earth, let no Christian be so bold as to come to Japan; and let all know that if the King of Spain, or the Christians' God, or the great God of all violate this command, he shall pay for it with his head."

The Roman Catholic Church, however, never gives up and it did not abandon its purpose to reëstablish missionary work in Japan. The promulgation of the treaty of 1854 between Japan and the United States appeared to open the door for foreigners to reënter the country. Obstacles were encountered, but in 1856, M. Furet and M. Mounicou, after several fruitless efforts, managed to get to Hakodate on a French war-vessel, and after a stay of four days went to the Loochoo Islands, where a struggling mission had been maintained for some years as a base from which Japan might again be entered. In 1859 the long-hoped-for day dawned. M. Girard landed at Yedo September 6, and two months later M. Mermet arrived in Hakodate. M. Mounicou came to Yokohama from Loochoo in 1861. Mission work was vigorously resumed. One by one new missionaries arrived. Caution was still neces-

sary, and in 1867 persecution again broke out. There were more deportations, imprisonments, sufferings, and deaths. But in March, 1872, Monsignor Petitjean wrote to a priest in Hong Kong to cable the following message to the Paris headquarters of the Society: "Edicts against Christians removed. Prisoners freed. Inform Rome, Propagation of Faith, Holy Infancy. Need immediately fifteen missionaries."

At that time the missionaries definitely knew of 15,000 Japanese Christians, and they believed that there were many others who secretly held to the Christian faith but had not dared to identify themselves with it. By 1887, however, the *Japan Weekly Mail* could speak of "a large and powerful mission, numbering nearly sixty fathers and over forty sisters of charity." Thirty years later, the number of foreigners on the staff had risen to 352, with 179 Japanese workers, 270 churches, and 76,134 members. The latest available report gives a foreign staff of 500, including priests, lay brothers, nuns, three bishops and one archbishop; a Japanese staff of 196; 339 churches and chapels, and 89,747 members. An official Roman Catholic report includes the following statement:

"The progress of the last sixty years cannot be considered markedly successful. Protestant forces who entered with the Catholic missionaries claim almost double the following. However, the nucleus of a mission organization is established in the eleven ecclesiastical territories assigned to five different societies. Japan is today our most poorly manned mission, there being but one priest, brother or sister for every 86,000 souls. There are less than 600 churches or chapels of any kind and less than 200 lower schools, though there is a group of promising higher schools, chiefly under the Brothers of Mary. The Jesuits have opened a University in Tokyo. The nuns conduct something over a score of orphanages, seven hospitals and seventeen dispensaries. There are five Catholic printing presses and five Catholic magazines."¹

¹ *Little Atlas of Catholic Missions*, 1926, published by the Society for the Propagation of the Faith, pp. 30-31.

The Japanese have been more distrustful of the Roman Catholic missionaries than of the Protestant. This is partly because the close affiliation of the priests with their home governments and their diplomatic representatives in Japan has aroused suspicion of political aims, and partly because the Roman Catholic polity places the seat of authority in Rome, and, as the Report of the *Société des Missions Etrangères* for 1906 frankly said: "The Japanese national pride opposes itself to permitting that a foreigner should, apart from the Emperor, have control over them." Nevertheless, the Roman Catholic Church in Japan has a notable history and it can point to a long line of devoted workers and an impressive roll of martyrs. Some of its teachings and methods are at a far remove from those which represent my own views. Many of the priests have been narrow and intolerant, and their conduct had something to do with turning an initial welcome into resentment and, although not of itself causing persecution, broadened its scope and intensified its bitterness.

But while candour compels this stricture, candour also compels hearty recognition of courage, persistence, and personal character. Most of the foreign bishops and priests have been, and still are, French, and of a distinctly higher type than the Spanish priests in the Philippine and South American missions. The fair-minded Protestant who writes of them may, if I may borrow an illustration, treat their defects as an artist was advised to treat the wart on Cromwell's face. He must paint it in, but he need not make it unnecessarily large or write underneath the picture: "Please note especially the wart." The consecration, October 30, 1927, by Pope Pius XI, of Monsignor Huyosaka as the first Japanese Bishop, was hailed with great rejoicing as a just recognition of the character of the Roman Catholic Church in Japan.

The story of the Eastern Orthodox Mission of the Russian Church is a shorter one, for it deals with a more limited work and for a briefer period, dating only from 1861. But it forms a part of the Christian movement in Japan which is of no

small importance. The mission was incarnated in an extraordinary personality—the great Archbishop Nicolai, one of the modern apostles of God whom all communions gladly recognize. When a young man of twenty-four in Petrograd, he was chosen by the Holy Synod as chaplain of the Russian consulate at Hakodate, Japan. He eagerly accepted the appointment, and on his ordination took the name Nicolai instead of Ivan Kasatkin, by which he had been hitherto known. Arriving at Hakodate in June, 1861, he was delighted to find his official duties so light that he had time to study the Japanese language with a view to preaching to the people of the city. He studied with Joseph Neesima for a month, and after that with various teachers until he could speak in the native tongue. Opposition to Christianity was strong, and progress was beset with difficulties and at times danger. But in April, 1868, he conducted with tender solemnity a service in his own rooms in which he administered baptism to three Japanese—Sawabe, Sakai, and Urano. The services had to be held in secret, and the converts had to leave town immediately to escape punishment. Sawabe soon afterward brought two other Japanese, Kannari and Arai, to Pere Nicolai, as he was now called. The good priest now became convinced that the time had come to give his whole time to work among the Japanese. He applied for a furlough and returned to Russia in 1870 to interest the Holy Synod and to secure financial support for a mission. He was offered the bishopric of Peking, but attractive as the offer was he declined it, saying that he had consecrated his life to Japan. Thereupon his plans were approved; he was made an archimandrite; money was raised for his work, and he started back to Japan, arriving at Hakodate in February, 1871.

The work broadened. Converts carried the Gospel to other places, Sendai among others. In January, 1872, Nicolai removed to Tokyo, and there began the mission which afterward became so famous. Some of the converts were imprisoned and harshly treated, but they sturdily clung to their faith. The missionary himself was suspected of being a spy, and was

hampered in many ways; but nothing could daunt him. By 1883 he could report five foreign priests and teachers, 120 Japanese evangelists, of whom 11 were ordained priests, 148 organized churches, and a Christian constituency of 8,863.

The political difficulties which developed between Japan and Russia in the closing years of the century and the opening years of the twentieth affected, to some extent, the position of the mission in the public mind as compared with the popular attitude toward the Protestant missions. Christianity in all its forms was still unpopular, although active opposition was lessening. But the Orthodox Church, being the State Church of Russia, and as such closely identified with its government, could not escape the distrust with which all Russian activities were regarded. One of the priests issued a statement in 1903, in which he said: "From the present political situation of Japan and Russia, since the Japanese Orthodox Church is aided by the Russian Missionary Society, some are led to believe that the Church is necessarily Russianized and given to Russian forms."

He proceeded to explain that this was a misapprehension, but the Japanese were not easily convinced. They knew that the Orthodox Mission in Japan was not autonomous but a Russian Orthodox diocese whose bishop was under the rule of the Patriarch of the Church in Russia. It is immensely to the credit of both missionaries and Japanese that, during all the months of growing suspicion and irritation between the two countries, and the outburst of the storm of war in 1904, the work of the mission was maintained, with some difficulty indeed, but without disaster. The Russian missionaries were neither deported nor interned, but were allowed to go on with their duties. This happy result was due, in part, to the remarkable tact and wisdom of Pere Nicolai, then a bishop, in scrupulously observing the proprieties of a very delicate situation, avoiding unneutral words and acts, and strictly confining himself and his priests to the regular duties of a Christian mission. And it was also due to the equally remarkable fair-

ness and good sense of the Japanese in recognizing the fact that missionary work was conducted from motives quite distinct from the objectives of the war, and that it was not for the benefit of Russia but for the direct benefit of Japan. As the war grew in magnitude and intensity, and the fate of Japan trembled in the balance, the Bishop wrote: "From our hearts we give thanks and praise God that through His mercy the Church remains in peace unmolested, and that its members still maintain their good faith, each worker doing his duty faithfully. We also give thanks to the Japanese Government for its kind protection. From the beginning of this war, the government declared that religion and politics or war should not be confounded, that no one should be hindered in religious rites or faith. As you know, this declaration has been kept."

A wide field of effort developed in the camps in which 73,000 Russian prisoners were confined. The Bishop assigned all he could spare of his Japanese priests and evangelists, 23 of whom could speak the Russian language, to do Christian work among these men and to distribute copies of the four Gospels and religious tracts and books. The Bishop himself devoted much of his time to literary work, writing articles and pamphlets, editing periodicals, and revising his translation of the New Testament. He was made an archbishop in 1906, and February 16, 1912, he died at the age of seventy-six, honoured and loved not only by his own communion but by foreigners and Japanese of all faiths. He was succeeded by Bishop Sergie, later Archbishop.

The Christian Movement in Japan from 1926 gives the number of churches and chapels as 114 and of communicants 14,356. The staff, as reported by the Church authority in Russia in January, 1927, is one Archbishop, one secretary, 36 priests, 7 deacons (of whom one is Russian), and 29 catechisers.

XVII

PROTESTANT MISSIONS IN JAPAN

THE first Protestant service of which there is record was conducted by that fine Christian layman and American diplomat, Townsend Harris. The following entry appears in his diary:

"Sunday, December 6, 1857. This is the second Sunday in Advent; assisted by Mr. Heusken, I read the full service in an audible voice, and with the paper doors of the houses here our voices could be heard in every part of the building. This was, beyond doubt, the first time that the English version of the Bible or the American Protestant Episcopal service was ever repeated in this city. Two hundred and thirty years ago a law was promulgated in Japan inflicting death on any one who should use any of the rites of the Christian religion. That law is still unrepealed."

This service was for his own household and official staff. The foundations of Protestant missionary work for Japanese were laid soon afterward by a remarkable group of men. The Rev. John Liggins, who arrived May 2, 1859, and the Rev. Channing N. Williams, who joined him two months later, both of the American Protestant Episcopal Church; James C. Hepburn, M. D., of the American Presbyterian Church, who arrived October 18 of that year; the Rev. Guido S. Verbeck, the Rev. Samuel R. Brown, and D. B. Simmons, M. D., of the Dutch Reformed Church, who landed in November—these were men of high type, characterized by breadth of view, intellectual ability and force of character. Four of them, Williams, Hepburn, Verbeck, and Brown, acquired international

reputation. Williams attained fame as a bishop of large administrative qualities. Hepburn was a physician, scholar, author, and translator, of whom *The Japan Mail* editorially said that he was "a man whose name will be remembered with respect and affection as long as Yokohama has annals—a man of beauty of character, untiring charity, absolute self-negation, steady zeal in the cause of everything good, constituting a picture which could not fail to appeal to the Japanese people." On his ninetieth birthday, in 1905, the Emperor of Japan, although burdened with the anxieties of the war with Russia, remembered that devoted missionary and conferred upon him the Imperial Order of the Rising Sun in recognition of his distinguished services to Japan. Brown's great work as an educator led William Elliot Griffis to write his biography under the title: *A Maker of the New Orient*. Verbeck was teacher, writer, statesman, and confidential adviser of the Japanese Government, which trusted him as it has trusted no other man from the West.

The beginnings of mission work were beset by such difficulties that less dauntless men would have been discouraged. The missionaries were regarded with suspicion and dislike, their motives were misunderstood, and their purpose was misrepresented. Not until March, 1860, ten months after the first arrivals, could any Japanese be persuaded to teach them the language; and then the only one who could be secured was a government spy, and the only pupils were a few little boys whose parents wanted them to learn English. But the little company of missionaries was composed of men and women of heroic mould, and they unflinchingly persevered. The early years were spent in quiet, patient study, winning the good-will of the people by kindly, Christlike lives, and laying foundations for coming years in language helps and in translations of portions of the Bible and Christian books and tracts. In January, 1872, the British and American missionaries in Yokohama observed the Week of Prayer with special solemnity. A few Japanese students from their private classes attended the serv-

ices, possibly out of curiosity. The interest in the meetings became so great that they were continued throughout the month of February. Dr. Verbeck wrote that after a week or two the Japanese, for the first time, were on their knees in a Christian prayer-meeting, entreating God with great emotion that He would give His Spirit to Japan as to the early Church. American and British naval officers who witnessed the scene wrote: "The prayers of these Japanese take the heart out of us." As a direct fruit of this prayer-meeting, the first Japanese Protestant Church was organized at Yokohama, March 10, 1872, with nine young men who were baptized that day and two middle-aged men who had been previously baptized.

The pioneer missionaries found difficulty, too, in explaining some Christian ideas to people who had not conceived of a Supreme Being in terms of personality and who did not understand some biblical allusions. The parable of the Prodigal Son did not suggest to them what it does to Americans because they had never thought of God as a father or of man as his child. The twenty-third Psalm and the parable of the Good Shepherd conveyed very little of their rich meaning to people who had never seen a sheep. A missionary has written an amusing account of his difficulty in making his Japanese hearers understand what angels are and why a dove should have been chosen as a symbol of the descent of the Spirit of God at the baptism of Jesus.

Japanese churches now include a considerable number of Christians who have passed beyond the stage referred to in the preceding paragraph, but difficulties are still encountered by evangelists who address the comparatively untouched masses. Even among Christians, especially those of the first generation of believers, the heritage of centuries of non-Christian beliefs often creates certain presuppositions that are apt to affect the interpretation of the Bible. The persistence of pre-Christian ideas in Christian churches and their effect upon faith and practice is a subject which I have discussed in another volume,¹

¹ *Rising Churches in Non-Christian Lands*, pp. 53 sq.

and which has received suggestive treatment by Professor Joh. Warneck.¹

The lot of the first Christians was hard. It is easy to confess Christ in a land where Christianity is the popular religion, and where church membership involves no sacrifice. But the first converts in Japan had to break with their relatives and lose their friends. They were ostracized by society and persecuted by the leaders of the dominant faiths. The shopkeeper found that his customers forsook him. The son was disowned by his family. The ambitious young man was debarred from office. A high type of courage was required to face a hostile world, to stand before the whole business, social, and religious order and, like Martin Luther, fling out the challenge: "Here I stand. God help me; I can do no other." These Asiatic Christians had to take up the Cross to follow Christ.

The missionaries suffered less than the native converts, but their position was far from comfortable during this period. An illustration of the attitude of many Japanese appeared in a letter sent from Kyoto in 1884, addressed "To the four American Barbarians—Davis, Gordon, Learned and Greene," and including these sentences:

"You have come from a far country with the evil religion of Christ and as slaves of the robber Neesima. . . . Those who brought Buddhism to Japan in ancient times were killed; but we do not wish to defile the soil of Japan with your abominable blood. Hence take your families and go quickly."

The missionaries did not leave and the tide of popular feeling soon turned. The Japanese became eager to learn western methods, and missionaries became popular almost over night, not because of their religious character but because they were available foreigners who could tell the Japanese about European and American history, education, government, machinery,

¹"Vestiges of Heathenism Within the Church in the Mission Field," *International Review of Missions*, October, 1914.

banking, navigation, manufacturing, and military organizations. Mission schools were crowded. Churches doubled and trebled their membership. The advice of missionaries was sought by prominent Japanese, and they and other resident foreigners were treated with distinguished consideration. Christianity gained 6,000 communicants in 1889, and so promising were the signs of continued growth that it began to look as if Christianity might become the religion of Japan within a generation.

The Japanese, however, had no notion of allowing aliens to gain control of their country's industrial life. As soon as western methods were understood, suspicion and jealousy revived, and after 1889 the tide of national favour ebbed as suddenly as it had arisen. Life in Japan was not pleasant for foreigners during these years. They were seldom subjected to violence, but they were snubbed and elbowed aside on every hand. Mission schools dwindled. Chapel congregations fell off, and new converts became so scarce that they hardly more than filled the vacancies caused by death and dismissal. "The night of the nineties," the missionaries called this gloomy period. Some came to the conclusion that the opportunity for mission work in Japan had passed, and a few resigned and went home.

The change in public sentiment, like the one that preceded it, was not primarily due to the fact that they were missionaries, but to the fact that they were foreigners. They shared the anti-foreign reactions of this period that affected European and American business interests quite as seriously as they affected missionary work. Many foreigners who had been employed by Japanese were dismissed. Others who were engaged in trade saw their business go to pieces, and their curses were both loud and deep.

A contributory cause, however, lay in the reports of Japanese who had gone to Europe and America to study the institutions and methods of western lands and to learn the secret of their ascendancy. They had supposed that Christianity was the religion of all the modern progressive nations and that, if

Japan were to take her place as an equal among them, she must adopt their religion as well as their military, naval, industrial, and educational systems. They were impressed by a remark which Bismarck was reported to have made, that, if Japan expected to be regarded as a world-power of the first rank, she must become Christian. There was actually some talk for a time of making Christianity the national religion, and Mr. William T. Ellis says that when he was in Tokyo he was told by a government official, whose "utterance upon any governmental question would not go unheeded in the world's capitals, that it had been the intention to make the Crown Prince a Christian so that the next Emperor would be counted among the Christian rulers of the earth."

Then the Japanese heard with surprise that western nations were only partially Christian; that the people of the United States carefully separated Church and state; that the French and Italian governments were hostile to the Church; that, while Great Britain and Germany had established churches, a large part of the population in both countries was outside of them; and that the great cities in all of these lands reeked with immorality, intemperance, and other forms of irreligion. The inquiring Japanese went back to tell their countrymen that western nations were not really Christian; that their power was due to their inventions and manufactures instead of to their religion; that the Japanese could now handle the former themselves; that Christianity could be left out of account as a factor in the material program; and that Japan's position in the world would be determined by her military and industrial efficiency rather than by her religion.

This anti-foreign reaction culminated in 1896, and by the opening of the twentieth century, its force had been spent. By that time the Japanese had begun to feel more sure of themselves, and their jealousy and dislike of foreigners considerably abated. Since then, the attitude of the Japanese toward foreigners in both business and missionary life has been one of personal good-will as long as the foreigners have kept their

proper place and recognized the fact that they are not superior beings but residents or visitors among a people who propose to manage their own affairs, and who gladly welcome coöperation but resent dictation or patronage. The Japanese now accept most cordially the assistance which the missionaries can give. They have begun to understand that the best elements in the life of the enlightened and progressive nations of the world are Christian; that the teachings of the Founder of Christianity are pure and ennobling; that missionaries have come to communicate these teachings; and that they should not be judged by those of their countrymen who openly disregard them.

The governmental policy is one of fairness to all faiths, including Christianity. Article XXVIII of the Constitution provides that "Japanese subjects shall, within limits not prejudicial to peace and order, and not antagonistic to their duties as subjects, enjoy freedom of religious belief." Count Katsura, then Prime Minister, said in 1904:

"Japan stands for religious freedom. A man may be a Buddhist, a Christian, or even a Jew, without suffering for it. . . . There are Christian churches in every large city and in almost every town in Japan; and they all have complete freedom to teach and worship in accordance with their own convictions. These churches send out men to extend the influence of Christianity from one end of the country to the other as freely as such a thing might be done in the United States. There are numerous Christian newspapers and magazines which obtain their licenses precisely as other newspapers and magazines and as a matter of course. Christian schools are found everywhere, and an ordinance has been issued by the Department of Education under which Christian schools of a certain grade are able to obtain all the privileges granted to government schools of the same grade. There are few things which are a better proof of the recognition of rights than the right to hold property. In many cases, associations composed of foreign missionaries permanently residing in Japan have been incorporated by the Department of Home Affairs. These associations are allowed to own and manage land, buildings and

other property for the extension of Christianity, the carrying on of Christian education, and the performance of works of charity and benevolence.' It should be added also that they are incorporated under the article in the Civil Code which provides for the incorporation of associations founded for 'purposes beneficial to the public'; and as 'their object is not to make a profit out of the conduct of their business,' no taxes are levied on their incomes. . . . Christian literature has entrance into the military and naval hospitals, and a relatively large number of the trained nurses employed in them are Christian women."¹

The Japanese set a good example to all other nations in the Russia-Japan War. That war was fraught with dire issues to Japan. But although the Russian Church was a state Church, the Japanese Government permitted the Russian missionaries in Japan to continue their work unmolested throughout the war because it realized that their mission was conducted from motives quite distinct from the objectives of the war, and was for the direct benefit of the Japanese people. Indeed, Count Katsura, then Prime Minister, sent an official communication to the representatives of the Christian churches in the Empire, in which he said that, anticipating that the feelings aroused by the war might cause differences between peoples of different nationalities and religious beliefs, instruction had been issued to local officials regarding the protection of Russian residents and the members of the Russian Church. He declared that the need for this caution was emphasized by the fact that the war was against a professedly Christian nation, and he hoped that no one "will be betrayed into the error of supposing that such things as differences in race or religion have anything whatever to do with the present complication. . . . Regarding religion as an essential element of civilization," he continued, "I have uniformly tried to treat all religions with becoming respect; and I believe it to be an important duty of statesmen, under all circumstances, to do their utmost to prevent racial animosities."

¹ Interview with the Rev. William Imbrie, D. D.

Indeed the Government has virtually recognized Christianity as one of the religions of the Empire. In the war with Russia the War Department authorized the appointment of chaplains for the armies in Manchuria. The missionaries respectfully asked that Christian ministers as well as Buddhist and Shinto priests be appointed. The officers who had the power of selection were not disposed to accede to the request; but when it was presented to the Imperial Cabinet through the good offices of Sir Claude MacDonald, the British Ambassador, and Count Inouye, the influential Japanese statesman, that body promptly sanctioned the appointment of six British and American missionaries and six Japanese Christians as chaplains with the transport and commissariat privileges accorded to other chaplains. The agents of the Bible Societies received special permission to distribute copies of the Bible among the men of the army and navy, and a Vice Admiral promised to send to every ship in the navy the Bibles and other religious reading that the agents might wish to supply. The late Dr. Henry Loomis of Yokohama wrote that Mr. S. Shimada, a member of the Imperial Diet, said in a public address that, during the China-Japan War, there were disgraceful reports of fraud and embezzlement on the part of the officials to whom was intrusted the disbursement of funds; that to obviate such conduct in the last war (Russia-Japan), Christian men were selected to fill such places; and that from the beginning to the end the administration was efficient and satisfactory.¹ Bishop Awdry of South Tokyo, says that in the Russia-Japan War the Japanese Government ruled that all native interpreters who accompanied foreign correspondents must be Christians, and that this action was taken on the ground that for this important post men of absolute reliability were desired, who would fairly represent the interests of Japan.²

When, early in 1912, the Vice Minister of Home Affairs for Japan, Mr. Tokonami, called a conference of the religious

¹ Article in *The Chinese Recorder*, March, 1907.

² Article in *The Spirit of Missions*, July, 1904.

leaders of the Empire "for the upholding of morality and the betterment of social conditions," he invited Christians, Buddhists, and Shintoists alike to send representatives. The conference was attended by thirteen Shintoists, fifty Buddhists, and seven Japanese Christians—one each of the Baptist, Methodist, Presbyterian, Congregational, Episcopal, Roman Catholic and Greek Catholic communions. The omission of Confucianism was significant as showing that it is not regarded as one of the separate religions of Japan, its ethics and ancestor worship finding expression in other ways. The Government was represented by four members of the Cabinet and several vice ministers and bureau chiefs. The conference continued in session four days. Its sessions were private, but one can imagine the decorum with which the Japanese would conduct the proceedings, in spite of the fact that the convictions of the delegates were as varied as their robes—the Shintoists white and gray; the Buddhists red, yellow, and purple; and the Christians black. Mr. Tokonami sanctioned a public statement which included the following:

"1. The primary intention in holding the conference is to direct attention to religion as a necessary means to the highest spiritual and moral welfare of both the individual and the nation. For a number of years this matter has not been given the importance that properly belongs to it, and the primary purpose of the conference is to reassert that importance.

"2. No attempt is intended to unite the adherents of the several religions in one body, still less to establish a new religion. Shintoism, Buddhism and Christianity are all religions; but in certain important particulars each differs from the others and the religious convictions of the adherents of each should be respected without interference. It may, however, be confidently presumed that Shintoists, Buddhists and Christians alike will cordially recognize a responsibility to act as fellow-labourers for the advancement of the spiritual and moral interests of the nation to the utmost of their ability.

"3. Shintoism and Buddhism have long had a recognized place as religions of the Japanese people. Christianity should also be accorded a similar place."

Opinions as to the value of the conference differed. The prevailing opinion was expressed by Professor A. K. Reischauer of Tokyo:

“We have in the statement of the Vice Minister a recognition of the great importance of religion as a means to the highest spiritual and moral welfare of both the individual and the nation. This recognition is in sharp contrast with the views held by the great majority of Japanese statesmen during the past two or three decades. Mr. Tokonami's scheme recognizes two things about Christianity. One of these is that, though the constitution of Japan recognizes the principle of religious liberty, Christianity has not had a fair chance in this land; the other point is that Christianity is worthy to be recognized as a religion which can contribute something to Japan's welfare.”

It would be easy to cite other evidences of friendly feeling toward Christianity. Governors and mayors often accept invitations to address meetings of religious bodies. At the coronation of the Emperor Yoshihito in 1912, several Christians were included in the list of Japanese who received honours; some of them, like the Rev. Doctor Motoda, headmaster of St. Paul's College, Tokyo, and Miss Ume Tsuda, principal of a college for girls, being so prominent as Christian workers that their selection implied an approval of their work. Never before had Christians been so honoured by the throne. A further side light on the standing of Christianity in Japan was recently revealed when the Government publicly honoured the thirty-two most prominent social welfare workers in recognition of their long service. Of these, twenty-two were Christians, a proportion quite in contrast to the one-third of one per cent of Christians as compared to the total population of the country. The present Emperor, during his visit in England when Crown Prince, accepted honorary membership in the Young Men's Christian Association. In 1927 the Imperial Household contributed 5,000 yen toward a fund that was being sought for the Tokyo Y. M. C. A.

Christian workers who are known to be favourably disposed toward the Government receive many courtesies. An American missionary, the Rev. Doctor George P. Pierson, writes:

"I have to report the placing of forty-one railway stations at our disposal for addresses, the official assembling of audiences, and a free pass on the line when engaged in this particular work. The Railway Department of the Government has for a long time felt the need of moral instruction for its employees. Buddhist and Shinto priests have had the privilege of holding meetings at the stations, and latterly Christian speakers have not only been allowed but even invited. When I wish to speak at a station or two, I ask our local station-master the day before to make arrangements. He telephones down the line, fixes the hour, and next day stands ready to furnish me with a pass. When I reach the station, I find the main waiting-room arranged like a chapel, with table, glass of water, and sometimes a vase of flowers. The seats are occupied by the station-master, his assistant, the ticket man, the telegraph men, the baggage men, and in almost every case by some of the women and children from families of the men, as well as by people from the stores near by. The station-master asks me into his office, gives tea, and sometimes offers lunch. I can leave a package of books in the men's room, and send them papers regularly thereafter."

In 1926, the Mayor of Nokkeushi, where Dr. Pierson had resided for many years, presented him with a diploma and a silver cup in recognition of his useful service to the city.

In 1926, the Bureau of Religions in the Ministry of Education introduced in the Imperial Diet a bill which proposed governmental supervision of religions and regulations that were severely restrictive of religious freedom. The bill was not directed against Christianity but was to apply to Buddhism, Shintoism and Christianity alike. It was simply another illustration of the fundamental Japanese conviction that everything in the country should be controlled by the Government. The immediate occasion for the bill was said to have been abuses that had grown up in connection with some of the

Buddhist and Shinto temples. Such strong protests, however, were made by all religious bodies, Christian and non-Christian alike, that, after a long debate, the Committee of Peers March 17, 1927, decided not to press the bill at that session. Its advocates declared that they would revive it at a later session, but they disclaimed hostility to religion and insisted that the government should be empowered to regulate it and to correct abuses. However laudable their intention, the bill would have given government officials powers of inquisition and intervention which would be destructive of the freedom that religions have hitherto enjoyed in Japan. The tremendous volume of protests against the bill by the Japanese people themselves is a wholesome indication that modern Japan prizes the religious liberty guaranteed by its constitution.

Christian work has been steadily progressing for many years, and the Japanese churches have made solid gains. At the Semi-Centennial of Protestant Missions in Tokyo, the Rev. Dr. William Imbrie was able to say:

" Fifty years ago, notice boards were standing on the highways declaring Christianity a forbidden religion; today these same notice boards are seen standing in the Museum of Tokyo as things of historical interest. Less than fifty years ago, the Christian Scriptures could be printed only in secret; today Bible Societies scatter them far and wide without let or hindrance. Even forty years ago, there was not an organized church in all Japan; today there are Synods and Conferences and Associations, with congregations dotting the Empire from the Hokkaido to Formosa. Today, Christians from the north and south and east and west gather together in the capital to celebrate the semi-centennial of the planting of Protestant Christianity in Japan, and men of high position in the nation cordially recognize the fact that Christianity in Japan has won for itself a place worthy of recognition."

Christianity has made great strides in Japan since these words were spoken. A three-year national evangelistic campaign, inaugurated by a joint committee of Protestant churches

and missions in 1913, resulted in 4,788 meetings, attended by 777,119 persons, of whom 27,350 professed conversion. Of the meetings in Kobe, the Rev. H. P. Jones wrote that the first night the church, which seats 900, was filled and many were turned away. The next night a theatre seating 2,000 was crowded to the doors, and again many were turned away. Mr. Ando, the lay leader of the temperance movement in Japan, spoke for an hour. Then for another hour that packed house quietly listened to Dr. Ebina of Tokyo. The next day the capacious Y. M. C. A. building was filled to the limit morning, afternoon and evening. In a club house near by a meeting for children was attended by 3,500. Monday night, the people literally jammed the largest theatre, and a sign requested Christians not to come into the building so that non-Christians could have the seats. The police ordered the doors closed, pronouncing the house full, but people kept coming for more than an hour demanding entrance.

The famous evangelist, Paul Kanamori, has a notable sermon three hours long which he has preached more than eight hundred times to audiences aggregating over three hundred thousand people. Few if any European and American preachers can hold an audience for three hours, but Kanamori's account of his Christian experience and his presentation of the Gospel are so moving that immense audiences have literally hung upon his words and the number of those who have accepted Christ in his meetings is estimated at 50,000. His delivery is not dramatic. He makes no effort at oratorical effect, but he tells his story with a simplicity and yet with a power which give him absolute mastery over his hearers.

Protestant Christianity in Japan is now represented by 1,250 foreign missionaries, of whom 981 are Americans and most of the others British, including Canadians; 1,692 organized churches of which 412 are wholly self-supporting; 177,683 adult communicants; 4,333 Japanese workers of whom 1,145 are ordained ministers; 254 kindergartens; 45 primary schools; 36 night schools; 59 middle schools; 24 colleges; 21 theological

schools for men; 46 normal training schools; 36 Bible training schools for women; 12 hospitals; 2 nurses' training schools; 11 orphanages; 2 leper asylums; 8 institutions for the blind; 8 rescue homes for girls; 3 industrial training schools; and 10 industrial homes. Japanese Christians contributed for the support of this work during the year in question yen 3,000,492 (\$1,500,246), in addition to the sums sent by the mission boards in Great Britain and North America. Roman Catholic members, 76,134, and Russian Orthodox 36,265, swell Christianity's total membership to 290,082.

The influence of Christianity is far greater than official reports can indicate. In most countries Christianity made its first converts among the lower strata of society; but in Japan it has won its greatest successes among the Samurai, or knightly class, which has furnished the majority of the army and navy officers, journalists, legislators, educators, and leading men generally of the new Japan. While approximately one person in every thousand of the population is a Christian, one in every one hundred of the educated classes is a Christian. The personnel of the churches probably averages higher in intelligence and in social and professional position than in any other non-Christian land. The proportion of Christians is noticeably high among editors and school-teachers. At the time of my second visit to Japan, there were said to be more than a score of Christian journalists in Tokyo and fourteen members of the Imperial Diet were of the same faith. Joseph Hardy Neesima, founder of the Doshisha College in Kyoto; Yoitsu Honda, first Bishop of the Methodist Episcopal Church in Japan; Kenkichi Kataoka, formerly President of the Lower House of the Imperial Diet; Tasuku Harada, President of the Doshisha; Kajinosuke Ibuka, former President and Daikichiro Tagawa, present President of the Meiji Gakuin; Masahisa Uemura, theologian, editor, and preacher; Yukio Ozaki, an eminent statesman and member of the Imperial Diet; Dr. Sato, President of Sapporo University, Bishop Motoda of the Anglican Church—these are names of which the Church

in any land might well be proud. "One would indeed be very courageous," says Tyler Dennett, "as well as something else, to suggest in Japan to Professor Nitobe of the Imperial University, Senator Suroku Ebara of the House of Peers, Dr. Ukita, editor of the *Taiyo*, Takutaro Sakai of the Mitsui Bank, Mr. Kobayashi the tooth-powder man; Mr. Ohara the millionaire silk manufacturer of Kurashiki; Mr. Hatano of the Ayabe Silk Filatures; Madame Yajima and Miss Tsuda, both of whom were decorated by the Emperor, Madame Hirooka daughter of the Mitsui family and one of the richest women in Japan, that they were 'rice Christians.'"¹

When the Rev. Dr. Henry Sloane Coffin of New York attended a Sunday service in Dr. Uemura's church in Tokyo, he found that the officers of the congregation included the Vice Mayor of the city, a professor in the Imperial University, an editor of one of the principal daily newspapers, the head of the Government Bureau of Agriculture, a general in the army, a prominent broker and banker, and a judge of the Court of Appeals.

Japanese churches are not only alert and aggressive in their plans and work at home, but they have organized missionary societies to follow their countrymen who have emigrated to Korea, China and Formosa. The Kumiai (Congregational) churches have undertaken an active work in Korea, sending over a considerable number of ministers and evangelists and developing churches in several cities. Their efforts are encouraged by the government because they are deemed helpful in strengthening Japanese influence in Korea and in promoting the national policy of assimilation. Mr. Setsuzo Sawada, counsellor of the Japanese Embassy at Washington, said February 15, 1927: "Not only the Great War but also the Immigration Act of 1924 have forced many of the serious minded among my countrymen to question the sincerity of the profession of Christianity. But perhaps this may prove to be, eventually, no real loss. There was a time when people em-

¹ Article in *Asia*.

braced this faith mostly for the reason that it was widely exercised in advanced nations; but these gigantic events transpiring in the Christian countries of the world have forced our earnest Christians to distinguish Christianity as a real religion from that of an agent of the material civilization of the West. It may be said that to them the faith has become personal and indigenous. Thus the deeper meaning of Christianity is now being sounded by learned souls among our Christians."

Very earnest many of the Japanese Christians are. An army officer who was sent to open a new post at Kyodo on the Antung-Mukden Railway in Manchuria, where he had 3,000 Japanese labourers under his command for construction work, made a neat little church the first building to be erected, he and his equally devoted Christian wife and a few other Japanese Christians paying for it themselves. One may now find quite a number of Japanese churches in Korea and Manchuria which have been developed without foreign assistance, and whose members evidence the genuineness of their faith by their works.

We shall long remember the first Japanese Christian whom we met after our arrival in Japan—Kawai Suye Kichi, of the household of Mr. and Mrs. Theodore MacNair, in Tokyo. Reared among the mountains of Shinshui, he had earned a living by transporting loads over the pass by which multitudes of pilgrims journeyed to the sacred places beyond. The railroad destroyed his business, but one day it brought to his mountain home the tired missionary family, seeking rest. Ever intent upon their Father's business, they failed not to speak of Him. Kawai Suye Kichi heard and believed. When the missionaries returned to Tokyo, he begged to be allowed to go with them that he might be more fully instructed. In due time he was baptized. A plain man past middle age, he grew mighty in prayer and in the Scriptures, and preached in his former village, which he regularly visited. We learned that the day before we landed this brother at morning prayers

had made special intercession for us, simply but earnestly asking God to be with us during all our visit and to make us a "witness for Jesus Christ" wherever we went. As we were beginning our tour of Asia, and were then without experience in speaking through an interpreter to strangers of a different race and modes of thought, the knowledge of such a prayer and the affectionate welcome of that humble child of God warmed our hearts, and made our speaking to Japanese congregations seem much easier.

A fine type of Christian faith was illustrated shortly after an explosion on a Japanese battleship some years ago. The son of a Vice Admiral was involved in the wreckage. While search was being made for the bodies, many prominent Japanese called upon the mother to offer their condolence. She told them that she felt the need of the consolations of the Christian religion in that time of anxiety, and she called upon her Japanese pastor to read the Scriptures and to offer prayer. He was a young man who had been recently graduated from the theological seminary. It was a difficult position for him; but with tact and fidelity he opened the New Testament, read suitable passages, and then earnestly prayed, while Japanese in high official position, some of whom had never heard such words before, bowed with the anxious mother. Later, the body of the son was found. The stricken parents announced that the public funeral would be followed by a Christian service, and that any of their friends who wished to come would be welcome. A distinguished company assembled. The young Japanese again spoke, impressively dwelling upon the Christian meaning of death and the comfort which God gives to His children in the time of need. Such an evidence of Christian faith, wholly independent of the presence or suggestion of any foreign missionary, is a significant illustration of the hold that Christianity has taken upon the Japanese.

It would be easy to multiply instances of a kind that cannot be tabulated in statistical tables. For example, a few years ago, the pupils of the government schools in a certain city were

not allowed to attend the Sunday-school of the local church. Now they are not only free to attend but six of the teachers are Christians, and four of them teach in that Sunday-school. Three successive principals of the Government Normal School in the same city, and several of the teachers from the Normal and other public schools, although not Christians, have been members of the Bible Class. In another city the report of the principal of a government school showed that four of the five students who stood at the head of the graduating class were Christians. He also reported that fourteen other students gave "no religion" in response to his inquiries, but stated that they were "inquirers." A missionary asked him what they were inquirers of, and he replied: "Christianity."

Among the exhibits at an industrial and commercial exhibition at Osaka in 1925 was a chart, prepared by the principal of one of the government schools, showing the answers of 9,000 pupils in the schools of Osaka to five questions regarding their religious beliefs, as follows:

"I. What is the religion of your family?" Eight thousand answered Buddhist, 400 Shintoist, 330 Christian.

"II. Are you a believer in God or gods or are you an atheist?" Seventy per cent answered that they believed in God, 20 per cent that they were atheists, and 10 per cent said that they did not know.

"III. Do you desire to believe in God?" Eighty per cent answered yes, 10 per cent answered no, and 10 per cent were indifferent.

"IV. What religion do you wish to believe?" Three thousand answered Buddhism, 1,500 answered Christianity.

"V. Have you ever read any religious book or books?" The great majority said they had read no religious book, 1,400 said they had read the Bible, 400 had read books about Christianity, and 400 had read books on Buddhism.

Dr. Hugh T. Kerr says that the Hon. Daikichiro Tagawa of Tokyo told him that this chart represented in general the attitude of the boys and girls of Japan toward Christianity and was exceedingly hopeful. They had come from 8,000 Buddhist

homes, and yet only 3,000 were disposed to believe in Buddhism. This apparently indicates that Buddhism is failing to hold its own children. On the other hand, while there were only 330 Christian homes represented, there were over 1,500 young people who "wished to believe Christianity."

A report issued in June, 1926, by Mr. J. Shimomura, head of the Religious Bureau of the Government Department of Education, revealed a marked growth of Christianity among the student classes. It stated that investigation of the religious beliefs of students in 27 colleges and universities, 23 medical colleges, 49 collegiate institutes, 27 religious colleges, and 51 technical colleges disclosed that in these 177 institutions there were 222 religious organizations—101 Buddhist, 114 Christian, 2 Shintoist, and 5 of other faiths. The total membership of these organizations was 11,975 of whom 6,292 were Buddhists, 4,924 Christian, 180 Shintoist and 579 miscellaneous. The report adds: "If we judge by the number of organizations in the higher institutions of learning throughout Japan, we find that the students indicate their religious inclinations as follows: Buddhist, 45.5 per cent; Christians, 43 per cent; Shintoists, 9 per cent, and others 2.5 per cent."

Prince Tokugawa, head of the Japanese delegation to the Washington Conference on Limitation of Armaments, said: "Today Japan has Christian adherents numbering more than a million. The American Bible Society at Tokyo can never print enough Bibles to meet the ever-increasing demand. There is no doubt that Christianity has already spread its roots wide and deep in Japanese soil. The Japanese newspapers, magazines, and fiction of today bear testimony to this statement."

A professor in the Imperial University at Tokyo has declared that "at least a million Japanese outside the Christian Church have so come to understand Christianity that, though as yet unbaptized, they are framing their lives according to the teachings of Christ"; and Marquis Okuma remarked: "The indirect influence of Christianity has poured into every realm

of Japanese life." These are generalizations that are not verifiable by any exact facts with which I am acquainted, but it is significant that Christianity bulks so large in the estimation of such men.

The same thought is emphasized by Mr. Kanzo Uchimura, a prominent Japanese who avows himself a Christian though not connected with any church, and who declared in a published article:

"There are hundreds of thousands of Christians in Japan who have had nothing to do with missionaries, and who, without belonging to any church and knowing nothing about dogmas and sacraments and ecclesiastical orders, are yet devout believers in God and Christ. There is such a thing as 'Christianity outside the churches,' and it is taking hold of the Japanese people far more strongly than the missionaries imagine. The western idea, that a religion must show itself in an organized form before it can be recognized as a religion at all, is alien to the Japanese mind. With us, religion is more a family affair than national or social, as is shown by the strong hold that Confucianism has had upon us without showing itself in any organized societies and movements. And I am confident that Christianity is now slowly but steadily taking the place of Confucianism as the family religion of the Japanese. Christianity is making progress in this country far ahead of missionaries."

The Bible societies, which have done remarkably efficient work in Japan, report that over 13,000,000 copies of the Bible and Bible portions have been circulated among the Japanese during the last fifty years, and that the demand is still so great that the Bible is the best selling book in Japan today, the actual number disposed of in the last ten years having been 5,301,726. The translations, begun by Dr. Gutzlaff and brought to a successful conclusion in 1885 by Drs. Hepburn, Verbeck, Brown, Bettelheim, and McCartee, have been characterized by competent linguists as "scholarly, idiomatic, readable and rhythmic," and have taken a recognized place in the literary as well as the religious life of Japan.

The Young Men's Christian Association flourishes in the large cities and in the army and navy. The Association won golden opinions from the military authorities during the Russia-Japan War, and has been in high favour ever since. The attendance of soldiers at the eleven Y. M. C. A. branches in Korea and Manchuria aggregated a million and a half in eighteen months. The branch at Dairen, equipped under the guidance of that capable Christian officer, Colonel (now Major-General) Hibiki, held the record for attendance until the World War in 1914, the daily number of visiting soldiers ranging from 2,000 to 6,000.

The secular press does not fail to note the trend. A Christmas Day editorial in *The Japan Advertiser* said:

"Dotted throughout the city are the Christian churches, each one of which is now engaged in celebrating the holy season with religious services, as well as sacred concerts and other entertainments suitable to the occasion. It must be conceded that Christianity is making great progress in a country where its principal festivals are coming to be accepted by the mass of the people, even if that acceptance is only concerned with the purely secular manifestations of the faith. It is a great stride forward compared with what it was only a few years ago, when the people were still antagonistic toward the religion which, together with all its associations, they regarded with contempt."

Striking is the contrast between jeering crowds trampling on crosses lying in the dust a generation ago, and the great Red Cross Government Hospital in Tokyo and the Japanese Red Cross Society enrolling thousands of the most influential men and women of the new Japan under the direct patronage of the Empress. It is true that the name was adopted without reference to the religious significance of the word Cross; but it is significant that the Japanese see no objection today to a symbol which a former generation despised and outlawed.

Mr. Shimomura, Director of the Bureau of Religions of

the Department of Education, recently issued a statement in which he said that an investigation of 177 higher educational institutions showed that there were 222 religious organizations in them—101 Buddhist, 114 Christian, two Shinto and five others. Fifty-one per cent of these organizations were Christian and forty-one per cent of the members although Buddhists were 73 per cent of the total population and Christians only one-third of one per cent. He added: "Generally speaking, there are few sincere inquirers after truth among Buddhists. If you (Buddhists) do not seriously consider this matter, then in fifty or a hundred years Buddhism will lose its place and influence in our nation. . . . Christianity is capturing the leadership. . . . The leaders of industry, politics, journalism and the officials of the future are to be found in the universities and colleges where the survey has been made and you must consider this phase of the question." It is not surprising that Sir Ernest Satow, for many years the British Ambassador at Tokyo, said: "In Japan, Christianity is now recognized as a very great moral motive in the national life."

One should not make too much of these facts. It is indeed highly encouraging that there are now more Christians in Japan than there were in the Roman Empire a century after the Day of Pentecost. But Japan is still far from being a Christian nation. The obstacles yet to be surmounted are numerous and formidable. In Japan, as in Europe and America, not every Christian is a consistent follower of Christ. The impression has gone abroad that the whole Japanese nation, having adopted many western methods, has also undergone a vital religious transformation. That such a transformation has begun is undoubtedly true. Evidences are numerous. But the statement of a committee of missionaries years ago still holds, that, while the country has in many ways adopted the fruits of Christian civilization, it has done so with no large acceptance of Christian truth as its basis, and that approximately eighty per cent of the population is still destitute of a

knowledge of the character of Christianity which would make intelligent acceptance possible. There are thousands of villages and scores of towns of from 5,000 to 50,000 population in which no Christian work is being done. The bulk of the peasant class knows little or nothing of Christianity, except in the vaguest way; and many of the educated classes value its enlightening, social, and humanitarian influence without a real understanding of its vital spiritual power. Buddhism and Shintoism having long been the national religions, it is not surprising that there are thirty times as many Buddhist and Shinto temples as Christian chapels, and two hundred times as many priests as Christian preachers. The old faiths are far from moribund.

Nevertheless, surveying the whole Christian movement in Japan, and making all due allowance for the many difficulties still existing and the great work yet to be done, the broad fact remains that Christianity has made notable headway in a country in which it came as a faith alien to the beliefs and customs of the people, a faith brought by foreigners whose motives were suspected and whose ideas and practices were widely at variance with those of the Japanese. A vigorous church has been developed, with capable leadership and a deepening sense of responsibility for the evangelization of the people. Christian ideas have begun to permeate the literature and the thinking of the nation to a greater extent than is commonly realized. Dr. D. C. Greene of Tokyo declared, shortly before his lamented death, that "hardly ever before in any land has Christianity borne riper or more varied fruit at so early a stage in its history." The tree is comparatively small, but it is no longer an exotic of uncertain life. It has struck its roots firmly into Japanese soil and has showed that it can and that it will flourish there as an indigenous growth.

It is regrettable that many of the Americans and Europeans who visit the Far East do not make more effort to see missionary work. Most of them spend their time in the shops, hotels, and clubs of the ports and capital, the Buddhist and

Shinto temples and shrines, and a few places of scenic or historic interest. The professional guides whom they employ know that they have nothing to gain by advising a traveler to visit a mission; and if he asks about one, they are apt to profess ignorance or to tell him that there is nothing worth seeing there. It is to their financial gain to pilot him to the shops, which pay them a commission on articles that he can be induced to buy. The business and professional residents in the foreign settlements include men and women of high Christian character; but they themselves frankly lament that irreligion in these settlements is more common than in corresponding circles in American and British cities. Between mendacious guides and irreligious foreigners, the hurried traveler is apt to get a misleading impression of Christian work unless he insists on seeing it for himself.

During Colonel Alfred E. Buck's incumbency as American Minister to Japan, a traveler asked his opinion of missionaries, stating that he had heard so many criticisms on the steamer and in the hotels that he was inclined to discontinue his support. Colonel Buck replied that he should not make such reports the basis of judgment; that he himself had once doubted the value of missionary effort; but that fuller knowledge had led him to the conclusion that the influence of missionaries had been worth more to Japan than all other influences combined. Another American Ambassador to Japan, Mr. Luke E. Wright, said: "I have not met a single missionary who could not pass anywhere. Both in the Philippines and in Japan I have met many missionaries, and a finer lot of men I have never seen anywhere."¹ These are the disinterested opinions of men who know the facts; and they are corroborated by the eminent Japanese that have been cited on preceding pages.

¹ Cf. also the tribute of F. A. Mackenzie, correspondent of the *London Daily Mail*, in his books, *The Unveiled East* and *From Tokyo to Tiflis*.

XVIII

CHRISTIANITY AS JAPANESE SEE IT—DO THEY WANT IT?

THE student of religious thought who has visited such lands as India and Korea finds himself in a somewhat different religious atmosphere in Japan. The range of New Testament teaching is wide, and national groups of Christians, like individual believers, instinctively appropriate the truths that are adapted to their respective needs. Temperamental, social and political differences are apt to be reflected in types of religious experience.

It might be supposed that the martial spirit of the Japanese and their strict ideas of organization and discipline would incline them to a rigid type of religious thinking; but their national tendency in this direction is modified by the equally strong Japanese disposition to scrutinize everything of foreign origin and to adopt only so much as they deem adapted to their use. When the Missions of the Presbyterian and Reformed Churches formed The Church of Christ in Japan, they did so on the doctrinal basis of their home churches, and the infant organization adopted the Canons of the Synod of Dort, the Heidelberg Catechism, the Westminster Confession of Faith, and the Shorter Catechism. Dr. K. Ibuka, of Tokyo, vainly protested, urging unsuitability and that two of these symbols had never been translated into the Japanese language and were unknown to Japanese Christians. But the Japanese Church had not then had time to find itself and it was easier to use the historic creeds of the churches which maintained the missions than it was to frame a satisfactory new creed for itself. The Japanese Christian leaders soon became convinced that these elaborate symbols of the West should not be im-

posed upon the youthful church in the East. Dr. Ibuka's motion was revived and carried, and short and simple articles were adopted, together with the Apostles' Creed. The late Dr. M. Uemura, of Toyko, plainly wrote: "In the realm of religious thought, is it not shameful to accept opinions ready-made, relying on the experiences of others instead of one's own? . . . Is it not a great duty that we owe to God and to mankind to develop the religious talent of our people, and to contribute our share to the religious ideas of the world?" We of the West cannot consistently object to this for we have done the same thing ourselves and, we believe, to the enlargement and enrichment of common Christianity. Perhaps the Japanese will make quite as valuable an addition to the world's faith.

Many of the leaders of the Japanese churches have been largely influenced by the inquiring spirit of modern scientific methods, either in European or American universities or in Japanese institutions which have accepted those methods. Some years ago the tendency appeared to be toward Unitarianism. Since then, the current has swung back to evangelical channels. A missionary of the conservative school declares that the Japanese Christian leaders "are doctrinally sound. This does not mean that they all stand for the old-line orthodoxy. To a very considerable extent they express themselves in terms of the 'assured results of Higher Criticism.' In spite of some things here and there that men like myself deplore, however, we find ourselves obliged in fairness to admit that the trend of the past decade has been toward a positive and sound stand on the great fundamentals of the faith." The annual review of "The Christian Movement in Japan," 1926, states that "an estimate of the situation leaves upon one the impression that the philosophy of Christianity has gripped the thought; that the spirit of Christianity has gripped the heart; and that the faith of Japanese Christians is rooted in a true loyalty to the Person of Christ."

In his report on a visit to Japan in 1926, Dr. Robert E.

Speer comments on the wide intellectual range of some of the Japanese Christian ministers.

"In one of the towns of Hokkaido I went into the little study of the pastor. There was time for but a partial examination of his library, but I found among his English books volumes of Gore's, Simpson's, Hutton's, Calkins', Peabody's, Darlow's, Deissmann's, and the Expositor's Greek Testament. Another Hokkaido pastor had Dale, Bushnell, Forsyth, Denney, Campbell, Sabatier. On a train far up in the extremely sparsely settled north I met a young pastor reading Garvie's *The Christian Doctrine of the Godhead* and marking it very carefully. Later I was in his home in a village of 700 houses. These were some of the books in his little library: Peake's *Commentary*, Westcott on *St. John's Gospel*, Sedgwick's *Philosophy of Kant*, Chamberlain's *Immanuel Kant*, Prichard's *Kant's Theory of Knowledge*, Otto's *The Idea of the Holy*, Eucken's *The Problem of Human Life*, Westcott and Hort's *Greek Testament*, Kulpe's *Introduction to Philosophy*, Matheson's *Representative Men of the Bible*, Glover's *The Nature and Purpose of a Christian Society*, Seeley's *Ecco Homo*, Phillips Brooks' *Sermons*, J. M. Sharp's *The Gospel and the Fatherhood of God*, McGiffert's *The Rise of Modern Religious Ideas*, Royce's *The Source of Religious Insight*, Machen's *Christianity and Liberalism*, Stalker's *Life of Christ*, Sohm's *Outline of Christian History*, McGiffert's *Protestant Thought Before Kant*, Moore's *Christian Thought Since Kant*, Workman's *Christian Thought to the Reformation*, Wilson's *Is the Higher Criticism Scholarly*, Keyser's *The Doctrine of Modernism*, and Gore, Moberly, Moffatt, Kennedy, Mozley, Erdman and Hans Andersen, and more that I did not get down. Such a library of a lad on a tiny salary in a frontier village church, snowbound all winter long, tells its own tale. This young Japanese ministry is taught in its seminaries to grapple honestly with its intellectual problems."

The problem of the relation of the foreign mission to the native church, which in most lands is still in its early or middle stages, has become acute in Japan. It is not a purely religious problem; it is a part of the fundamental attitude which affects political and commercial relationships. When foreigners de-

velop any enterprise, the Japanese insist on controlling it. As already noted, converts have not come so generally from the lower classes as in most other countries, but from the middle and higher middle class which has produced the leaders of modern Japan in education, commerce, politics, and the army and navy. This predominance of exceptionally strong men, together with the national spirit of pride and self-reliance, naturally has resulted in the development of a spirit of independence in the Church earlier than in other lands. Dr. Uemura declared that "apart from Christ and the Spirit, Japanese Christianity has no need to rely on any one whatever. Sufficient unto itself, resolved to stand alone, it must advance along the whole line toward the realization of this ideal. . . . To depend upon the pockets of foreigners for money to pay the bills is not a situation which ought to satisfy the moral sense of Japanese Christians."

Independence of missionary control has reached its most complete stage in the Kumiai (Congregational) Churches. Missionaries are not members of local churches, as in America, nor are they eligible to membership in the National Council. The Methodist Episcopal Church is organized into conferences under a Japanese bishop. Two Japanese bishops of the Anglican Communion, representing a union of the Church of England, the Protestant Episcopal Church in the United States, and the Church of England in Canada, were consecrated in 1923. Seven other bishops are foreigners, but Japanese clergy preponderate in the diocesan conventions and the demand for more Japanese bishops is insistent. The Church of Christ, formed in 1877 by the six Presbyterian and Reformed Missions, is composed exclusively of Japanese. It will not organize a congregation as a church unless it is self-sustaining, and if, after organization, a church becomes dependent on foreign money it loses its representation in Presbytery.

The Roman Catholic Church lodges final power in the authorities in Rome who appoint all bishops. But while the government of the Church is centralized in the Vatican, it has

always been the policy to develop a native priesthood and to give as wide discretion to local bishops as may be compatible with obedience to the Supreme Pontiff in Rome. Reference was made in a former chapter to the consecration of a Japanese bishop, October 30, 1927.

The control of the Mission of the Holy Orthodox Church was formerly lodged in the Holy Synod in Russia, but July 13, 1909, forty Japanese clergy and laity passed a resolution to the effect that the maintenance of the Japan Orthodox Church should be placed in the hands of Japanese believers as soon as possible; that since the whole expenses of the Church were met by the Holy Synod, or supplied by the Russian Government, the pastors of the Church were in the position of being salaried officials of the Russian Government, a position unbecoming for Japanese. The Russian Revolution changed the conditions against which this protest was made. The Soviet Government has no interest in Christian missions, and the Holy Synod, persecuted and impoverished, has not been able to maintain its former financial assistance. The necessities of the situation have therefore accelerated the movement toward the autonomy of the Church in Japan.

White men are as independent and high spirited as Japanese, and it is not surprising that the transition from pioneer days, when foreign missionaries were necessarily supreme, to present conditions when there are vigorous Japanese churches, has been marked by some embarrassing episodes. But on the whole the missionaries of all denominations have cordially recognized the legitimate aspirations of the Japanese churches. That authoritative publication, *The Christian Movement in Japan*, mentions among encouraging facts that "the leadership of the Church has passed from the hands of the missionaries to capable Japanese Christian leadership." The typical missionary respects his Japanese brethren and rejoices in their Christian character and activity. He believes that he makes no mistake when he trusts his native associates and ungrudgingly coöperates with them. If they do some things

that he does not approve, it does not follow that they are wrong. At any rate, they are in their own country and are dealing with matters that are more vital to them than to any one else. The missionary is not in Japan for himself, but for the Japanese. His aim is to establish the Church; and the Church when established does not exist for the missions, but the missions exist for the Church which is expected to assume responsibility for the work that is developed.

We look upon the growing power and independence of the churches in Japan with large gratification. They have made mistakes, and they will probably make more. The churches in New Testament times made them, and so have the churches in Europe and America. Asiatic churches may promulgate some doctrines and interpretations of the Bible that we regard as unsound; but are western churches so free from error that they should be patterns for the churches in the mission field? When we think of all the vagaries and heresies that thrive like weeds in the western mind, we may feel that perhaps it is just as well that the churches in the Far East should be free to accept the good and to reject the bad.¹

No one can study the Japanese with an open mind without deepened friendliness of feeling. Their high spirit and growing power increase rather than diminish one's interest. It is to their credit that they are able, self-reliant and ambitious. We do not extenuate their faults any more than we extenuate those of our own countrymen; but we are eager to see the Japanese united with the best people of Europe and America in the effort to promote international justice, morality and good-will. Evil forces, which in the West are opposed by numerous and powerful Christian churches, are surging over a country where the opposing forces of righteousness are still comparatively new and small.

¹For a further discussion of the relation of western theological and ecclesiastical forms to the churches in Asia cf. the author's volumes on *The Foreign Missionary*, *Unity and Missions*, and *Rising Churches in Non-Christian Lands*.

An influential Japanese journal editorially warns its readers of the resultant danger:

"Japan is now joyfully riding on the wave of prosperity, gold is flowing in and many a man has amassed a fortune which he never dreamed of before. It is a question, however, whether this abnormal growth in wealth is an unalloyed blessing. A nation on which wealth has been unexpectedly thrust will degenerate unless it is morally strong enough to bear it. Japan now stands at the crossways of rise and decline. If, on account of the great wealth she has been given, she becomes swell-headed, extravagant, and effeminate, she is doomed. Morally this is really a critical time for her, and it is a time when her statesmen, educationists, and religionists must exert themselves to the utmost to warn the people against the danger looming ahead, restrain them from giving themselves up to a life of careless luxury, and show them the right way to pursue."

The peril of the situation is intensified by the fact that the old religions of Japan are losing their hold, particularly upon the educated classes. Mr. Galen W. Fisher, then Secretary of the Y. M. C. A. in Tokyo, says that a census of 409 students in three schools showed that only 21 acknowledged any faith. The flower of Japan's youth are in the government universities. Several years ago the students in the Imperial University in Tokyo were asked to indicate their religions. The responses were: Buddhists, 50; Christians, 60; atheists, 1,500; agnostics, 3,000. In other words, out of 4,610 young men who replied, many of whom will be among the influential men of the future, 4,500 had discarded the national religious faiths and become atheists or agnostics. No wonder that Baron Makino, then Minister of Education, said: "We are greatly distressed about the moral condition of the students, and the low character of the ordinary lodging-houses where young men live."

Mr. Masujiro Honda said of the conference of representatives of Buddhist, Shinto and Christian religions in 1912: "It was, on the one hand, a frank admission on the part of govern-

ment officials and Elder Statesmen of their powerlessness to cope with the alarming situation that the trend of events presented before their anxious eyes, and on the other hand it was a rebuke administered to the spiritual powers that be for their lack of zeal. . . . The leading intellects and financiers who organized it have been compelled to recognize the urgent and imperative need of a religion as the true basis of a moral and material regeneration of their countrymen."

A society for the study of religions has been found among the professors of the Imperial University in Tokyo. This does not imply that the members are disposed to become Christians, but it does signify that members of that faculty of able and scholarly men are not satisfied with an agnostic or atheistic interpretation of life, and that they regard religion as a force that should have careful and intelligent study. It is significant, too, that in 1916 the University accepted a gift of 200,000 yen from the Christian Baron Morimura, to establish a chair of Christianity.

In my conversations with prominent Japanese during my two visits to Japan, I was accustomed to bring in the query: "What do you regard as the chief need of modern Japan?" After collating the answers I found that the consensus of opinion was that Japan's most urgent need is a new basis of morals; that the nation has broken loose from its old religious moorings and has not yet made new ones.

The lesson should be taken to heart in Occidental as well as Oriental lands. We of the West know that Christ is a cleansing and stabilizing force in national life, and we ought to be profoundly concerned that the Japanese should have Christ to help them. We want to see Christian missions in Japan strengthened, not because we regard the Japanese as inferiors, not because we deserve any credit for the knowledge of God which was brought to us as to them from the outside, but because we count the Japanese as fellow men who need the same Christ that we need. Lord Balfour truly declared in the British Parliament that "the great lesson impressed upon us

by our representatives from whatever race they come and in whatever field they work is that it is perilous to give the benefits of civilization with its accompanying temptations, without making an earnest effort to strengthen moral and spiritual forces. . . . It is the duty of Christian nations to make as the first aim of their policy the good of the races with whom they are brought in contact. The desire for their own advantage is no excuse for departure on their part from this sound principle."

Western peoples have given the Japanese weapons to increase their military efficiency, inventions and discoveries to increase their manufacturing and commercial efficiency, educational and scientific methods to increase their intellectual efficiency, medical and surgical equipment to increase their ability to treat disease. Are they not under equal obligation, to say the least, to give them the Gospel that will increase their spiritual efficiency and enable them to make right use of their other powers?

The Japanese already have a political vision. They covet the leadership of Asia, and they are preparing for it with a skill and energy which elicit the wonder of mankind. They already have a commercial vision, and they are strenuously trying to realize it. They already have an intellectual vision, and they have built up one of the best educational systems in the world. What Japan now needs is a spiritual vision which will purify and glorify these other visions.

This vision of Christ is vital to the future of Japan and of the Far East. Few foreigners have been so deeply in sympathy with the Japanese as the late Lafcadio Hearn; but in his chapter on "The Genius of Japanese Civilization" he wrote:

"The psychologist knows that the so-called adoption of western civilization within a time of thirty years cannot mean the addition to the Japanese brain of any organs or power previously absent from it. He knows that it cannot mean any sudden change in the mental or moral character of the race. Such changes are not made in a genera-

tion. Transmitted civilization works much more slowly, requiring even hundreds of years to produce certain permanent psychological results. . . . It is quite evident that the mental readjustments, effected at a cost which remains to be told, have given good results only along directions in which the race has shown capacities of special kinds. . . . Nothing remarkable has been done, however, in directions foreign to the national genius. . . . To imagine that the emotional character of an Oriental race could be transformed in the short space of thirty years by the contact of Occidental ideas is absurd. . . . All that Japan has been able to do miraculously well has been done without any self-transformation, and those who imagine her emotionally closer to us today than she may have been thirty years ago ignore the facts of science which admit of no argument."¹

The decades that have since been added to "thirty years" may have modified but they have not essentially altered the significance of Hearn's statement. The Japanese mind has long been adapted to war, to politics, and to certain kinds of industrial and scientific efficiency. Knowledge of western inventions and discoveries has enabled the Japanese to do more effectively and on a larger scale what they had been doing after a fashion before. The spiritual realm, as the Bible reveals it, is still a comparatively new world to the average Japanese. Shintoism and Buddhism have not known, and therefore could not make known, a personal God. In his instructive book, *The Future of Japan*, W. Petrie Watson declares that religion, conceived as God and as a final and sufficient explanation of all phenomena, is not a Japanese notion; that the Japanese have been accustomed to regard religion as subordinate in life; and that the temper of their mind is such that it is usually difficult for them to acquire a just view of its authority and indispensableness in individual and national existence. He admires the administrative efficiency which Japan is bringing to her present tasks, but he holds that only as the Japanese grasp Christ's ideals of life and build upon

¹ *Kokoro*, pp. 16-18.

the solid foundation of Christ's teachings will they be able to maintain themselves as a great Power, and that they need to be brought within view of the necessity of a religious interpretation of life, ampler, clearer, and more categorical than that which they have found or can find either in a religion of loyalty, or in Bushido, or in esoteric Buddhism, or in superstitious Shintoism.¹

Thoughtful Japanese see this, and see also that Christianity offers the regenerative principle that Japan needs. Let their own authoritative testimony be cited rather than that of a foreigner:

Marquis Okuma:

"The Japanese have made great progress along material lines. It is only sixty years since we were a feudal nation. We have done in that time what some nations have taken five centuries to accomplish. But our real development has been chiefly along the material side. We still have the moral and spiritual faults of a feudal civilization, even, in some cases, augmented by contact with the faults of the most modern capitals. . . . Our mental and moral development has not kept pace with our material progress. . . . Japan is athirst for moral and religious guidance. . . . The origin of modern civilization is to be found in the teaching of the Sage of Judea by whom alone the necessary moral dynamic is supplied. . . . No practical solution of many pressing problems is in sight apart from Christianity."

Baron Mayejima, former member of the Imperial Cabinet:

"I firmly believe we must have religion as the basis of our national and personal welfare. No matter how large an army and navy we may have, unless we have righteousness as the foundation of our national existence we shall fall short of success. And when I look about me to see what religion we may best rely upon, I am convinced that the religion of Christ is the one most full of strength and promise for the nation."

¹ *The Future of Japan*, cf. Chapters XIV, XXVIII and XXX.

Baron Kanda, Principal of the Higher Commercial School in Toyko:

"Let me pay a humble tribute to that noble band of American missionaries and teachers who have consecrated their lives to the cause of moral and intellectual elevation of our people, . . . the lasting influence of whose labours it is impossible to overestimate. And I am glad to say that this noble band is constantly recruited and is ever swelling, whose influence is deeply stamped upon the rising generation and will be felt indirectly through generations to come."

Baron Shibusawa, Chairman of the Commission of representative business men of Japan who visited America a few years ago:

"Japan in the future must base her morality on religion. It must be a religion that does not rest on an empty or superstitious faith, like that of some of the Buddhist sects in our land, but must be like the one that prevails in your own country (America), which manifests its power over men by filling them with good works."

Prince Ito, in an address at the laying of the corner-stone of the Y. M. C. A. building in Seoul, pressed the following propositions: That no nation can prosper without material improvement; that material prosperity cannot last long without a moral backbone; and that the strongest backbone is that which has a religious sanction behind it. The following year he took part in the dedication of the completed building, when he said: "Civilization depends upon morality, and the highest morality upon religion. Therefore, religion must be tolerated and encouraged."

Major-General Hibiki:

"It is important to send missionaries to other parts of Asia, but it is far more important to send them to Japan. This is the strategic land and now is the strategic time, for Japan is the inevitable leader of the Orient. It will make a vast difference with the whole East,

and indeed with the whole world, whether Japan becomes Christian or remains permanently an un-Christian nation."

Editor of *The Kokumin*, Tokyo:

"The development of Japan to a first class power within the past fifty years is to a great extent attributable to the trouble taken by the missionaries who, either by establishing schools or by preaching the Gospel of Christ in the churches, have cultivated the minds of the Japanese and enhanced the standard of their morals. It is to be hoped that the missionaries will redouble their energies and zeal in promoting the welfare and happiness of the Japanese."

Prof. Ichimura: "Christian education has produced from among its 40,000 graduates many leaders in the world of religion, learning, politics, education, business, etc., and has thus made a great contribution to the development of the culture of our nation."

Prince Tokugawa: "The prevailing popular conception of mankind and humanity, and of liberty, equality and fraternity, may be directly or indirectly traced to Christianity."

Mr. S. Shimada, M. P., of Tokyo: "Japan's progress and development are largely due to the influence of missionaries exerted in the right direction when Japan was first studying the outer world."

Dr. Tagawa, member of the Japanese delegation at the Washington Conference on the Limitation of Armaments, and formerly a member of the Imperial Diet: "If we are to make a free Japan, we are to make a Christian Japan. Only the Christian Church with its program of redemption and righteousness, individual and social, can victoriously combat the unseen forces of greed, fear and hate which so largely cause the depressing disease of which the world suffers."

In the trying days that followed the appalling earthquake of 1923, the Educational Department of the Government called upon the Christian as well as Buddhist leaders to aid in encouraging the suffering people and assigned the Christians

80,000 yen toward the expenses of conducting meetings in tents and barracks and rebuilding Christian institutions. Miss Leila S. Halsey of Tokyo writes that a group of Japanese ministers and laymen presented a plan for permanent work for primary school children to the Educational Committee of the Social Bureau. This plan was to visit with the head of the Bureau, who was a Christian, the 200 primary schools in Tokyo and ask for a suitable time to meet the pupils and tell Bible stories. The plan was approved by the Social Bureau and yen 20,000 of the 80,000 were allotted for this work. Then the promoters, with the head of the Educational Committee of the Social Bureau, invited all the principals of the city primary schools to a meeting where the plan was explained by the government official and two Christian ministers. One hundred and fifty principals attended this meeting. Four or five schools were visited each week and told stories of the heroes of the Christian faith. The children were delighted. Each school was visited at least twice, and some schools by request enjoyed a third meeting, principals, teachers and pupils eagerly awaiting their turn.

Dr. Robert E. Speer says that during his visit in Japan in 1926, a professor of political science said to him: "I am not a Christian but I tell my classes to read the Bible and study Christianity." "Nor am I a Christian," said another Japanese who was present, "but what Japan wants is more Christianity." Dr. Speer adds:

"One could duplicate experiences like this indefinitely in Japan today. One will meet among social and religious leaders the same spirit of anxious discontent with present conditions and thoughtful and courageous search for the path of true progress. Pretty much every one realizes that a great transition is taking place and that tremendous forces are at work remaking the nation, as they are remaking all nations, and all the Japanese whom I have met are thinking of these things and striving to act toward them just as honest and thoughtful people in America are doing. The idea of

Japan as a vain, cock-sure, opinionated nation, with no high principles and no humble thought of human duty and world brotherhood is no more true than a similar idea of America."

If any one in America or Great Britain doubts whether Christian missions are needed or desired by the Japanese, let him ponder these emphatic statements of representative Japanese. They believe that the spiritual duty of the hour is of the most urgent description. Dr. Harada, former President of Doshisha University, Kyoto, wrote:

"The situation in the Orient constitutes one of the most splendid opportunities, and at the same time one of the greatest crises in the whole history of the Church. . . . The Christianization of Japan is no holiday task; indeed, it is certain to be a long and a severe campaign. Japan, with all her progress in the arts and crafts of civilization, and all her friendliness toward Christian ethical standards, is far from being a Christian nation. Gigantic as are the internal forces arrayed against Christianity, the Christian cohorts are daily growing in numbers and efficiency. The disquieting consideration is that the tides of new social and religious life are waiting for no man."

The self-supporting, self-governing Japanese churches are chiefly in the cities. With all their intelligence and activity they are not yet strong enough to handle unaided the tremendous problems of evangelization and Christian education. They will undoubtedly do so in time. We have such faith in the future of Christianity in Japan that, if missionaries were to be withdrawn entirely, we believe that Christianity would survive and ultimately spread throughout the Empire. But the churches of the West should not acquiesce in a policy which might defer the evangelization of Japan for centuries, when they are able to assist in accomplishing it within a shorter period.

Influential Japanese Christians, who are themselves independent of missionaries, strongly urge the missionary boards in America and Great Britain to send many more missionaries

to Japan. When the late Bishop Honda, of the Methodist Episcopal Church, was asked by the Canadian Methodist Mission for his judgment as to the advisability of an extensive evangelistic work by the Mission or the gradual withdrawal of the missionary force, he replied: "From the depth of my heart I request you to go on. . . . The Church is struggling for self-support and has not power to advance; so it is absolutely necessary to have the missionaries work for the unevangelized places." His successor, Bishop Uzaki, Chairman of the National Christian Council writes: "We hear it said nowadays that missionaries are no longer needed in Japan. I think this is due to a lack of knowledge of the situation. In the work of reaching the millions still outside the churches, the missionaries as pioneers still have a big part to play." The Rev. S. Tada of Tokyo: "I hear that some even raise the foolish question as to whether the foreign missionary is still needed in Japan. But there are only a few hundred thousand believers among the 60,000,000 people in Japan proper." Professor Takasugi, of the Northern Imperial University: "Give us more missionaries of genuine character, full of faith and grace, and the future of Japan is sure." Dr. Ebina, President of Doshisha University, Kyoto: "Missionaries of the right quality should be increased."

The leaders of the Church of Christ have repeatedly declared that the present foreign force is too small and that more men and money are urgently needed, particularly for the educational and literary work which the Japanese Christians are not yet able to do on an adequate scale. The Secretary of the Kumiai churches, the Rev. T. Makino, says: "For years we raised our voices for the independence of our churches. Now, independence being an accomplished fact, we are up against another problem. It is the need of that hand-in-hand effort that goes with the expansion of evangelistic effort. . . . The day has passed for us to regard them (missionaries) as strangers. It is now the time for us to work in full fellowship with them in spiritual welfare."

Many Japanese have emphasized the kind of missionaries that are desired. What do they mean by such phrases as "right quality," "genuine character," "full of faith and grace." Do they mean scholarship, intellect, force? Undoubtedly, but in men and women who are willing to serve and not to command, who will enter into sympathy with the people, the type of personality and devotion illustrated in the following letter from Miss Julia L. Leavitt who, after forty-five years of faithful and loving service, wrote as follows:

"I wish I might speak in an impersonal way of the need and opportunities for a very common missionary, not a specialist in any line but one willing to be friendly with small-town people and live Christianity among them. Will you let me use my own experience just as a sample of the way the Japanese people respond to such work, and not as if I were speaking of myself?

"When it became known that the land on which my house stood had been sold and that I would have to move out, some people of the town (not yet Christians) came and begged me to stay. One who owns considerable land said that he would build for me any kind of a small house I would plan, anywhere I liked in the quiet edge of the town. A woman whose grandchildren I had taught offered to do the same if I would only stay. I had already disposed of my things, and it was too late to consider the possibility of starting a new home for the few years I would be able to use it. The Christians had long before urged me to stay among them after retiring from active work. Most of them are poor, with neither houses or lands to offer, but they promised to care for me if I got sick or helpless with age. Their request was that I 'leave my bones' in their land as a reminder to their children's children of the message sent to them from God. I could only make Paul's protest, 'What mean ye to weep and break my heart?' For it was heart-breaking to go and leave them. They came by boatloads to see me off, singing good-bye songs and weeping till even the sailors and other passengers wept in sympathy.

"And what had I done for them which any one might not do who wanted to make Christ known to them? I am grateful beyond measure that the Lord let me come early in life, that He could use my small gifts in His service, allowing me many years instead of great ones."

Japanese who resent any assumption of superiority in a foreigner are ready to take into their hearts a thousand more missionaries of that type.

No more significant event has occurred in modern times than the emergence of Japan from the isolation of centuries into the noonday of world prominence. With remarkable energy and skill the Japanese are adapting themselves to the wider demands of the new era. They have amply demonstrated that they are not an inferior people. They should have, not a grudging tolerance, but a cordial welcome as an equal member of the family of nations. They have done some splendid things already, and they will undoubtedly do more. They have achieved the mastery of the Far East. They are "leading the Orient—but whither?" Their best men are striving, under a solemn sense of responsibility, to have their country lead toward high levels of national character and influence.

A spiritually regenerated Japan would mean much for the Far East and for the whole world. The very solidarity of the nation would powerfully reinforce its impact for righteousness. The energy and courage which so eminently characterize the people, their readiness to adapt themselves to new conditions, their sacrificial willingness to dare and to die for the cause they espouse—these qualities, if pervaded and inspired by the spirit of Christ, would make Japan one of the greatest powers for good that the world has known. Regenerative forces have already begun to operate most promisingly. Many intelligent Japanese are earnestly trying to strengthen them. The character of these Japanese justifies large hopes for the future. To aid them in seeking the best things for Japan and the Far East is the high privilege as well as the imperative duty of good men in other lands.

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